CL_AGN_251013_CC_AgendaPacket_F1
City Council
Monday, October 13, 2025, 7:00 PM
Regular Meeting
City of Rolling Hills
The meeting agenda is available on the City’s website. The City Council meeting will be live-streamed on the City’s
website. View both the agenda and the live-streamed video.
Members of the public may submit written comments by emailing the City Clerk’s office at CityClerk@cityofrh.net. Your
comments will become part of the official meeting record if received before 3pm on the meeting day. You must provide
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AGENDA
1. Call to Order
2. Roll Call
3. Pledge of Allegiance
4. Presentations/Proclamations/Announcements
5. Approve Order of the Agenda
This is the appropriate time for the Mayor or Councilmembers to approve the agenda as is or reorder.
6. Blue Folder Items (Supplemental)
Blue folder (supplemental) items are additional back up materials to administrative reports, changes to the posted agenda
packet, and/or public comments received after the printing and distribution of the agenda packet for receive and file.
7. Public Comment on Non-Agenda Items
This is the appropriate time for members of the public to make comments regarding items not listed on this agenda. Pursuant to
the Brown Act, no action will take place on any items not on the agenda.
8. Consent Calendar
Business items, except those formally noticed for public hearing, or those pulled for discussion are assigned to the Consent
Calendar. The Mayor or any Councilmember may request that any Consent Calendar item(s) be removed, discussed, and
acted upon separately. Items removed from the Consent Calendar will be taken up under the "Excluded Consent Calendar"
section below. Those items remaining on the Consent Calendar will be approved in one motion. The Mayor will call on anyone
wishing to address the City Council on any Consent Calendar item on the agenda, which has not been pulled by
Councilmembers for discussion.
8.A. Approve Affidavit of Posting for the City Council Regular Meeting of October 13,
2025
Page 1 of 266
2
RECOMMENDATION: Approve.
8.B. Approve Motion to Read by Title Only and Waive Further Reading of All Ordinances
and Resolutions Listed on the Agenda
RECOMMENDATION: Approve.
8.C. Approve the following Minutes of September 22, 2025: City Council Regular and
Special Meetings
RECOMMENDATION: Approve as presented.
8.D. Payment of Bills
RECOMMENDATION: Approve as presented.
8.E. Republic Services Recycling Tonnage and Complaint Reports for August 2025
RECOMMENDATION: Receive and file.
9. Excluded Consent Calendar Items
10. Commission Items
11. Public Hearings
12. Discussion Items
12.A. Preliminary Year-End results for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2025
RECOMMENDATION: That City Council hear a report from staff on the preliminary year-
end results for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2025.
13. Matters From the City Council
14. Matters From Staff
14.A. Review and approve the 2025 Holiday Open House Final Guest List
RECOMMENDATION: Approve list as presented or provide direction to staff.
14.B. Receive and file an update on the Tennis Court ADA project's need for the City
Manager to execute a Professional Services Agreement with Bolton Engineering for
a construction support retainer at a not-to-exceed amount of $1,500.
RECOMMENDATION: Receive and file.
14.C. Receive and file a Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Update
RECOMMENDATION: Receive and file.
14.D. Receive and file a verbal report on the Rolling Hills Community Association's
request to host a Salvation Army donation drive in the City Hall parking lot
RECOMMENDATION: Receive and file. Provide direction to staff.
15. Recess to Closed Session
16. Reconvene to Open Session
Page 2 of 266
3
17. Adjournment
Next regular meeting: Monday, October 27, 2025 at 7:00 p.m. in the City Council Chamber, Rolling Hills City Hall, 2 Portuguese
Bend Road, Rolling Hills, California, 90274.
Notice:
Public Comment is welcome on any item prior to City Council action on the item.
Documents pertaining to an agenda item received after the posting of the agenda are available for review in the City Clerk's office or at the meeting at
which the item will be considered.
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), if you need special assistance to participate in this meeting due to your disability, please
contact the City Clerk at (310) 377-1521 at least 48 hours prior to the meeting to enable the City to make reasonable arrangements to ensure
accessibility and accommodation for your review of this agenda and attendance at this meeting.
Page 3 of 266
Item: 8.A.
Meeting Date: 10/13/2025
To: City Council
From: Christian Horvath, Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk
Thru: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Subject: Approve Affidavit of Posting for the City Council Regular Meeting of October 13, 2025
Background:
None.
Discussion:
None.
Fiscal Impact:
None.
Recommendation:
Approve.
Attachments:
1. CL_AGN_251013_CC_AffidavitofPosting
Page 4 of 266
Administrative Report
8.A., File # 2025-166 Meeting Date: 10/13/202 5
To: MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL
From: Christian Horvath, City Clerk
TITLE
APPROVE AFFIDAVIT OF POSTING FOR THE CITY COUNCIL REGULAR MEETING OF OCTOBER 13,
2025
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) SS
CITY OF ROLLING HILLS )
AFFIDAVIT OF POSTING
In compliance with the Brown Act, the following materials have been posted at the locations below.
Legislative Body City Council
Posting Type Regular Meeting Agenda
Posting Location 2 Portuguese Bend Road, Rolling Hills, CA 90274
City Hall Window
City Website: https://www.rolling-hills.org/government/agendas_meetings.php
https://rollinghillsca.portal.civicclerk.com/
Meeting Date & Time OCTOBER 13, 2025 7:00pm Open Session
As City Clerk of the City of Rolling Hills, I declare under penalty of perjury, the document noted above was
posted at the date displayed below.
Christian Horvath, City Clerk
Date: Octo ber 1 0, 2025
Page 5 of 266
Item: 8.C.
Meeting Date: 10/13/2025
To: City Council
From: Christian Horvath, Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk
Thru: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Subject: Approve the following Minutes of September 22, 2025: City Council Regular and
Special Meetings
Background:
None.
Discussion:
None.
Fiscal Impact:
None.
Recommendation:
Approve as presented.
Attachments:
1. CL_MIN_25092_CC_Special_F
2. CL_MIN_250922_CC_F
Page 6 of 266
MINUTES – CITY COUNCIL SPECIAL MEETING
Monday, September 22, 2025
Page 1
Minutes
Rolling Hills City Council
Monday, September 22, 2025
Special Meeting 6:30 p.m.
1. Call To Order
The City Council of the City of Rolling Hills met in person on the above date at 6:30 p.m. Mayor Pieper
presiding.
2. Roll Call
Councilmembers Present: Mirsch, Wilson, Black, Dieringer, Mayor Pieper
Councilmembers Absent:
Staff Present: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Christian Horvath, Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk
Nicolas Papajohn, City Attorney
3. Pledge Of Allegiance – None
4. Blue Folder Items (Supplemental) – None
5. Public Comment on Non-Agenda Items – None
6. Consent Calendar
6.A. Approve Affidavit of Posting for The City Council Special Meeting of September 22, 2025
Motion by Councilmember Mirsch, seconded by Councilmember Wilson to approve the Consent Calendar.
Motion carried unanimously with the following vote:
AYES: Mirsch, Wilson, Black, Dieringer, Mayor Pieper
NOES: None
ABSENT: None
7. Recess to Closed Session – 6:31 p.m.
7.A. Conference With Legal Counsel - Existing Litigation Government Code Section 54956.9(D)(1)
The City Finds, Based on Advice from Legal Counsel, that Discussion in Open Session will
Prejudice the Position of the City in the Litigation. (2 Cases) A. Name of Case: City of Rolling
Hills v. SCE CPUC Docket No. C.24-10-008 B. Name of Case: City of Rolling Hills v.
SoCalGas CPUC Docket No. C.24-10-009
8. Reconvene To Open Session – 6:57 p.m.
9. Adjournment: 6:58 p.m.
The meeting was adjourned at 6:58 p.m. on September 22, 2025. The next regular meeting of the City
Council is scheduled to be held on Monday, September 22, 2025 beginning at 7:00 p.m. in the City Council
Chamber at City Hall, 2 Portuguese Bend Road, Rolling Hills, California. It will also be available via City’s
website link at: https://www.rolling-hills.org/government/agenda/index.php
Page 7 of 266
MINUTES – CITY COUNCIL SPECIAL MEETING
Monday, September 22, 2025
Page 2
All written comments submitted are included in the record and available for public review on the City website.
Respectfully submitted,
____________________________________
Christian Horvath, City Clerk
Approved,
____________________________________
Jeff Pieper, Mayor
Page 8 of 266
MINUTES – CITY COUNCIL MEETING
Monday, September 22, 2025
Page 1
Minutes
Rolling Hills City Council
Monday, September 22 , 202 5
Regular Meeting 7:00 p.m.
1. Call To Order
The City Council of the City of Rolling Hills met in person on the above date at 7:01 p.m. Mayor Pieper
presiding.
2. Roll Call
Councilmembers Present: Mirsch, Wilson, Black, Dieringer, Mayor Pieper
Councilmembers Absent:
Staff Present: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Christian Horvath, Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk
Samantha Crew, Management Analyst
Reina Schaetzl, Willdan Contract Senior Planner
Nicolas Papajohn, City Attorney
3. Pledge Of Allegiance – Councilmember Mirsch
4. Presentations / Proclamations / Announcements – None
5. Approve Order of the Agenda
Motion by Councilmember Black , seconded by Mayor Pro Tem Dieringer to approve the order of the agenda.
Motion carried unanimously with the following vote:
AYES: Mirsch, Wilson, Black, Dieringer, Mayor Pieper
NOES: None
ABSENT: None
6. Blue Folder Items (Supplemental) – None
Motion by Councilmember Black , seconded by Mayor Pro Tem Dieringer to receive and file Blue Folder
Items 12A and 13A. Motion carried unanimously with the following vote:
AYES: Mirsch, Wilson, Black, Dieringer, Mayor Pieper
NOES: None
ABSENT: None
7. Public Comment on Non-Agenda Items – None
8. Consent Calendar
8.A. Approve Affidavit of Posting for the City Council Regular Meeting of September 22, 202 5
8.B. Approve Motion to Read by Title Only and Waive Further Reading of All Ordinances and
Resolutions Listed on the Agenda
Page 9 of 266
MINUTES – CITY COUNCIL MEETING
Monday, September 22, 2025
Page 2
8.C. Approve the following Minutes of August 25, 2025: City Council Regular and Special Meetings;
September 11, 2025: Special Meeting
8.D. Payment of Bills
Motion by Councilmember Mirsch, seconded by Councilmember Wilson to approve the Consent Calendar.
Motion carried unanimously with the following vote:
AYES: Mirsch, Wilson, Black, Dieringer, Mayor Pieper
NOES: None
ABSENT: None
9. Excluded Consent Calendar Items – None
10. Commission Items
10.A. Zoning Case No. 24-149: Site Plan Review for construction of a new garage with workshop,
non-exempt grading and other improvements; Conditional Use Permit for a detached mixed-
use accessory structure (garage with workshop) greater than 200 square feet, and a variance
for site disturbance of more than 40% and finding the project categorically exempt from the
California Environmental Quality Act for location at 3 Outrider Road (Hoyler & Adams) (Lot
29-A-EF)
Presentation by Willdan Contract Senior Planner Schaetzl
Motion by Councilmember Mirsch, seconded by Councilmember Wilson to receive and file. Motion carried
unanimously with the following vote:
AYES: Mirsch, Wilson, Black, Dieringer, Mayor Pieper
NOES: None
ABSENT: None
11. Public Hearings – None
12. Discussion Items
12.A. Receive and file an update on the Emergency Outdoor Siren Notification System project;
Authorize the City Manager to seek easement licensing from the Rolling Hills Community
Association on the two proposed locations at Upper Blackwater and Portuguese Bend Road
(Garden Triangle) and Chesterfield cul-de-sac; and provide direction on a third (or fourth) pole
location
Presentation by Management Analyst Crew
HQE CEO Qais Alkurdi
Public Comment: Darrin Del Conte, Marc Ellers, Bill Dilfer, Danica Iannitti, Martha Bernadette, Faustino
Bernadette, Cheryl Marcz, Kathleen Hughes
Motion by Mayor Pieper, seconded by Councilmember Black directing staff to proceed with seeking
easement licensing from the Rolling Hills Community Association for the Upper Blackwater Canyon and
Portuguese Bend Road Garden Triangle location; explore options for shorter, multiple pole locations in or
around the proposed Chesterfield sound propagation area; proceed with staking for Dig Alert at
Southfield/Ringbit Road West intersection, Southfield/Flying Mane intersection, and in the Flying Triangle on
Page 10 of 266
MINUTES – CITY COUNCIL MEETING
Monday, September 22, 2025
Page 3
Portuguese Bend Road just north of Ranchero Road ; and say no to a camouflage option. Motion carried with
the following vote:
AYES: Mirsch, Black, Dieringer, Mayor Pieper
NOES: Wilson
ABSENT: None
13. Matters From the City Council
13.A. Approval of Traffic Commission appointment to complete the current term beginning January
2, 2024 and expiring January 1, 2028
Presentation by Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk Horvath
Motion by Councilmember Black, seconded by Mayor Pro Tem Dieringer appointing Roger Hawkins to serve
on the Traffic Commission on the condition that he recuse himself from any issues related to Crest Road.
Motion failed with the following vote:
AYES: Black, Dieringer
NOES: Mirsch, Wilson, Mayor Pieper
ABSENT: None
Motion by Councilmember Black, seconded by Councilmember Mirsch appointing Bill Varner to serve on the
Traffic Commission. Motion carried with the following vote:
AYES: Mirsch, Wilson, Black, Mayor Pieper
NOES: Dieringer
ABSENT: None
Councilmember Black left the dais at 9:14 p.m.
14. Matters From Staff
14.A. Receive a verbal update on the Rolling Hills Tennis Courts ADA improvements and potential
access during construction
Presentation by Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk Horvath
City Manager Bañales
Public Comment: Dustin McNabb
Motion by Councilmember Wilson seconded by Councilmember Mirsch to receive and file. Motion carried
unanimously with the following vote:
AYES: Mirsch, Wilson, Dieringer, Mayor Pieper
NOES: None
ABSENT: Black
14.B. Receive an update on the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (CalOES)
Voluntary Buyout Program
Presentation by Management Analyst Crew
Page 11 of 266
MINUTES – CITY COUNCIL MEETING
Monday, September 22, 2025
Page 4
Motion by Mayor Pro Tem Dieringer, seconded by Councilmember Mirsch to receive and file the
determination letter from the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services regarding the City of Rolling
Hills’ potential participation in the Hazard Mitigation Program; and direct staff to formally close out the draft
Notice of Interest submitted in May 2025, thereby concluding the City’s application process for this funding
cycle. Motion carried unanimously with the following vote:
AYES: Mirsch, Wilson, Dieringer, Mayor Pieper
NOES: None
ABSENT: Black
Councilmember Mirsch request a thank you letter be sent to CalOES Assistant Director, Hazard Mitigation
Robyn Fennig
14.C. Receive a verbal update on Planning Department Recruitment(s)
Presentation by City Manager Bañales
Motion by Mayor Pieper, seconded by Councilmember Mirsch to receive and file. Motion carried unanimously
with the following vote:
AYES: Mirsch, Wilson, Dieringer, Mayor Pieper
NOES: None
ABSENT: Black
15. Recess To Closed Session – None
16. Reconvene To Open Session – None
17. Adjournment: 9:58 p.m.
The meeting was adjourned at 9:58 p.m. on September 22, 2025. The next regular meeting of the City
Council is scheduled to be held on Monday, October 13, 2025 beginning at 7:00 p.m. in the City Council
Chamber at City Hall, 2 Portuguese Bend Road, Rolling Hills, California. It will also be available via City’s
website link at: https://www.rolling-hills.org/government/agenda/index.php
All written comments submitted are included in the record and available for public review on the City website.
Respectfully submitted,
____________________________________
Christian Horvath, City Clerk
Approved,
____________________________________
Jeff Pieper, Mayor
Page 12 of 266
Item: 8.D.
Meeting Date: 10/13/2025
To: City Council
From: Christian Horvath, Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk
Thru: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Subject: Payment of Bills
Background:
None.
Discussion:
None.
Fiscal Impact:
None.
Recommendation:
Approve as presented.
Attachments:
1. CL_AGN_251013_CC_PaymentOfBills_E
Page 13 of 266
Page 14 of 266
Page 15 of 266
Item: 8.E.
Meeting Date: 10/13/2025
To: City Council
From: Christian Horvath, Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk
Thru: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Subject: Republic Services Recycling Tonnage and Complaint Reports for August 2025
Background:
On July 1, 2020, the City entered into an Amended and Restated Agreement with Republic Services
for the collection, transportation, recycling, composting, and disposal of solid waste, including
recyclables, green waste, bulky items, and brush. The Agreement is scheduled to expire on June 30,
2029.
As part of this partnership, the city regularly receives and reviews Recycling Tonnage and Complaint
Reports from Republic Services. These reports serve several important municipal, regulatory, and
community functions.
Discussion:
The primary purpose of the Republic Services Recycling Tonnage and Complaint Reports is to
provide the City with oversight and transparency regarding its waste management and recycling
services. These reports enable the City to monitor the volume of waste and recyclable materials
collected and processed, as well as identify any recurring service issues or resident complaints. By
regularly reviewing these reports, the City can ensure that Republic Services is fulfilling its contractual
obligations, promptly addressing service deficiencies, and making informed decisions related to public
education and operational improvements. Additionally, the reports support compliance with recycling
and waste diversion, while supplying essential data for planning and reporting to regulatory agencies.
Below are highlights of the types of reports and notes included:
Recycling Tonnage Report: Documents the total weight of recyclable materials collected, helping the
City measure progress toward recycling and waste diversion goals and comply with mandated
requirements.
Complaint Report: Logs resident complaints related to waste and recycling services—such as missed
pickups or other service issues, to enable tracking of service quality and resolution of recurring
concerns.
Page 16 of 266
Red Tags Report: Records instances where a "red tag" is issued at an address, indicating a violation
or another issue with waste practices.
Missed Pick-Up Report: Details incidents where scheduled waste pickups were missed, including the
address, date, and resolution status.
Commercial Recycling: Commercial recycling materials are hauled to various transfer facilities, with a
portion separated and recovered. Recovery rates from these facilities are reported monthly and
applied to servicing areas.
Greenwaste Reporting: Greenwaste data in the Non-Franchise report may fluctuate monthly due to
factors like changes in customer service types, load contamination, or data entry errors.
Resident Services: Residents may request one free roll-off container for green waste disposal once a
year. Monthly Residential Franchise Reports highlight usage of these bins.
Diversion Requirements: Under the current Agreement between the City and Republic Services,
Republic Services is required to achieve a minimum annual Diversion Rate of 30% for Residential
Solid Waste Collection Services, or such amount as may be set in accordance with other changes in
law which mandate certain actions of programs for municipalities. The City currently achieves
compliance with California’s recycling and waste diversion requirements rate of at least 50% by
diverting green waste (such as yard trimmings and plant matter) from landfills and incorporating it into
its overall waste management program.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Free Residential Roll-Off Bin
As mentioned, the City offers residents the opportunity to request one free roll-off container annually
for green waste disposal. According to the current Residential Franchise Reports, entries labeled
“Greenwaste – Free Residential Roll-Off Bin” and “Trash-Free Residential Roll-Off Bin.” Although the
City does not provide free roll-off bins for regular trash collection, the presence of “Trash-Free
Residential Roll-Off Bin” in the report may indicate one of two possibilities:
• When Republic Services retrieves the bin and returns it to their facility, they may have
identified contamination in the green waste bin, such as non-green waste disposed of
improperly.
• Alternatively, this may be due to data entry or keying errors that require correction.
Republic Services is working on the reporting of this item. It is important to note that the City is not
covering the cost associated with "trash-free" roll-off bins.
Red Tag Report Abbreviations
COMM: This column refers to Commercial service status. While Republic Services uses a standard
red-tag reporting template across all its service jurisdictions, the City of Rolling Hills does not have
commercial waste service. Therefore, entries under “COMM” are marked as “NO” for applicable red
tags within the City.
Fiscal Impact:
None.
Recommendation:
Page 17 of 266
Receive and file.
Attachments:
1. VC_REP_250922_Aug_TonnageReport
2. VC_REP_250922_Aug_C&D_Report
3. VC_REP_250922_Aug_CallLog
4. VC_REP_250922_Aug_RedTagReport
5. VC_REP_251007_AugustComplaintList_Redacted
Page 18 of 266
Year 2025
Diversion RequirementY
Month Commodity Tons Collected Tons Recovered Tons Disposed Diversion %
1 Greenwaste 128.08 128.08 - 100.00%
Greenwaste - Free Residential Roll Off Bin 1.63 1.63 - 100.00%
Trash 189.31 - 189.31 0.00%
Trash - Free Residential Roll Off Bin 10.51 - 10.51 0.00%
1 Total 329.53 129.71 199.82 39.36%
2 Greenwaste 102.30 102.30 - 100.00%
Greenwaste - Free Residential Roll Off Bin 8.54 8.54 - 100.00%
Recycle 4.35 2.02 2.33 46.46%
Trash 181.14 - 181.14 0.00%
Trash - Free Residential Roll Off Bin 16.57 - 16.57 0.00%
2 Total 312.90 112.86 200.04 36.07%
3 Greenwaste 110.94 110.94 - 100.00%
Recycle 14.41 7.66 6.75 53.17%
Trash 199.27 - 199.27 0.00%
3 Total 324.62 118.60 206.02 36.54%
4 Greenwaste 81.53 81.53 - 100.00%
Recycle 0.28 0.13 0.15 48.11%
Trash 201.63 - 201.63 0.00%
Trash - Free Residential Roll Off Bin 19.37 - 19.37 0.00%
4 Total 302.81 81.66 221.15 26.97%
5 Greenwaste 85.39 85.39 - 100.00%
Recycle 11.61 5.69 5.92 49.00%
Trash 214.00 - 214.00 0.00%
5 Total 311.00 91.08 219.92 29.29%
6 Greenwaste 76.33 76.33 - 100.00%
Recycle 0.83 0.43 0.40 51.54%
Trash 236.54 - 236.54 0.00%
Trash - Free Residential Roll Off Bin 10.97 - 10.97 0.00%
6 Total 324.67 76.76 247.91 23.64%
7 Greenwaste 49.50 49.50 - 100.00%
Recycle 9.34 4.63 4.71 49.61%
Trash 279.22 - 279.22 0.00%
Trash - Free Residential Roll Off Bin 2.29 - 2.29 0.00%
7 Total 340.35 54.13 286.22 15.91%
8 Greenwaste 63.74 63.74 - 100.00%
Greenwaste - Free Residential Roll Off Bin 2.85 2.85 - 100.00%
Recycle 2.41 1.29 1.12 53.73%
Trash 217.84 - 217.84 0.00%
Trash - Free Residential Roll Off Bin 17.86 - 17.86 0.00%
8 Total 304.70 67.88 236.82 22.28%
Grand Total 2,550.58 732.69 1,817.89 28.73%
CITY OF ROLLING HILLS RESIDENTIAL FRANCHISE
2025
Page 1 of 2
Page 19 of 266
Year 2025
Diversion RequirementN
Month Commodity Tons Collected Tons Recovered Tons Disposed Diversion %
1 C&D 10.85 8.71 2.14 80.24%
Greenwaste 14.33 14.33 - 100.00%
Recycle 0.20 0.08 0.12 41.79%
Trash 56.68 - 56.68 0.00%
1 Total 82.06 23.12 58.94 28.17%
2 C&D 5.26 4.22 1.04 80.24%
Recycle 0.19 0.09 0.10 46.46%
Trash 21.78 - 21.78 0.00%
2 Total 27.23 4.31 22.92 15.82%
3 C&D 3.67 2.94 0.73 80.24%
Greenwaste 9.52 9.52 - 100.00%
Recycle 0.33 0.17 0.16 52.66%
Trash 58.05 - 58.05 0.00%
3 Total 71.57 12.64 58.93 17.66%
4 C&D 26.23 23.13 3.10 88.20%
Recycle 0.21 0.10 0.11 48.11%
Trash 18.30 - 18.30 0.00%
4 Total 44.74 23.23 21.51 51.93%
5 Recycle 0.22 0.10 0.12 46.21%
Trash 31.39 - 31.39 0.00%
Organics 0.04 0.03 0.01 69.07%
5 Total 31.65 0.13 31.52 0.40%
6 C&D 11.76 11.76 - 100.00%
Recycle 0.16 0.08 0.08 51.54%
Trash 30.42 - 30.42 0.00%
6 Total 42.34 11.84 30.50 27.97%
7 Recycle 0.25 0.12 0.13 48.54%
Trash 65.70 - 65.70 0.00%
Organics 0.01 0.01 0.00 70.96%
7 Total 65.95 0.13 65.82 0.19%
8 Recycle 0.18 0.10 0.09 53.73%
Trash 35.07 - 35.07 0.00%
8 Total 35.26 0.10 35.16 0.28%
Grand Total 400.79 75.49 325.30 18.84%
CITY OF ROLLING HILLS NON-FRANCHISE
2025
Page 2 of 2
Page 20 of 266
Republic Services City of Rolling Hills
C&D Report Reporting Period August-25
Disposal Site Material Loads Taken Tons Collected
*No C&D to report this month
Summary
Row Labels Sum of Tons Collected
(blank)
Grand Total
Page 1 of 1
Page 21 of 266
Republic Services Call Log Report
City:Rolling Hills
Year 2025
Month/Quarter 8
Summary of Calls by Type
Final Call
Final Call Type Sub-Type Total
3.Missed Pick Up Missed Bulk Service 2
Missed Trash - Residential 1
Missed Yard Waste - Residential 2
3.Missed Pick Up Total 5
Grand Total 5
Pg 1 of 2
Page 22 of 266
Republic Services Call Log Report
Final Call Type Sub-Type Case Number
Date/Time
Opened
Date/Time
Closed
Created
By Request Description Resolution Comments Customer Category Account Number Site Account Name Site Address Phone
3.Missed Pick Up Missed Bulk Service 20250811-220816631 8/11/2025
3:21 PM
8/13/2025
10:36 PM
Diana
Norman (blank)(blank)RESI 9020002972 1 RESIDENT 6 MAVERICK LN
ROLLING HILLS CA (000) 000-0000
3.Missed Pick Up Missed Bulk Service 20250813-220948277 8/13/2025
9:26 AM
8/15/2025
10:33 PM
Mayra
Atilano (blank)(blank)RESI 9020002972 1 RESIDENT 6 MAVERICK LN
ROLLING HILLS CA (000) 000-0000
3.Missed Pick Up Missed Trash - Residential 20250820-221387378 8/20/2025
9:50 AM
8/20/2025
9:56 AM
Andrea
Kossio
Corona
(blank)(blank)RESI 9020002983 1 RESIDENT 3 MIDDLERIDGE LN N
ROLLING HILLS CA (000) 000-0000
3.Missed Pick Up Missed Yard Waste - Residential 20250819-221312064 8/19/2025
11:22 AM (blank)Mona
Carpio (blank)(blank)RESI 9020002998 1 RESIDENT 3 MIDDLERIDGE LN S
ROLLING HILLS CA (000) 000-0000
3.Missed Pick Up Missed Yard Waste - Residential 20250820-221387774 8/20/2025
9:53 AM
8/22/2025
10:32 PM
Andrea
Kossio
Corona
(blank)(blank)RESI 9020002983 1 RESIDENT 3 MIDDLERIDGE LN N
ROLLING HILLS CA (000) 000-0000
Pg 2 of 2
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Rolling Hills Red Tags – August 2025
Date Address Issue
8/5/2025 5 Buggywhip Container Placement
8/7/2025 35 Saddleback Road Item on top of lid
8/18/2025 83 Crest Rd Container Placement
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City of Rolling Hills - August 2025 Republic Services Complaint Log
Date of Issue Time Issue/Complaint Resident Name Resident Address Republic
contacted Republic Reponse Date
Reponse
Time of
Reponse Resolved
8/1/2025 3:28PM Missed Trash and Green waste 54 Eastfield Dr Lori Reyna Lori Reyna
8/1/2025 4:03PM Missed Green waste 62 Eastfield Dr Lori Reyna Lori Reyna
8/6/2025 10:28AM Missed Trash Pickup 5 Roundup Rd Lori Reyna Lori Reyna
8/19/2025 Missed Green waste Pickup 36 Portuguese Bend Rd Lori Reyna Lori Reyna
8/19/2025 Missed Green Waste Pickup 15 Wideloop Rd Lori Reyna Lori Reyna
8/19/2025 Missed Green Waste Pickup 9 Reata Lane Lori Reyna Lori Reyna
8/20/2025 Missed Green Waste Pickup 9 Crest Rd. W Lori Reyna Lori Reyna
8/20/2025 Missed Green Waste Pickup 9 Upper Blackwater Canyon Lori Reyna Lori Reyna
8/26/2025 Missed Green Waste and Trash Pickup 38 Crest Rd E.Lori Reyna Lori Reyna
8/27/2025 Missed Trash and Green Waste 7 Southfield Dr.Lori Reyna Lori Reyna
8/29/2025 Missed Green Waste Pickup 15 Wideloop Rd Lori Reyna Lori Reyna
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Item: 12.A.
Meeting Date: 10/13/2025
To: City Council
From: Robert Samario, Finance Operations Lead Consultant
Thru: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Subject: Preliminary Year-End results for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2025
Background:
At the end of each fiscal year, staff present the preliminary year-end revenue and expenditure totals
and their related budgets to the City Council. Although the revenue and expenditure amounts in this
report are unaudited, they are close enough to final to provide the City Council with a good idea of
how the City ended the fiscal year, which includes both the results relative to the amended budget,
but also in terms of whether the City ended the fiscal year with a surplus or deficit.
Discussion:
The largest and most important fund is the General Fund, which is where the traditional and ongoing
services provided to the community are accounted for, including public safety, building/planning,
emergency preparedness, and city administration.
However, the City has a number of other funds that account for other important activities, programs,
and services. Most of these funds account for monies that are restricted to a specific purpose and,
therefore, are required to be accounted for separately. The City also accounts for large capital
projects separately, including projects funded from federal and state grants. Lastly, the City provides
refuse collection and disposal services by contract. This operation is accounted for in an enterprise
fund.
A recap of the fiscal year 2024-25 preliminary year-end results for the General Fund is provided
below. However, a more detailed analysis of both the General Fund, the restricted funds, and the
enterprise fund is included in Attachment A to this report. In addition, detailed revenue and
expenditure reports are presented in Attachments B through F.
General Fund
The adopted fiscal year 2024-25 revenue budget totals $2,596,685. Through June 30, 2025, actual
revenues from all sources totaled $2,609,131, resulting in a small favorable variance of $12,446.
The originally adopted operating budget for fiscal year 2024-25 totaled $2,576,708. The amended
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budget includes appropriation carryovers and budget amendments approved between July 1, 2024,
and June 30, 2025, and totals $3,987,109, of which $1,361,810 is for one-time capital transfers.
Excluding capital transfers, expenditures through June 30, 2025, totaled $2,793,804, resulting in an
unfavorable variance of $168,505. Although there were a number of variances in each department,
both favorable and unfavorable, the biggest variance is in the Planning Department's Building
Inspection Service from Los Angeles County (A/C #878) in the amount of $200,911. County charges
for their plan review and building services increased from $347,115 in fiscal year 2023-24 to
$450,911.10. Normally, an increase in County charges translates into an increase in the fees the
County charges and collects on behalf of the City. However, in this case, City revenues
actually declined by $156,476, from $398,898 to $242,422.
Staff has been in conversations with County staff to, first, determine if these revenue and expenditure
results related to the County's service are accurate and, second, to understand what led to these
highly irregulare results.
Notwithstanding the issue surrounding the services provided by the County's services related to
planning and building, the preliminary results are summarized in the table below.
Overall, operating expenditures exceeded operating revenues by $184,673 at year-end. Including
capital expenditures of $339,975, the total impact on General Fund reserves is $524,648. Note that
reserves have already been set aside for the $339,975 in capital expenditures.
Fiscal Impact:
None.
Recommendation:
That City Council hear a report from staff on the preliminary year-end results for the fiscal year ended
June 30, 2025.
Attachments:
1. Attachment A - CL_AGN_251013_CC_YearEndResults_NarrativeAnalysis
2. Attachment B - CL_AGN_251013_CC_GeneralFund_BudgetSummary
3. Attachment C - CL_AGN_251013_CC_GeneralFund_Revenues
4. Attachment D - CL_AGN_251013_CC_GeneralFund_Expenditures
5. Attachment E - CL_AGN_251013_CC_RestrictedFunds_Revenues_Expenditures
6. Attachment F - CL_AGN_251013_CC_GeneralFund_BudgetAmendments_ReserveBalances
7. Attachment G - CL_AGN_251013_CC_Item12A_Presentation
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Attachment A
CITY OF ROLLING HILLS
Fiscal Year 2024-25
Preliminary Year-End Result
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2025
OVERVIEW
The analysis below provides a comparison of actual revenues and expenditures to the amended
budget through June 30, 2025. Note that the year-end results are still preliminary and thus are
subject to change; however, the amounts reported are sufficient to provide a good sense of the
final results and how the City ended the fiscal year.
The largest and most important fund is the General Fund, which is where the traditional and
ongoing services provided to the community are accounted for, including public safety,
building/planning, emergency preparedness, and city administration.
However, the City has a number of other funds that account for other important activities,
programs, and services. Most of these funds account for monies that are restricted to a specific
purpose and, therefore, are required to be accounted for separately. The City also accounts for
large capital projects separately, including projects funded from federal and state grants. Lastly,
the City provides refuse collection and disposal services by contract. This operation is accounted
for in an enterprise fund.
Each of the City’s funds are discussed below.
GENERAL FUND
General Fund Revenues
A summary of General Fund revenues is provided in the table below, which shows that the
adopted fiscal year 2024-25 revenue budget totals $2,596,685. Through June 30, 2025, actual
revenues from all sources totaled $2,609,131, resulting in a small favorable variance of $12,446.
An analysis of each key revenue is provided below.
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Property Taxes. By far, the largest General Fund revenue is from property taxes, representing
58% of total adopted revenues. At June 30, 2025, property tax revenues totaled $1,481,839. This
is $18,911 below the adopted budget of $1,500,750. In addition, property grew just 3.5% from
fiscal year 2023-24. This growth represents a 4-
year low and, with the exception of the impacts
of COVID-19 in fiscal year 2020 and 2021, the
3.5% is the lowest since fiscal year 2018.
In general, most of the annual growth is
attributable to the re-assessment of properties
that have sold to the market value (i.e., the sales
price). In an older and stable community such as
Rolling Hills, the assessed values established by
Proposition 13 (1978) are well below the market
values and the assessed value can only increase
by a maximum of 2% per year. Thus, when a property is sold, the assessed value increases to
market value and results in a substantial increase in property taxes.
Preliminary
Adopted Year-End Variance
Budget Actuals (Unfavorable)
401 Property Taxes 1,500,750$ 1,481,839$ (18,911)$
405 Sales Taxes 10,000 26,000 16,000
410 Property Transfer Tax 64,890 43,833 (21,057)
415 Other Taxes 1,000 - (1,000)
420 Motor Vehicle In Lieu 280,545 284,773 4,228
440 Building & Other Permits 400,000 349,000 (51,000)
441 C&D Permits 10,000 6,150 (3,850)
450 Variance, Planning & Zoning 25,000 24,608 (392)
455 Animal Control Fees 300 541 241
460 Franchise Fees 13,000 12,000 (1,000)
480 Fines & Traffic Violations 4,000 6,052 2,052
482 Cost Recoivery - Publications 3,000 8,250 5,250
600 RHCA Lease Revenue 69,000 68,991 (9)
650 Public Safety Aug Fund 1,200 1,086 (114)
670 Interest on Investments 140,000 155,689 15,689
671 PARS Earnings 44,000 65,337 21,337
6XX Cal Water Grant - Turf Removal - 48,897 48,897
675 Miscellaneous Revenue 6,000 2,085 (3,915)
699 Transfers In - Refuse Fund 24,000 24,000 -
TOTALS 2,596,685$ 2,609,131$ 12,446$
CITY OF ROLLING HILLS
Revenues Through June 30, 2025
General Fund
Fiscal Total
Year Revenues Growth
2017 1,007,250$
2018 1,089,838 8.2%
2019 1,189,613 9.2%
2020 1,201,368 1.0%
2021 1,222,948 1.8%
2022 1,323,001 8.2%
2023 1,380,891 4.4%
2024 1,432,117 5.0%
2025 1,500,750 5.0%Budget
2025 1,481,839 3.5%Actual
2026 1,501,494 1.3%Budget
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However, as staff has discussed with Council over the last year, the landslide in the Palos Verdes
Peninsula last year, which caused major shutdown in utilities and damages to public and private
properties, has likely impacted home sales. This is likely the cause for the below average growth
this past year.
Looking forward, staff believes the effects of the land movement along the peninsula will
continue for at least the next year. For that reason, the fiscal year 2025 -26 adopted budget
assumed a 3.5% growth based on revenue projections made in April 2025. Fortunately, actual
fiscal year 2024-25 property revenues were slightly above the projections, thus only requiring a
1.3% growth to meet the budgeted estimate.
Real Property Transfer Tax (RPTT). RPTT, also referred as a documentary tax, is assessed when a
property is sold. The tax is $1.10 per thousand dollars in sales value. Revenues collected by
County are shared 50-50 with the city where the
property is located so that cities effectively receive
$0.55 per thousand dollars of sales value. Revenues
are driven, first, by the number of properties sold and,
second, the sales price.
As noted above in the discussion of property taxes, the
decline in RPTT is likely due the result of fewer home
sales. As shown in the accompanying table to the right,
RPTT is fairly volatile, which may be due to variabilities in the price of homes sold in the year.
Lastly, RPPT revenues serves as a leading indicator of the growth in property taxes in the
following year. As such, the City can expect relatively lower property tax growth in fiscal year
2025-26.
Building and Other Permits. Revenues from this category are the General Fund’s second-largest
revenue, with budgeted revenues of $400,000. Actual revenues are $349,000, which are $51,000
below budget. More importantly, revenues from fees collected on behalf of the City are not only
below expectations, the County’s charges for their services are substantially higher than
expected given the revenues collected on the City’s behalf. The table to the left provides an
historical perspective on the relationship
between revenues collected by the
County on the City’s behalf and their
corresponding charges for their services.
From fiscal year 2022 through 2024, the
City realized a net revenue margin of
15%. The City has long recognized the
direct relationship between how much
the County charges for their services and the revenues collected. Thus, the sharp decline in
revenues from fiscal year 2024 of $156,476 coupled with a $103,796 increase in the County’s
charges is a dramatic departure from this well-understood relationship of revenues vs costs.
Fiscal Total
Year Revenues
2022 132,888$
2022 80,719
2023 49,160
2024 63,040
2025 64,890 Budget
2025 43,833 Actual
2026 62,400 Budget
Fiscal Revenue County
Year Collections Charges Net
2022 241,947$ 206,177$ 35,770$
2023 198,166 156,678 41,488
2024 398,898 347,115 51,783
2025 242,422 450,911 (208,489)
County Building Services
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Note that total revenues in fiscal year 2024-25 of $349,000 include revenues collected by the
Wildan Group for expedited plan check and permitting services. During fiscal year 2024-25,
Wildan collected approximately $107,000.
See additional discussion of this issue the Expenditure section of this report below under the
Planning Department.
Interest on Investments. Excluding the funds held in the Section 115 Pension Trust, interest
revenues through June 30, 2025, totaled $155,689 versus the adopted budget of $140,000. This
favorable result reflects the higher interest rates relative to prior years. Note that in fiscal year
2023-24, interest earnings were $166,681 which is reflective of higher available cash for
investing. As the City invests in capital improvements from the use of reserve, the City will see a
decline in cash balances and a commensurate decline in earnings.
Interest earnings from the funds held in the City’s Section 115 pension trust are also higher than
budget, ending the year at $65,337 versus a budget of $44,000. Last year’s earnings were
$42,638.
Cal Water Grant. The City of Rolling Hills received a grant from Cal Water in the amount of
$48,897 to fund landscape and irrigation system improvements at City Hall. This grant and the
related cost were not budgeted as they were not expected when the budget was adopted.
General Fund Expenditures
The originally adopted operating budget for fiscal year 2024-25 totaled $2,576,708. The amended
budget includes appropriation carryovers and budget amendments approved between July 1 ,
2024, and June 30, 2025, and totals $3,987,109, of which $1,361,810 is for one-time capital
transfers.
Excluding capital transfers, expenditures through June 30, 2025, totaled $2,793,804, resulting in
an unfavorable variance of $168,505. A discussion of the key variances at the department level
is provided below.
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• City Administrator/Manager Department (01)
Although there are many favorable variances at an account level, total City Administrator
expenditures exceeded the department budget by $39,102. This is the result of several
accounts as explained below.
PERS Unfunded Liability (712) – Each year the City is required to make payments to CalPERS
to reduce its unfunded pension liability. The City did not budget for this payment because the
intention was that this payment would be funded by a drawdown from its Section 115 Trust
where funds have been set aside to offset the City’s unfunded liability. However, due to
investment losses of 6.1% realized by CalPERS in fiscal year 2021-22 that impacted the
calculated liability at June
30, 2025, the City’s
unfunded liability
increased from $549,100
to $1,018,747. This
results in the City having
its unfunded liability
almost entirely covered by the assets in its Section 115 Trust in fiscal year 2023-24 to a deficit
of $466,205. Because of this, staff decided in the spring to not draw the funds to p reserve as
much as possible in the trust. Note that from fiscal year 2022 -23 through 2024-25, CalPERS
realized an average of 8.9% returns on its investments. While these returns are higher than
their assumed rate of return and will help reduce the unfunded liability to a degree, they will
only offset a small portion of the 6.1% loss in fiscal year 2021-22.
Actuals Variance
Amended Thru Favorable
Department Budget Budget 06/30/25 (Unfav)
City Administrator 869,059$ 894,165$ 933,267$ (39,102)$
Finance 159,500 159,500 126,644 32,856
Planning & Development 890,549 890,549 1,075,318 (184,769)
Public Safety 323,000 323,000 311,007 11,993
Non-Departmental 142,600 142,600 96,943 45,657
City Properties 192,000 215,485 250,625 (35,140)
Total Operations 2,576,708 2,625,299 2,793,804 (168,505)
Capital Transfers - 1,361,810 339,975 1,021,835
GENERAL FUND TOTALS 2,576,708$ 3,987,109$ 3,133,779$ 853,330$
CITY OF ROLLING HILLS
General Fund Expenditures by Department
Budget Vs. Actual
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2025
Adopted
FY 2023-24 FY 2024-25 Increase
Section 115 Balance 502,930$ 552,542$ 49,612$
Unfunded Liability 549,100 1,018,747 469,647
Net Unfunded Liability (46,170)$ (466,205)$ 519,259$
PENSION LIABILITY
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Group Insurance (716) – In fiscal year 2024-25, the City of Rolling Hills spent a total of
$134,192 for the City-paid portion of health insurance for its staff. This is split between the
Administration Department ($97,957) and the Planning Department ($36,235). The portion
related to Administration exceeded the budgeted estimate of $80,378 by $17,579. This is due
to new Administrative Assistant participating in the City’s health insurance program starting
in July 2024, in contrast to her predecessor. This added $1,730.82 per month between July
2024 through December 2024, then $1,853.04 per month starting in January 2025 through
June 2025. This resulted in additional costs for the entire fiscal year of $21,503.16 that were
unexpected and unbudgeted.
Legal Expenses (803 & 804) – Additional legal expenses were incurred in connection with the
land movement last year, including filing claims with the California Public Utilities
Commission. In total, the City incurred over $69,000 in unbudgeted legal costs.
• Finance Department (05)
The Finance Department Budget totals $159,500, consisting of three accounts: Dues and
Subscriptions, Annual Audit, and Consulting Fees. All three accounts ended the year with
combined savings totaling $32,856. The largest amount of savings was in the Consulting Fees
account where the costs for contracted finance staff are charged. Contracted staff have made
a concerted effort to keep costs down, which was possible given the progress made over the
last few years in streamline operations and refining the accounting processes.
• Planning Department (15)
In total, actual expenditures of $1,075,318 exceeded the amended budget of $890,549 by
$184,769. Although there were a number of unfavorable variances at the line -item account
level, they were all offset by savings in other account. The net unfavorable variance was
essentially all due to the Building Inspection – LA County account (878).
LA County’s Public Works Department performs building-related service on behalf of the City
per a long-standing contract. The services include plan checks, inspections, and the issuance
of building permits. For these services, the County charges the City based on specified hourly
rates for County staff performing the work. The County also collects all fees from planning
review services and the issuance of permits on behalf of the City.
Each month, the County sends the City a statement detailing the hours spent by County staff
and their resulting charges for their services. In addition, the statement includes details of
fees collected on the City’s behalf. In months where the fees collected exceed the County’s
charges for their services, the County includes a check for the net difference. In those months
where the fees collected on the City’s behalf are less than the County’s charges, the monthly
statement effectively serves as an invoice for the difference. Historically, the occasions in
which the fees collected were less than the County’s charges were uncommon, typically one
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to three times per year. More importantly, the total fees collected in any given fiscal year
were greater than the total amount charged by County for their services.
However, in fiscal year 2024-25, this was not the case. In only two months during the year
did the fees collected by the County exceed their charges to the City. Furthermore, for the
first time in at least the last five years, total County charges exceeded to City revenues for the
entire fiscal year.
As shown in the table below, this is due to two interesting factors. First, the County’s charges
increased from $347,115 in fiscal year 2023-24 to $450,911 in fiscal year 2024-25. However,
City revenues declined by $156,476 during this same time. The relationship between City
revenues and County fees is highlighted in the table below. Essentially, the more work the
County does on behalf of the City, there will be a corresponding increase in City revenues. In
addition, the fees are set to essentially create a net surplus to the City to cover its own
administrative costs. This relationship inexplicably broke down in fiscal year 2024 -25,
resulting in a net loss to the City of $208,489.
The City is currently in talks with the County to gain insight into what factors led to this highly
unusual outcome. Staff will report any additional information and updates to Council that is
provided by the County.
• Public Safety
In total, public safety expenditures were $311,007 through June 30, 2025, which were
$11,993 below the amended budget. This is entirely due to unspent budget dollars in the
Wildlife Management & Pest Control account. The adopted budget was set at $20,000;
however, only $1,000 was spent during the year.
GENERAL FUND BUDGET SUMMARY
Although revenues ended the year slightly better than budget, these results mask the striking
decline in building revenues as previously discussed and, to a lesser extent, the shortfall in
Property Taxes and Real Property Tax Transfer Tax revenues. The shortfall in property-tax related
revenues, in hindsight, is not surprising; the impacts of the land movements last year clearly
affected sales in residential real estate that drive these tax revenues. However, the 39% decline
in building fees collected by the County on behalf of the City was not only unexpected, but
City County
Revenues Fees Net
FY 2024-25 242,421.66 450,911.10 (208,489.44)
FY 2023-24 398,898.00 347,115.00 51,783.00
FY 2022-23 198,166.00 156,677.91 41,488.09
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necessitates further examination. This is exacerbated by the unexplained increased in charges
from the County by 30%. Staff will continue with its discussions and further work on this issue
and will provide an update to the City Council as soon as it is avai lable.
With this in mind, the year end results are summarized below.
In the aggregate, total expenditures exceeded revenues by $184,673 as shown in the table above.
This amount will ultimately be funded from reserves once the accounting books are closed. In
addition, $339,975 was transferred to cover capital improvement costs accounted for in the CIP
Fund and the Capital Grants Fund. The amended budget for capital transfers totals $1,361,810.
There are several capital projects that have been funded/budgeted from previous years and
which are still in progress. In addition, the General Fund is currently covering a portion of costs
of two utility undergrounding projects (Eastfield and Crest Road) that ultimately will be
reimbursed by FEMA and CalOES.
Status of Reserves
Based on audited numbers, General Fund reserves at June 30, 2024 totaled $4,679,695. However,
through June 30, 2025, a total of $1,086,900 in amendments and carryovers in the General Fund
budget has been approved by Council that draw upon reserves. The vast majority of the
amendments are tied ted to one-time costs. As a result, the available balance is currently
$3,592,794. Of this total, $2,679,259 is set aside for emergencies, such as natural disasters,
pursuant to the City’s adopted reserve policy. This leaves $913,535 available for discretionary
one-time costs. Please refer to Attachment 5 for a summary of approved budget amendments
and calculation of available reserves.
RESTRICTED FUNDS
Transit/Transportation Funds (Propositions A and C, Measures M and R)
The City receives revenues, primarily from the County, that are restricted for specific purposes.
These include the allocation of special sales tax measures approved by Los Angeles County voters
Adopted Amended Variance
Budget Budget Actuals Fav (Unfav)
Operating Revenues 2,596,685$ 2,596,685$ 2,609,131$ 12,446$
Operating Expenditures 2,576,708 2,625,299 2,793,804 (168,505)
Operating Surplus (Deficit)19,977 (28,614) (184,673) (156,059)
Capital Transfers - (1,361,810) (339,975) 1,021,835
Surplus (Deficit) - Total 19,977$ (1,390,424)$ (524,648)$ 865,776$
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over the last several decades that are restricted to transit and tran sportation programs and
projects. The measures include Proposition A, Proposition C, Measure R, and Measure M. Since
the City of Rolling Hills does not own and operate a transit system and, in fact, has no transit
service provided within the City limits, nor does the City own and maintain any public roads, the
funds received pursuant to the four tax measures are either gifted to other agencies or
exchanged for unrestricted monies with other agencies that can utilize the funds in accordance
with their intended uses.
Revenues received within these transit/transportation funds through June 30, 2025, totaled
$138,215, compared to a budget of $158,500. The represents a budget shortfall of $20,285 and
a decline from the prior year of $2,607.
Revenues from all of the transit/transportation measures are generated from sales taxes and are
allocated among jurisdictions in Los Angeles County on a per capita basis. As such, the change
from year to year is tied to consumer spending and relative changes in the population of all
jurisdictions. However, historically, changes from year to year have been primarily driven by
consumer spending.
As shown in the table above, revenues in fiscal year 2023/24 dropped considerably from fiscal
year 2023/24 – from $154,737 to $140,822 (or 9%). It appears the impact of steady increases to
the federal reserve rate from March 2022 through July 2023, from 0.25%-0.50% to 5.25%-5.5%
eventually cooled consumer spending with the greatest impact on fiscal year 2023-24. Eventually,
rates were decreased starting in September 2024 back down to their current rates of 4.0%-4.25%.
Unfortunately, the fiscal year 2024-25 budget was built on the fiscal year 2023-24 budget rather
than final revenues, and revenues remained flat.
Citizens Option for Public Safety (COPS) Fund
The City also maintains a COPs Fund for monies received from the County’s Supplemental Law
Enforcement Services Fund, created in 2009 throu gh an increase statewide to vehicle license
fees. The revenues can only be used for supplemental law enforcement services.
FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024 Budget Actuals
Proposition A 47,324$ 49,047$ 44,654$ 52,750$ 43,792$
Proposition C 39,254 40,683 37,039 43,750 36,325
Measure R 29,436 30,500 27,770 29,000 27,238
Measure M 33,310 34,507 31,359 33,000 30,860
TOTALS 149,324$ 154,737$ 140,822$ 158,500$ 138,215$
FY 2025
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Total revenues through June 30, 2025, are $194,663 versus the budget of $170,000. The
favorable revenue total is the result of a one-time payment for prior year under-allocations from
the State of California.
On the expenditure side, allocated costs for supplemental law enforcement services totaled
$145,536 through June 30, 2025. The costs include two parts: (1) the allocation of 30% of the
monthly invoices received by the Sheriff and other, separately billed, traffic enforcement
services.
Measure W Fund
The City receives an allocation of the countywide special parcel tax pursuant to Measure W (Safe,
Clean Water Act) for parcels located within the Los Angeles County Flood Control District . These
revenues are intended for storm water recycling and water quality improvement projects and
programs. The City receives a single payment each year for the full annual allocation. In January
2025, the City received $104,950, which is very close to the $105,000 budget.
Actual costs will not be known until after the staff and the City’s consultant are able to analyze
the costs to determine the appropriate allocation between the General Fund and the Measure
W Fund.
ENTERPRISE FUND
Refuse Fund
The Refuse Fund is the City’s only enterprise fund. Enterprise funds are typically used to account
for utilities owned and operated by governments, such as water, wastewater, electricity, and
refuse, and other operations that are similar to those provided by the private sector, such as
airports and golf courses.
The Refuse Fund accounts for the contracted waste collection and disposal for all City of Rolling
Hills residents. The fees charged to City residents are processed as a “Direct Assessment” through
the County Assessor’s Office, which means the annual total is added to the property tax bill sent
to property owners by the County and is payable in two installments. Thus, the payments the
City receives from the County for refuse services coincide with the payments we receive for
regular property taxes.
After several years of subsidized rates via the General Fund, rates for refuse services were
calculated to fully recover the contracted cost of services, which totaled $994,110 for the fiscal
year. Revenues, budgeted at $1,005,336, are intended to cover the $981,33 to be paid to the
refuse contractor plus $24,000 paid by the General Fund for administrative support. Through
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June 30, 2025, revenues totaled $994,110, short of expectations by $11,226. It is unclear why
revenues declined from the prior year.
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ATTACHMENT B
Adopted Amended Variance
Budget Budget Actuals Fav (Unfav)
Operating Revenues 2,596,685$ 2,596,685$ 2,609,131$ 12,446$
Operating Expenditures 2,576,708 2,625,299 2,793,804 (168,505)
Operating Surplus (Deficit)19,977 (28,614) (184,673) (156,059)
Capital Transfers - (1,361,810) (339,975) 1,021,835
Surplus (Deficit) - Total 19,977$ (1,390,424)$ (524,648)$ 865,776$
CITY OF ROLLINGS HILLS
General Fund
Fiscal Year 2024/25 Budget Summary
Page 39 of 266
ATTACHMENT C
Preliminary
Adopted Year-End Variance
Budget Actuals (Unfavorable)
401 Property Taxes 1,500,750$ 1,481,839$ (18,911)$
405 Sales Taxes 10,000 26,000 16,000
410 Property Transfer Tax 64,890 43,833 (21,057)
415 Other Taxes 1,000 - (1,000)
420 Motor Vehicle In Lieu 280,545 284,773 4,228
440 Building & Other Permits 400,000 349,000 (51,000)
441 C&D Permits 10,000 6,150 (3,850)
450 Variance, Planning & Zoning 25,000 24,608 (392)
455 Animal Control Fees 300 541 241
460 Franchise Fees 13,000 12,000 (1,000)
480 Fines & Traffic Violations 4,000 6,052 2,052
482 Cost Recoivery - Publications 3,000 8,250 5,250
600 RHCA Lease Revenue 69,000 68,991 (9)
650 Public Safety Aug Fund 1,200 1,086 (114)
670 Interest on Investments 140,000 155,689 15,689
671 PARS Earnings 44,000 65,337 21,337
6XX Cal Water Grant - Turf Removal - 48,897 48,897
675 Miscellaneous Revenue 6,000 2,085 (3,915)
699 Transfers In - Refuse Fund 24,000 24,000 -
TOTALS 2,596,685$ 2,609,131$ 12,446$
CITY OF ROLLING HILLS
Revenues Through June 30, 2025
General Fund
Page 40 of 266
ATTACHMENT D
FY 2024/25 Amendments
Adopted & Amended Preliminary Variance
Budget Carryovers Budget Results (Unfavorable)
01 - CITY ADMINISTRATOR
702 Salaries -Full Time 436,262$ -$ 436,262$ 417,576$ 18,686$
705 Temporary Salaries 7,000 - 7,000 1,448 5,552
710 Retirement CalPERS-Employer 35,159 - 35,159 30,325 4,834
712 CalPERS Unfunded Liability - - - 76,564 (76,564)
715 Workers Compensation Insurance 9,100 - 9,100 9,100 -
716 Group Insurance 80,378 - 80,378 97,957 (17,579)
717 Retiree Medical 37,500 - 37,500 42,213 (4,713)
718 Employer Payroll Taxes 33,821 - 33,821 30,091 3,730
719 Deferred Compensation 2,239 - 2,239 2,388 (149)
720 Auto Allowance 3,600 - 3,600 3,562 38
721 Phone Allowance 2,400 - 2,400 2,375 25
740 Office Supplies 13,000 - 13,000 4,038 8,962
745 Equipment Leasing Costs 11,000 - 11,000 9,841 1,159
750 Dues & Subscriptions 14,000 - 14,000 13,569 431
755 Conference Expense 2,000 - 2,000 2,604 (604)
757 Meetings Expense 2,300 - 2,300 1,381 919
759 Training & Education 5,000 - 5,000 - 5,000
761 Auto Mileage 500 - 500 965 (465)
765 Postage 19,500 - 19,500 12,783 6,717
775 City Council Expense 5,000 2,000 7,000 3,855 3,145
776 Miscellaneous Expenses 3,000 - 3,000 - 3,000
780 Comm./Newsletters & Outreach 2,500 - 2,500 4,372 (1,872)
785 Codification 2,400 - 2,400 - 2,400
790 Advertising 2,400 - 2,400 1,595 805
795 Other Gen Admin Expense 3,300 - 3,300 4,266 (966)
801 City Attorney 75,000 - 75,000 78,638 (3,638)
802 Legal Expense - Other 3,000 - 3,000 - 3,000
803 Legal & Other Outside Legal - - 26,138 (26,138)
804 Legal Expense -CPUC - - - 42,891 (42,891)
820 Website 6,000 - 6,000 2,400 3,600
850 Election Expense City Council 15,000 - 15,000 1,396 13,604
890 Consulting Fees 35,000 - 35,000 3,493 31,507
891 Records Management 1,700 23,106 24,806 5,443 19,363
Total City Administrator 869,059 25,106 894,165 933,267 (39,102)
05 - Finance
750 Dues & Subscriptions 4,500 - 4,500 3,401 1,099
810 Annual Audit 35,000 - 35,000 26,950 8,050
890 Consulting Fees 120,000 - 120,000 96,293 23,707
Total Finance 159,500 - 159,500 126,644 32,856
CITY OF ROLLING HILLS
Fiscal Year 2024-25 Preliminary Year-End Results
GENERAL FUND
Department/Object Account
1 Page: 1
Page 41 of 266
ATTACHMENT D
FY 2024/25 Amendments
Adopted & Amended Preliminary Variance
Budget Carryovers Budget Results (Unfavorable)Department/Object Account
15- PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT
702 Salaries 219,953 - 219,953 138,878 81,075
703 Salaries - Part-Time 26,587 - 26,587 16,727 9,860
705 Temporary Salaries - 124,427 (124,427)
710 Retirement CalPERS-Employer 17,726 - 17,726 10,144 7,582
715 Workers Comp. Insurance 3,900 - 3,900 3,900 -
716 Group Insurance 48,107 - 48,107 36,235 11,872
718 Employer Payroll Taxes 19,310 - 19,310 11,718 7,592
719 Deferred Comp 4,681 - 4,681 585 4,096
720 Auto Allowance 1,200 - 1,200 487 713
721 Phone Allowance 600 - 600 244 356
761 Auto Mileage 300 - 300 - 300
750 Dues & Subscription 11,670 - 11,670 7,850 3,820
755 Conference Expense 2,000 - 2,000 1,248 752
759 Training & Education 1,000 - 1,000 - 1,000
776 Miscellaneous Expenses 2,000 - 2,000 - 2,000
790 Publication/Advertising/Noticing 10,000 - 10,000 8,812 1,188
802 Legal Expenses-Other 10,000 - 10,000 16,472 (6,472)
872 Property Development-Legal Exp 37,000 - 37,000 19,579 17,421
875 Willdan Building 45,000 - 45,000 40,602 4,398
878 Build Inspect. LA County 250,000 - 250,000 450,911 (200,911)
881 Storm Water Management 90,990 - 90,990 115,505 (24,515)
884 Special Project Study & Consult.5,000 - 5,000 7,979 (2,979)
886 Code Enforcement 62,880 - 62,880 58,662 4,218
890 Consulting Fees (Onward)15,000 - 15,000 - 15,000
928 Traffic Engineering 5,645 - 5,645 4,353 1,292
Total Planning & Development 890,549 - 890,549 1,075,318 (184,769)
25 - Public Safety
830 Law Enforcement 293,000 - 293,000 301,633 (8,633)
833 Other Law Enforcement Exp 4,000 - 4,000 2,123 1,877
837 Wild Life Mgmt & Pest Control 20,000 - 20,000 1,000 19,000
838 Animal Control Expense 6,000 - 6,000 6,251 (251)
Total Public Safety 323,000 - 323,000 311,007 11,993
65 - NON-DEPARTMENTAL
895 Insurance & Bond Expense 40,000 - 40,000 52,456 (12,456)
901 South Bay Comm. Organization 17,600 - 17,600 13,101 4,499
915 Community Recognition 8,000 - 8,000 6,968 1,032
917 Emergency Preparedness 77,000 - 77,000 24,418 52,582
Total Non-Departmental 142,600 - 142,600 96,943 45,657
2 Page: 2
Page 42 of 266
ATTACHMENT D
FY 2024/25 Amendments
Adopted & Amended Preliminary Variance
Budget Carryovers Budget Results (Unfavorable)Department/Object Account
75 - CITY PROPERTIES
892 IT Services 63,000 - 63,000 67,777 (4,777)
893 Granicus Services 8,300 - 8,300 8,300 -
894 Computer Hardware Fund 5,000 - 5,000 648 4,352
925 Utilities 60,000 - 60,000 63,639 (3,639)
930 Repairs & Maintenance 19,100 23,485 42,585 42,692 (107)
932 Area Landscaping 21,600 - 21,600 14,474 7,126
932 Landscaping Project - - - 48,897 (48,897)
946 Buildings & Equipment 15,000 - 15,000 4,198 10,802
Total City Properties 192,000 23,485 215,485 250,625 (35,140)
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES 2,576,708 48,591 2,625,299 2,793,804 (168,505)
CAPITAL TRANSFERS
Capital Projects Fund - 821,322 821,322 196,153 625,169
Capital Grants Fund - 540,489 540,489 143,822 396,667
Total Capital Transfers - 1,361,810 1,361,810 339,975 1,021,835
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 2,576,708$ 1,410,401$ 3,987,109$ 3,133,779$ 853,330$
3 Page: 3
Page 43 of 266
ATTACHMENT E
Amended Preliminary Variance
Budget Actuals Fav (Unfav)
10 - COPS FUND
Revenues
570 COPS Allocation 170,000.00$ 194,663.00$ 24,663.00$
Expenditures
840 COPS Program Expenditures 170,000.00 145,536.00 24,464.00
Revenues Over (Under) Expenditures -$ 49,127.00$ 49,127.00$
16 - CAPITAL GRANT FUND
Revenues
588 Crest Road FEMA Grant - 4434-526-112R 1,131,712.00$ 732,879.00$ (398,833.00)$
589 Safety Element Disaster Grants - DR 4344 PL0521 - - -
590 Veg. Mgmnt FEMA Grant - HMGP-4382-175-13R 172,215.00 - (172,215.00)
591 Eastfield U/Grounding FEMA DR-4382-177-7R-CA 1,950,547.80 58,384.36 (1,892,163.44)
699 Transfers In - General Fund - Safety Element - - -
699 Rule 20A Tariffs - Crest Road 381,819.00 - (381,819.00)
699 Transfers In - General Fund - Crest Road 422,831.90 77,476.00 (345,355.90)
699 Transfers In - General Fund -Eastfield 66,345.73 66,345.73 -
699 Rule 20A Tariffs - Eastfield 503,056.00 - (503,056.00)
699 Transfer In Veg. Mgmnt FEMA Grant - HMGP-4382-175-13R 51,311.00 - (51,311.00)
Total Revenues 3,254,474.80 791,263.36 (2,463,211.44)
Expenditures
957 Crest Road East Project - 4434-526-112R 779,479.00 77,476.00 702,003.00
958 Safety Element DR4344-PL0521 219,189.00 - 219,189.00
959 Veg. Mgmt Mitig. Proj. - HMGP-4382-175-13R - - -
960 Eastfield Drive Utility U.G. - 4382-177-7R 2,514,279.00 1,276,828.00 1,237,451.00
Total Expenditures 3,512,947.00 1,354,304.00 2,158,643.00
Revenues Over (Under) Expenditures (258,472.20)$ (563,040.64)$ (304,568.44)$
25 - PROPOSITION A FUND
Revenues
500 Grant Revenues 52,750.00$ 43,792.00$ (8,958.00)$
670 Interest Earned 300.00 300.00 -
Total Revenues 53,050.00 44,092.00 (8,958.00)
Expenditures
620 Prop A Exchange - - -
Revenues Over (Under) Expenditures 53,050.00$ 44,092.00$ (8,958.00)$
Revenues and Expenditures Through June 30, 2025
CITY OF ROLLING HILLS
Restricted Funds and Refuse Fund
1
Page 44 of 266
ATTACHMENT E
Amended Preliminary Variance
Budget Actuals Fav (Unfav)
26 - PROPOSITION C
Revenues
501 Grant Revenue-Prop C 43,750.00$ 36,325.00$ (7,425.00)$
670 Interest Earned 250.00 250.00 -
Total Revenues 44,000.00 36,575.00 (7,425.00)
Expenditures
906 Prop C Gifted - - -
Revenues Over (Under) Expenditures 44,000.00$ 36,575.00$ (7,425.00)$
27- MEASURE R TRANSIT
Revenues
502 Measure R Grant Revenues 29,000.00$ 27,238.00$ (1,762.00)$
670 Interest Earned 250.00 250.00 -
Total Revenues 29,250.00 27,488.00 (1,762.00)
Expenditures
907 Measure R Gifted - - -
Revenues Over (Under) Expenditures 29,250.00$ 27,488.00$ (1,762.00)$
29 - MEASURE M
Revenues
507 Measure M Local Return 33,000.00$ 30,860.00$ (2,140.00)$
670 Interest Earned 250.00 250.00 -
Total Revenues 33,250.00 31,110.00 (2,140.00)
Expenditures
XXX Measure M Gifted - - -
Revenues Over (Under) Expenditures 33,250.00$ 31,110.00$ (2,140.00)$
30 - MEASURE W
Revenues
508 Grant Revenues 105,000.00$ 104,950.33$ (49.67)$
670 Interest Earned 500.00 - (500.00)
Total Revenues 105,500.00 104,950.33 (549.67)
Expenditures
913 Storm Water Management - 30%31,650.00 - 31,650.00
914 Storm Water Management - 70%73,850.00 44,340.00 29,510.00
105,500.00 44,340.00 61,160.00
Revenues Over (Under) Expenditures -$ 60,610.33$ 60,610.33$
2
Page 45 of 266
ATTACHMENT E
Amended Preliminary Variance
Budget Actuals Fav (Unfav)
40 - CAPITAL PROJECTS FUND
Revenues
Transfers from General Fund 821,880.75$ 196,152.00$ (625,728.75)$
821,880.75 196,152.00 (625,728.75)
Expenditures
887 Sewer Feasibility Project 32.50 - 32.50
899 Outdoor Siren System - Design & Constr 161,771.25 117,532.50 44,238.75
890 Consulting Fees 21,000.00 - 21,000.00
934 Equestrian Fence Replacement 6,799.50 - 6,799.50
935 Tennis Court Improvenments 298,708.75 19,572.00 279,136.75
947 Non-Building Improvements - - -
948 City Hall Improvements 7,342.75 19,566.00 (12,223.25)
949 Battery/Solar Back-Up 221,500.00 38,781.00 182,719.00
961 Middleridge Road Emergency Storm Drain Repairs 71,173.00 - 71,173.00
962 Phase 1 Bifurcated 8" Sewer Main Engineering 19,463.00 701.00 18,762.00
963 Generator & Waterproof Removal and Electrical Svcs 6,994.00 - 6,994.00
964 HVAC Replacement Project 7,096.00 - 7,096.00
Total Expenditures 821,880.75 196,152.50 625,728.25
Revenues Over (Under) Expenditures -$ (0.50)$ (1,251,457.00)$
50 - REFUSE FUND
Revenues
665 Service Charges 1,005,336.00$ 994,110.00$ (11,226.00)$
Total Revenues 1,005,336.00 994,110.00 (11,226.00)
Expenditures
815 Refuse Service Contract 981,336.00 981,336.00 -
999 Transfers Out 24,000.00 24,000.00 -
Total Expenditures 1,005,336.00 1,005,336.00 -
Revenues Over (Under) Expenditures -$ (11,226.00)$ (11,226.00)$
3
Page 46 of 266
ATTACHMENT F
Res.Account
No.Date Description Amount Type Number
Budgeted Surplus (Deficit)19,977.00$
Carryovers
Capital Improvement Fund (40)(817,317.20)
GF - Records Management (23,106.00)
(840,423.20)
FY 2024/25 Amendments
1379 10/28/24 ADA Improvements at City Hall (4,000.00) One-Time 01-00-999
1382 10/28/24 Emergency Plumbing Repairs (23,485.00) One-Time 01-75-930
1384 01/27/25 Council Expense (2,000.00) One-Time 01-01-775
1387 04/01/25 Eastfiled - Engineering & Env Svcs (236,969.00) One-Time 16-00-960
Total Amendments (266,454.00)
Total Budgeted Use of Reserves (1,086,900.20)$
Fund Balance - June 30 ,2024 4,679,694.61
Budgeted Use of Reserves (1,086,900.20)
Reserve for Contingencies (2,679,259.00)
Reserves Above Policy 913,535.41$
CITY OF ROLLING HILLS
Summary of Budget Adjustments and Reserves Status
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2025
Page 47 of 266
CITY OF ROLLING HILLS
FISCAL YEAR 2024/25
PRELIMINARY YEAR -END RESULTS
OCTOBER 13, 2025
Page 48 of 266
PURPOSE OF REPORT
▪To present status of revenues and expenditures
through June 30, 2025, in relation to the budget
▪Caveat:
▪These are unaudited and unfinalized numbers
▪For the General Fund, they should be close to final numbers
▪Attachment 1 provides a narrative analysis of all
funds
▪However, focus of today is the General Fund
Page 49 of 266
GENERAL FUND REVENUES
Page 50 of 266
General
Fund
Revenues
Preliminary
Adopted Year-End Variance
Budget Actuals (Unfavorable)
401 Property Taxes 1,500,750$ 1,481,839$ (18,911)$
405 Sales Taxes 10,000 26,000 16,000
410 Property Transfer Tax 64,890 43,833 (21,057)
415 Other Taxes 1,000 - (1,000)
420 Motor Vehicle In Lieu 280,545 284,773 4,228
440 Building & Other Permits 400,000 349,000 (51,000)
441 C&D Permits 10,000 6,150 (3,850)
450 Variance, Planning & Zoning 25,000 24,608 (392)
455 Animal Control Fees 300 541 241
460 Franchise Fees 13,000 12,000 (1,000)
480 Fines & Traffic Violations 4,000 6,052 2,052
482 Cost Recovery - Publications 3,000 8,250 5,250
600 RHCA Lease Revenue 69,000 68,991 (9)
650 Public Safety Aug Fund 1,200 1,086 (114)
670 Interest on Investments 140,000 155,689 15,689
671 PARS Earnings 44,000 65,337 21,337
6XX Cal Water Grant - Turf Removal - 48,897 48,897
675 Miscellaneous Revenue 6,000 2,085 (3,915)
699 Transfers In - Refuse Fund 24,000 24,000 -
TOTALS 2,596,685$ 2,609,131$ 12,446$
Page 51 of 266
PROPERTY TAXES
▪FY 2024-25 growth of 3.5% is
lowest in 4-years
▪Excluding COVID years, lowest
since 2018
▪Follows comparable growth in FY
2023-24 of 3.7%
▪Likely due to the impacts of land
movements in the PVP
Fiscal Total
Year Revenues Growth
2017 1,007,250$
2018 1,089,838 8.2%
2019 1,189,613 9.2%
2020 1,201,368 1.0%
2021 1,222,948 1.8%
2022 1,323,001 8.2%
2023 1,380,891 4.4%
2024 1,432,117 3.7%
2025 1,500,750 5.0%Budget
2025 1,481,839 3.5%Actual
2026 1,501,494 1.3%Budget
Page 52 of 266
REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER TAX
▪FY 2024-25 revenues of
$43,833 is lowest since
2022
▪Consistent with low growth
in property taxes
▪Serves as a leading indicator
for Property Tax growth
▪Fortunately, PT only need to
grow 1.3% in FY 25/26
Fiscal Total
Year Revenues
2022 132,888$
2022 80,719
2023 49,160
2024 63,040
2025 64,890 Budget
2025 43,833 Actual
2026 62,400 Budget
Page 53 of 266
BUILDING REVENUES
▪Revenues of $349,000 vs budget
of $400,000
▪FY 2024/25 budget based on FY
2023/24 projection
▪FY 2024/25 revenues declined by
$156,476
▪Uncharacteristically, costs
increased by $103,796, from
$347,115 to $450,911
Page 54 of 266
GENERAL FUND EXPENDITURES
Page 55 of 266
GENERAL FUND EXPENDITURES BY DEPT
Actuals Variance
Amended Thru Favorable
Department Budget Budget 06/30/25 (Unfav)
City Administrator 869,059$ 894,165$ 933,267$ (39,102)$
Finance 159,500 159,500 126,644 32,856
Planning & Development 890,549 890,549 1,075,318 (184,769)
Public Safety 323,000 323,000 311,007 11,993
Non-Departmental 142,600 142,600 96,943 45,657
City Properties 192,000 215,485 250,625 (35,140)
Total Operations 2,576,708 2,625,299 2,793,804 (168,505)
Capital Transfers - 1,361,810 339,975 1,021,835
GENERAL FUND TOTALS 2,576,708$ 3,987,109$ 3,133,779$ 853,330$
Adopted
Page 56 of 266
CITY MANAGER DEPARTMENT
▪$39,102 over budget
▪Savings in most accounts
▪Two main areas that created the overall unfavorable
variance
▪Legal Costs ($69,029)
▪Payment of the Unfunded Pension Liability ($76,564)
Page 57 of 266
CITY MANAGER DEPARTMENT
▪The $76,564 payment to CalPERS was not budgeted because it was
expected to be covered by a drawdown from PARS (Section 115
Pension Trust Account)
▪However, staff did not request a reimbursement from PARS for two
reasons:
▪Did not expect to need it (did not anticipate building revenue
issues
▪Thought it would be good to preserve the funds for the liability
Page 58 of 266
CITY MANAGER DEPARTMENT
▪FY 2022 Results (that relate to FY 2024-25)
▪Accrued liability increased from $4.2M to $4.4M
▪Realized a ~7% loss in their investments
▪Section 115 Pension Trust (PARS)
▪FY 2024-25 balance increased by $49,612
▪Net unfunded pension liability went from $46,170 to $519,259
Page 59 of 266
CITY MANAGER DEPARTMENT
Page 60 of 266
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
▪Overall $32,856 under budget
▪Audit –savings of $8,050
▪Consulting fees –savings of $23,707 ($120,000 budget vs
$96,293 actuals)
Page 61 of 266
PLANNING DEPARTMENT
▪Overall unfavorable variance of $184,769
▪Two main causes
▪Charges from LA County PW Dept for planning/building
services ($200,911 overage)
▪Storm Water Management ($24,515)
▪Unbudgeted temp salaries for planning services of
$124,427
▪Almost entirely offset by salary and benefit savings
Page 62 of 266
BUDGET SUMMARY
Page 63 of 266
BUDGET SUMMARY
Page 64 of 266
STATUS OF RESERVES
Page 65 of 266
RESERVE BALANCES AT 6/30/25
Total Reserves - June 30 ,2024 4,679,695$
FY 2024-25 Operating Results (184,673)
Budgeted Use of Reserves - Capital (1,086,900)
Total Reserves - June 30, 2025 3,408,121$
Reserve for Contingencies 2,679,259$
Reserves Above Policy 728,862
Total Reserves - June 30, 2025 3,408,121$
Page 66 of 266
Recap
▪Preliminary (but close to final)
▪Revenues in total came is as expected (0.5% variance)
▪Expenditures exceed budget by $168,505 primarily due to
unbudgeted legal costs and sharp increase in charges from
LACDPW
▪Expect some changes when audit is complete -more upside
potential than downside risk
Page 67 of 266
QUESTIONS/DISCUSSION
Page 68 of 266
Item: 14.A.
Meeting Date: 10/13/2025
To: City Council
From: Christian Horvath, Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk
Thru: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Subject: Review and approve the 2025 Holiday Open House Final Guest List
Background:
The 2025 Holiday Open House will be held on Monday, December 8th at City Hall from 4:00pm to
8:00pm. The guest list for the annual holiday open house was trimmed and updated with feedback
from Councilmembers in previous years and is included with this report for review and approval.
Discussion:
None.
Fiscal Impact:
The cost of the event in the past five years range between $6,100 and $6,600. The adopted FY 2025-
26 budget allocated $8,000 for the event.
Recommendation:
Approve list as presented or provide direction to staff.
Attachments:
1. CL_MIS_251013_CC_HolidayOpenHouse_ProposedInviteList
Page 69 of 266
2025 OPEN HOUSE PROPOSED LIST
Name Company Address City
1 Hon. Al Muratsuchi or designee Assemblymember, 66th District 3424 W. Carson St., Suite 450 Torrance, CA 90503
2 Hon. Ben Allen or designee State Senator, 26th District 2512 Artesia Blvd., #320 Redondo Beach, CA 90278-3279
3 Hon. Ted Lieu or designee United States Congress, 33rd District 1645 Corinth Ave, Suite 101 Los Angeles, CA 90025
4 Hon. Janice Hahn, Supervisor or designee Fourth District, County of Los Angeles 500 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012
5 Mr. Jeffrey Kiernan, Regional Public Affairs
Manager or designee League of California Cities 8581 Santa Monica Blvd. Suite 325 West Hollywood, CA 90069
6 Mr. Dave Pilon, President
and Members of the Board of Directors P.V.P. Land Conservancy 916 Silver Spur Road, Suite 207 Rolling Hills Estates, CA 90274
Ms. Adrienne Mohan, Executive Director or
designee P.V.P. Land Conservancy 916 Silver Spur Road, Suite 207 Rolling Hills Estates, CA 90274
7 Zoe Unno, President and Members of the
Board Palos Verdes Library District 701 Silver Spur Road Rolling Hills Estates, CA 90274
Ms. Jennifer Addington, Director or designee Palos Verdes Library District 701 Silver Spur Drive Palos Verdes Peninsula, CA
90274
8 Linda Kurt, President
and Members of the Board PVPUSD Board of Education 375 Via Almar Palos Verdes Estates, CA
90274
Devin Serrano, Ph.D, Superintendent of
Schools or designee
PVPUSD
Malaga Cove Administrative Center 375 Via Almar Palos Verdes Estates, CA
90274
Brenna Terrones, Assistant Superintendent
Administrative Services
PVPUSD
Malaga Cove Administrative Center 375 Via Almar Palos Verdes Estates, CA
90274
Mr. Brett Egan, Principal Rancho del Mar High School 375 Via Almar Palos Verdes Estates, CA 90274
9 Mr. Robert C. Ferrante, General Manager County Sanitation District of L A County 1955 Workman Mill Rd.Whittier, CA 90601
10 Mrs. Jacki Bacharach, Executive Director or
designee
South Bay Cities Council of
Governments 2355 Crenshaw Blvd., #125 Torrance, CA 90501
11 Sheriff Robert Luna L. A. County Sheriff's Headquarters 211 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012
Captain Kimberly Guerrero
or Core Deputy / designee L. A. County Sheriff's Department 26123 Narbonne Avenue Lomita, CA 90717
12 Brenda Olmos, President California Contract Cities Association 17315 Studebaker Road Suite 210 Cerritos, CA 90703
Mr. Marcel Rodarte, Executive Director California Contract Cities Association 17315 Studebaker Road Suite 210 Cerritos, CA 90703
13 Ms. Karin Conklin, President/CEO Palos Verdes Peninsula Chamber of
Commerce
4040 Palos Verdes Drive North, Suite
205 Rolling Hills Estates, CA 90274
14 Mr. Anthony Marrone, Fire Chief Los Angeles County Fire Department 1650 West 162nd Street Gardena, CA 90247-3734
Mr. Brian Kane, Assistant Fire Chief, Division I
Office - F. S. 158 or designee
Division 1, County of Los Angeles Fire
Department 1650 W. 162nd Street Gardena, CA 90247-3734
Battalion Chief John Butorovich or designee Fire Station 56 12 Crest Road West Rolling Hills, CA 90274
Page 70 of 266
2025 OPEN HOUSE PROPOSED LIST
15 Mayor David L. Bradley
and Members of the City Council City of Rancho Palos Verdes 30940 Hawthorne Boulevard Rancho Palos Verdes, CA
90275
Mr. Ara Mihranian, City Manager City of Rancho Palos Verdes 30940 Hawthorne Boulevard Rancho Palos Verdes, CA
90275
16 Mayor Debby Stegura
and Members of the City Council City of Rolling Hills Estates 4045 Palos Verdes Drive North Rolling Hills Estates, CA 90274
Mr. Greg Grammer, City Manager City of Rolling Hills Estates 4045 Palos Verdes Drive North Rolling Hills Estates, CA 90274
17 Mayor Victoria A. Lozzi
and Members of the City Council City of Palos Verdes Estates 340 Palos Verdes Drive West Palos Verdes Estates, CA
90274
Kerry Kallman, City Manager City of Palos Verdes Estates 340 Palos Verdes Drive West Palos Verdes Estates, CA
90274
18 Mr. Mike Dorta, District Engineer L. A. County
Dept. of Public Works Building and Safety Division 24320 S. Narbonne Ave.Lomita, CA 90717
19 Mr. Nicolas Papajohn, City Attorney BB&K LLP 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 110 Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
Mr. Michael Ervin, Assistant City Attorney BB&K LLP 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 110 Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
20 Ms. Vanessa Munoz, PE, TE, PTOE,
President/CEO, Traffic Engineer Willdan Engineering 13191 Crossroads Parkway North # 405 Industry, CA 91746-3497
21 Mr. Aaron Arugay, Executive Director LA County West Vector Control District 6750 Centinela Avenue Culver City, CA 90230
22 Ms. Marcia Mayeda, Director LA County Animal Care & Control
Administrative Headquarters 5898 Cherry Avenue Long Beach, CA 90805
24 Mr. Devin Kincaid, General Manager or
designee Republic Services Inc.14905 South San Pedro Street Gardena, CA 90248
25 Mr. Ralph Felix, District Manager California Water Service Company 2632 West 237th Street Torrance, CA 90505-5272
Mr. Robert Thompson, Operations Manager California Water Service Company 2632 West 237th Street Torrance, CA 90505-5272
Mr. Agustin Baeza Operations Manager California Water Service Company 2632 West 237th Street Torrance, CA 90505-5272
26 RHCA Board members 1 Portuguese Bend Road Rolling Hills, CA 90274
Ms. Kristen Raig RHCA Manager 1 Portuguese Bend Road Rolling Hills, CA 90274
27 Mr. Ben Steinberger or Gabriela Medina
Public Affairs Advisor Southern California Gas Company 2922 - 182nd Street Redondo Beach, CA 90278-3922
28 Ms. Connie Turner, Regional Manager or
designee Southern California Edison 505 Maple Street Torrance, CA 90503
29 Melaina Francis, Regional Risk Manager California Joint Powers Insurance
Authority 8081 Moody St.La Palma, CA 90623
30 Ryder Todd Smith, President or designee Tripepi Smith PO Box 52152 Irvine, CA 92619
Page 71 of 266
Item: 14.B.
Meeting Date: 10/13/2025
To: City Council
From: Christian Horvath, Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk
Thru: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Subject: Receive and file an update on the Tennis Court ADA project's need for the City
Manager to execute a Professional Services Agreement with Bolton Engineering for a
construction support retainer at a not-to-exceed amount of $1,500.
Background:
The Tennis Court ADA Project's Construction Agreement was approved by the City Council on July
28, 2025. Work began in early September and is currently ongoing. During the past month there have
been requests by the contractor for input or approval from the Engineer of Record, Bolton
Engineering, Corp (Bolton). The City currently does not have Bolton under contract for retainer-based
hourly work.
Discussion:
To correct the issue and ensure Bolton can provide input and responses as needed during
construction, staff requested the City Attorney draft an updated Professional Services Agreement
under the City Manager's authority and execute as such.
Fiscal Impact:
The proposed retainer is $1,500 and will be used based on Bolton Engineering's hourly rates if
deemed necessary.
Recommendation:
Receive and file.
Attachments:
1. CA_AGR_250925_BoltonEng_Proposal_CivilSupport_TC-ADA
Page 72 of 266
Bolton Engineering Corporation
Page 1 of 1
25834 Narbonne Ave. Suite 210
Lomita, CA 90717
tel (310) 325-5580 fax (310) 325-5581
September 25, 2025
City of Rolling Hills
Attention: Christian Horvath
Subject: CO#3 Civil Engineering Services for
Tennis Court ADA Access
Dear Mr. Horvath:
Per your request, we have been asked to prepare scope to provide construction support services for the Tennis
Court ADA Access project. Given this, we propose the following Change Order #3 to the previously approved
scope of services for Civil Engineering:
Ia. Scope of Work (Construction Support)
1. Document Review and Revisions: Prepare revisions to plans, as requested from the field, to address
RFIs or value engineering adds. Review contractor submittals.
2. Meetings: Attend field meetings and phone calls, as requested by the contractor.
Proposed Fee: $ Hourly
Retainer: $ 1,500.00
We propose to conduct this work in accordance with our previously executed work authorization, and per the
current hourly rates as follows:
Principal- $305.00 Reg. Civil Engineer - $170.00 Drafting- $105.00
Reg. Chief Engineer - $205.00 Staff Engineer- $140.00 Messenger- $80.00
Unless we are told differently, we assume that we can take direction from the City’s project manager Otto
Riesenber at the Bergeman Group, or another individual you designate, on this scope of work, with your office
copied on correspondence.
Regards,
BOLTON ENGINEERING CORP.
Dan Bolton, RCE63290
President
Accepted By:
Signature Date
Title
Page 73 of 266
Item: 14.C.
Meeting Date: 10/13/2025
To: City Council
From: Samantha Crew, Management Analyst
Thru: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Subject: Receive and file a Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Update
Background:
The City of Rolling Hills continues to place an emphasis on safeguarding residents and strengthening
community resilience. Through ongoing public safety initiatives, staff provide the City Council with
regular updates that reflect both recent progress and new challenges. These efforts include close
coordination with emergency service providers, utility partners, and regional agencies to ensure a
unified approach to protecting the community. This report carries that practice forward by
summarizing current activities and highlighting the measures underway to advance the City’s public
safety priorities.
Discussion:
A monthly public safety update keeps the community informed and engaged by sharing timely
information on emergency preparedness, ongoing initiatives, infrastructure projects, and regional
developments. These regular updates enhance coordination among residents, City staff, and public
safety partners, ensuring everyone remains aware, connected, and ready to respond effectively
during an emergency.
SoCalGas Restoration
SoCalGas has begun repairing and upgrading natural gas infrastructure in areas of the City that were
impacted by the September 2024 utility shut-offs, in preparation for restoring service to homes that
are ready in the coming weeks. The work includes the inspection and replacement of damaged gas
mains, as well as the installation of safety improvements such as automatic shut-off valves, isolation
valves, pipeline pressure monitors, and additional survey markers to help monitor and mitigate
potential impacts from future land movement in the area. Current work is focused in the Quail Ridge
South area, where crews anticipate approximately two more weeks of activity.
All restoration plans depend on minimal land movement and are being conducted with safety as the
top priority. SoCalGas continues to closely monitor the area through electronic pressure monitoring,
land movement markers, and increased leak surveys. Restoration work and safety efforts are being
coordinated with City and RHCA staff, first responders, and third-party experts to ensure the
continued safety and reliability of gas service as conditions evolve.
Page 74 of 266
SCE Re-Energization
Most Rolling Hills homeowners who elected to restore electricity following the service interruptions
have now been reconnected, with the City, Los Angeles County, and Southern California Edison
(SCE) working together to close out the few remaining cases. To reduce the burden on residents, the
City has waived all permitting fees for this work through December 2025.
Looking ahead, SCE is preparing an infrastructure project scheduled to begin in early 2026 as part of
its Tension Relief Strategy (TRS). This initiative is specifically designed for areas affected by ongoing
land movement and will include the installation of taller, more resilient poles, covered conductors, and
specialized tension-relief devices that help absorb ground shifts and protect power lines from
damage. Construction activities may result in short maintenance-related power outages or temporary
traffic impacts along certain roadways. Advance notification will be provided to residents to allow time
for planning, and the City will coordinate closely with SCE and other agencies to minimize disruption.
The utility’s long-term work, and upcoming upgrades, reflects a broader, regional commitment to
ensuring energy reliability and safety for the Rolling Hills community.
Emergency Outdoor Siren System
Staff continue to work with the City’s siren vendor, HQE Systems, to determine an alternative to the
originally proposed 50-foot siren pole at Chesterfield. HQE is evaluating the feasibility of installing two
30-foot poles in the surrounding area and is expected to provide an alternative approach soon.
Recently, Dig Alert assessed several potential sites, and staff are continuing to evaluate whether
these locations are viable for siren pole installation. Staff are also coordinating with the Rolling Hills
Community Association (RHCA) to present the proposed Upper Blackwater and Portuguese Bend
siren sites for easement licensing approval.
Dual Fuel Backup Generator
Over the past two weeks, coordination has continued between the City’s Engineer and Southern
California Gas Company (SCG) to finalize the design for the dual-fuel backup generator project. With
assistance from Public Affairs representatives, communication channels were re-established, and
updated project direction was provided by SCG. The utility has recommended a revised approach, a
direct gas connection from the middle of Palos Verdes Drive North to the generator shed, which SCG
will design and construct, billing the City for the work. The engineer has incorporated this change,
submitted revised plans to Willdan for review, and staff are preparing bid documents, with an
advertisement scheduled for October 13 and bid closing anticipated in early November.
West Basin Firescape Workshop
The Firescaping Workshop held on Thursday, October 2, at Rolling Hills City Hall in partnership with
the West Basin Municipal Water District was a tremendous success, drawing a total of 43 attendees.
Council Member Mirsch opened the evening with welcoming remarks, and the City was honored by
the attendance of West Basin Division 1 Director Tommy Faavae and General Manager EJ Caldwell,
along with Battalion Chief Sampang and Forestry Assistant Carlos Calderon from the Defensible
Space Unit. The first 25 attendees received a complimentary copy of Firescaping: Protecting Your
Home with a Fire-Resistant Landscape by Douglas Kent, a firescaping instructor, author, activist, and
educator who teaches at USC’s School of Architecture and UCLA Extension’s Horticulture and
Landscape Design Program. Sandwiches were served as residents learned about Kent’s balanced,
practical approach to home hardening and fire prevention, emphasizing that “one Saturday a month”
dedicated to maintenance can make a meaningful difference in home protection. His key message
was simple yet powerful: fire safety begins with tidiness, keeping plants lean and green, and
removing debris. The Presentation is attached to this report (Attachment A).
Chevron El Segundo Refinery Fire – October 2, 2025
On Thursday, October 2, 2025, at approximately 9:30 p.m., the El Segundo Fire Department
responded to a fire at the Chevron El Segundo Refinery. The incident occurred at a processing unit
Page 75 of 266
located near the southeast corner of the facility. Suppression activities were directed under unified
command with the El Segundo and Chevron Fire Departments, with mutual aid provided by the Los
Angeles County, Redondo Beach, and Manhattan Beach Fire Departments. The fire was contained
following coordinated response efforts.
Chevron initiated an internal investigation to determine the cause of the incident. Throughout the
night, Chevron’s emergency response personnel managed the situation with a primary focus on
protecting employees, responders, and the surrounding community. All personnel and contractors
were accounted for, and no injuries were reported. As a precaution, Chevron’s Health, Safety, and
Environmental team conducted mobile air monitoring in nearby areas.
Chevron continues to coordinate with local, state, and federal agencies, including Cal/OSHA, CAL
OSPR, and the South Coast Air Quality Management District, which were notified and are monitoring
the incident. The California Energy Commission is also receiving information updates.
The City of El Segundo conducts joint training and safety drills with Chevron to ensure coordinated
emergency response and preparedness.
After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and
Palisades Fires
An independent after-action review of alerts and evacuations has been completed by McChrystal
Group (Attachment B), providing a comprehensive picture of actions taken during the catastrophic
January wildfires along with recommendations to help guide future Los Angeles County responses.
The unprecedented wind-whipped January wildfires claimed 31 lives and destroyed 16,251 properties
in Altadena and Pacific Palisades, along with parts of Los Angeles, Pasadena, Sierra Madre, and
Malibu.
The McChrystal Group’s review identified significant gaps in Los Angeles County’s emergency
alerting, evacuation, and communication systems. The report found that outdated and conflicting
evacuation policies, inadequate staffing, and aging technology hindered the County’s ability to
respond effectively. The Office of Emergency Management was described as “fundamentally
inadequate” for the County’s complex needs, while the Sheriff’s Department staffing shortages,
unreliable cellular connectivity, and incompatible communication platforms further complicated
coordination. Some residents failed to receive alerts due to limited cellular coverage, power shutoffs,
or interference from smoke, and extreme fire conditions, particularly during the Eaton Fire, made it
difficult for responders to communicate real-time information to the public.
To address these challenges, the report recommends comprehensive reforms across five key areas:
(1) updating policies and clarifying authority for issuing evacuation orders, (2) enhancing training and
cross-department coordination, (3) improving resource management and staffing, (4) modernizing
outdated communication systems and ensuring interoperability through LA-RICS (Los Angeles
Regional Interoperable Communications System) and reliable satellite connectivity, and (5)
developing a robust public education campaign to strengthen community understanding of evacuation
zones and alert systems. Overall, the findings underscore the need for a unified, well-resourced, and
technologically advanced approach to emergency management and public safety across Los Angeles
County.
Following the Palisades and Eaton fires, Los Angeles County has taken steps to strengthen
emergency response and communication systems.
Prepared Peninsula Expo
The annual Prepared Peninsula Expo will take place on Sunday, October 26, 2025, from 10:00 a.m.
to 1:00 p.m. at Palos Verdes Peninsula High School, 27118 Silver Spur Road in Rolling Hills Estates,
in partnership with the Palos Verdes Farmers Market (Attachment C). This information-filled event will
feature dozens of exhibitors, emergency preparedness demonstrations, and equipment displays,
offering residents an opportunity to connect with local agencies and learn practical ways to stay
prepared. Free lunch will be provided while supplies last. Returning this year will be the LASD
Mounted Posse, a popular and engaging attraction for attendees of all ages. The City is also pleased
Page 76 of 266
to share that Southern California Edison has awarded a $7,500 grant to support this Peninsula-wide
event, helping to cover costs such as event materials and giveaway items for each participating city.
Fiscal Impact:
None
Recommendation:
Receive and file.
Attachments:
1. Attachment A - CL_AGN_251013_CC_FirescapingSlides10-02-2025
2. Attachment B - CL_AGN_251013_CC_AfterActionReviewEatonandPalisadesFires
3. Attachment C - 2025PreparedPeninsulaExpo
Page 77 of 266
WEST BASIN
Municipal Water District
WestBasinCA.gov Page 78 of 266
WestBasinCA.gov 2
•Provide a safe and reliable supply of
high -quality water to the
communities we serve.
Mission
Page 79 of 266
WestBasinCA.gov 3
Board of Directors
Division I
Tommy Faavae
Director
Division II Division III Division IV Division V
Gloria D. Gray
President
Desi Alvarez
Secretary
Scott Houston
Treasurer
Donald L. Dear
Vice President
Page 80 of 266
WestBasinCA.gov 4
West Basin’s Local Service Area
Division I
Carson, Palos Verdes Estates, Rancho Palos Verdes,
Rolling Hills, Rolling Hills Estates, and the unincorporated
LA County areas of Rancho Dominguez
Division II
Inglewood, portions of the cities of Gardena and
Hawthorne, and the unincorporated LA County areas
of Ladera Heights, View Park-Windsor Hills, West
Athens, and Westmont
Division III
Hermosa Beach, Lomita, Manhattan Beach, Redondo
Beach, a portion of the city of Torrance, and the
unincorporated LA County area of West Carson
Division IV
Culver City, El Segundo, Malibu, West Hollywood, a
portion of the city of Hawthorne, and the unincorporated
LA County areas of Del Aire, Marina del Rey,
Topanga, and Wiseburn
Division V
Lawndale, portions of the cities of Gardena and
Hawthorne, and the unincorporated LA County area of
El Camino Village and Lennox
Page 81 of 266
WestBasinCA.gov 58
30 Years Producing Recycled Water
Page 82 of 266
Community Programs
Page 83 of 266
WestBasinCA.gov 7
Free Landscape Designs Available
Requirements
•Must live in West Basin’s service area
•You must have a minimum of 250 square feet of living green grass to
qualify for the free landscape design and the grass replacement
rebate program
•Must submit photos of grass to landscape designer
To Register
•Visit www.WestBasinCA.gov , under “Water Use Efficiency”
page, Grass Replacement Rebates and Designs
Note: First -come, first -served, based on limited funding
Page 84 of 266
WestBasinCA.gov 8
Rain Barrel Giveaway Event
Page 85 of 266
WestBasinCA.gov 9
Rain Barrel Giveaway Event
DATE LOCATION
October 4, 8AM – 11AM Lawndale High School
October 11, 8AM – 11AM West L.A. College, Culver City
November 1, 8AM – 11AM Morningside High School - Inglewood
November 22, 9AM – 11AM City of Malibu – City Hall
Page 86 of 266
WestBasinCA.gov 10
Outreach & Education
Page 87 of 266
WestBasinCA.gov 11
Water Harvest – October 25
WestBasinCA.gov/water-harvest
Page 88 of 266
West Basin @ WestBasin
Connect with us
WestBasinCA.gov
West Basin Municipal
Water District
@ WestBasin
Gus Meza
GusM@WestBasinCA.gov
213-500-6658
Page 89 of 266
Quality. Service. Value.13
Lawn-to-Garden Rebate
•Lawn removal projects that
transform grassy areas into
water-wise gardens and
landscapes
•$5 per square foot for
residential customers
•3 plants per 100 square feet
of area transformed must
have low water use, climate-
appropriate, and non-invasive
plants
•A minimum of 250 square
feet of lawn must be
removed
•Artificial/Synthetic Turf is not
allowed
Page 90 of 266
Quality. Service. Value.14
Cal Water Conservation Rebates
•High-efficiency clothes washer
–Up to $500 per device
•High-efficiency toilet
–Up to $150 per device
•High-efficiency sprinkler nozzles
–Up to $5 per nozzle
•Smart irrigation controller
–Up to $125 per device
•Lawn-to-garden
•Smart Landscape Tune-Up Program
Increased Rebate Programs
Page 91 of 266
www.westbasin.org 15
Douglas Kent
Firescaping Instructor
Douglas Kent is an author, activist,
educator, and specialist in ecological
land management. He is the Principal of
Douglas Kent + Associates and teaches
at USC's School of Architecture and
UCLA Extension Horticulture/Landscape
Design.
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 92 of 266
www.westbasin.org 16
Outline
Firescaping: Protecting Your Home and Family
1.Structures
2.First 5 Feet
3.Defensible Space
4.Plants
5.Conclusion
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 93 of 266
Structures
Page 94 of 266
www.westbasin.org 18
Structures
Your 1st Priority!
Whether firebrands or direct
flame contact, your structure
must be maintained to withstand
an assault of intense heat and
flying burning embers.
Eaton Fire, 2025
Woolsey Fire, 2018
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 95 of 266
www.westbasin.org 19
Structures: Of Concern
Topics
Fire-Hardened Structures
Ridgetop Living
Outbuildings
Small Lots
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 96 of 266
www.westbasin.org 20
Structures: Characteristics of a Fire-Hardened House
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 97 of 266
www.westbasin.org 21
Structures: Ridgetop Living
Problems
Elongated flames
Intense heat
Firebrands propelled by
convection
Solutions
Screens
Eaves
Trim
Siding
Vulcan Vent: Fire and ember safe
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 98 of 266
www.westbasin.org 22
Structures: Outbuildings
Needs Attention
Basic maintenance
Weatherization
Check screens
Firebrands can ignite these two outbuildings.
The overflowing rain gutters (left) and the big
gaps in the door (top) create opportunities and
fuel for firebrands.WestBasinCA.gov
Page 99 of 266
www.westbasin.org 23
Small Properties
Old Fire, 2003
As illustrated by the state’s deadliest and most
destructive wildfires, small lot neighborhoods
are particularly vulnerable to loss. The reason
is because there is not enough distance
between the homes to buffer the intense heat
and a domino effect is created. Homes burn at
about 1,110 degrees F.
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 100 of 266
www.westbasin.org 24
Structures: Small Lot Design Strategies
See next slides for details
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 101 of 266
www.westbasin.org 25
Structures: Small Lot Design Strategies
The Roof: Installing and maintaining a fire-retarding roof is possibly the most important
aspect to protecting a house on a small lot.
Off-Street Parking: Gridlock is common in high-density neighborhoods, but more so
during wildfires. Off-street parking and pullouts will greatly speed travel times.
Escape Routes: Dense neighborhoods need as many escape routes as possible.
Fences: The pursuit of privacy adds an incredible amount of fuel to any property, but it is
compounded on small lots. Separate structures with a concrete wall.
Plant Selection: Fire retardant and fire-resistant plants only on small lots.
Shared Vegetation: Not every property needs a tree. Oftentimes a homeowner can
simply let their neighbor’s tree grow over and onto their property.
Pools and Spas: Design your pool or spa so that you or fire fighters have easy access to
the water and drain outlets.
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 102 of 266
www.westbasin.org 26
Ensure all openings
are screened.
Clean roof and gutters.
Manage seams and fill gaps.
Structures: To Do
Paint, if not sand,
all peeling paint.
Make your address
visible.
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 103 of 266
www.westbasin.org 27
Your Home
Your Home: Video
Page 104 of 266
First Five Feet
Page 105 of 266
First Five Feet
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 106 of 266
www.westbasin.org 30
Problems
Poorly maintained
Attached to structures
First Five Feet: Shade Structures
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 107 of 266
www.westbasin.org 31
First Five Feet: Shade Structures
Solutions
Detach from structure
Slant to allow heat to escape
Care for the wood
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 108 of 266
www.westbasin.org 32
First Five Feet: Do you see it?
The lumber, containers and tools provide opportunities for ignition
and unnecessarily add risk to an otherwise fire-hardened property.WestBasinCA.gov
Page 109 of 266
www.westbasin.org 33
First 5 Feet
First Five Feet: Video
Page 110 of 266
First Five Feet
Page 111 of 266
Defensible Space
Page 112 of 266
www.westbasin.org 36
Additional Topics
Shade Structures
Fencing
Decks
Defensible Space: First 30 Feet
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 113 of 266
www.westbasin.org 37
Defensible Space: Fencing
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 114 of 266
www.westbasin.org 38
Defensible Space: Fencing
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 115 of 266
www.westbasin.org 39
Defensible Space: Landscape Features
Needs Attention
Basic maintenance
Clean and preserve wood
Remove flammable items
from around landscape
feature
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 116 of 266
www.westbasin.org 40
Remove all flammable items within the first 5 feet!
Remove dead, dying and diseased vegetation.
Maintain landscape features, such as fences and tree houses.
Defensible Space: To Do
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 117 of 266
www.westbasin.org 41
Defensible Space
Defensible Space: Video
Page 118 of 266
Defensible Space
Page 119 of 266
Plants
Page 120 of 266
www.westbasin.org 44
Knowing Traits is
More Important than Lists
Broadleaf plants
Moist and easily bent leaves
Thick leaves
Low amount of litter
Sap that looks more like water
Plants without fragrance
Plants with silver or gray leaves
Plant leaves without hair
Plants: Less Flammable
Deep rooted and fire adapted,
oak can withstand a firestorm
with your help and partnership.
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 121 of 266
www.westbasin.org 45
FIRE
RESISTANT
FIRE
RETARDANT
Plants: Less Flammable
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 122 of 266
www.westbasin.org 46
Fire Retardant Fire Resistant
Artemisia ‘Silver King’
Ceanothus
Cistus – Rockrose
Coast Live Oak
Cotoneaster
Lemonade Berry
Mallow
Native Verbena
Toyon
Yarrow
Yucca
Plants: Less Flammable
Agapanthus
Cercis – Redbud
Crape Myrtle
Fescue
Flax
Gazania
Grape
Liquidambar
Philodendron
Photinia
Succulents
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 123 of 266
www.westbasin.org 47
Fire Resistant
Bird
Food
Lawn Alternatives
Medicine
Native
Chaparral
Desert
Woodland Understory
Succulents
Temperate
Tropical
Plants: Less Flammable - Lists
Citrus is notoriously good at resisting the
effects of fire and intense heat.
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 124 of 266
www.westbasin.org 48
Too Old
Diseased
Injured
Pest Infested
Not Healthy
Maintenance is the Fulcrum of Fire Safety
Plants: The Problem with Lists
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 125 of 266
www.westbasin.org 49
Remove dead, dying and diseased vegetation.
Replace vegetation before it becomes an economic liability
and fire risk.
Do not let your plants dry out.
Plants: To Do
WestBasinCA.gov
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www.westbasin.org 50
Plants
Plants: Video
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 127 of 266
Plants
Page 128 of 266
www.westbasin.org 52
Thank You!Resources for the Palos Verdes Peninsula Area
State Approved Air Vents for Fire
Protection
•Brandguard Vents, San Clemente, CA
https://www.brandguardvents.com/
•Embers Out LLC, Yorba Linda, CA
https://www.embersout.com/
•Vulcan Technologies, San Rafael, CA
http://www.vulcantechnologies.com/
Flame Retardant Paints
All the companies below provide Class A paints, the
most fire retarding and state approved.
•BanFire
•FireTech
•FlameOFF
•INSL-X
•Krylon
•Master Flame
•Zero Flame
Nursery Centers with Experience in Fire
Protection
•Armstrong Nurseries, Torrance
•Elwood Nursery, Rolling Hills Estates
•South Coast Botanic Gardens, Palo Verdes Estates
Qualified Landscape Contractors
California Landscape Contractors Association, “Find a
Contractor”
https://member-
clca.org/max/4DCGI/directory/contractor/index.html
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 129 of 266
www.westbasin.org 53
Douglas Kent MS, MLA
newair@mindspring.com
www.anfractus.com
Contacts
West Basin Municipal Water District
www.WestBasinCA.gov
California Water Service Company
www.calwater.com
City of Rolling Hills
www.rolling-hills.org County of Los Angeles – Fire Dept.
www.fire.lacounty.gov
https://fire.lacounty.gov/fire-hazard-
reduction-programs/
Wen Wang – Forestry Assistant
Forestry Division – Defensible Space Unit
Wen.wang@fire.lacounty.gov
Grant Dinson – Forestry Assistant
Forestry Division – Fuel Modification Unit
Grant.Dinson@fire.lacounty.gov
Alert Southbay
https://alertsouthbay.com
PVP Ready
https://www.pvpready.gov
WestBasinCA.gov
Page 130 of 266
www.westbasin.org 54Page 131 of 266
After-Action Review of Alert
Notification Systems and
Evacuation Policies for the Eaton
and Palisades Fires
McChrystal Group
333 N. Fairfax Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
mcchrystalgroup.com
Page 132 of 266
OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 1
Table of Contents
Executive Summary....................................................................................................................4
How to Use This Document ........................................................................................................................... 6
Introduction ...............................................................................................................................8
Purpose of the After-Action Review .....................................................................................8
Scope of the Review ...............................................................................................................8
Data Collection .............................................................................................................................................. 9
Stakeholder Interviews ................................................................................................................................... 9
Incident Timeline ........................................................................................................................................... 9
Community Listening Sessions..................................................................................................................... 10
Final Report Compilation ............................................................................................................................. 11
Incident Overview..................................................................................................................... 12
A Perfect Storm ................................................................................................................... 12
Wind Conditions and Other Weather Factors ................................................................................................ 12
Ignition ........................................................................................................................................................ 13
Escalation Due to Wind Conditions .............................................................................................................. 14
Seven Fires Strained Resources .................................................................................................................... 19
Terrain, Fuel Load, and Fire Behavior ............................................................................... 21
Transition to a Wildfire-Initiated Community Conflagration ......................................................................... 23
Evacuation ................................................................................................................................................... 24
Impact Summary ................................................................................................................. 27
County Pre-Incident Preparedness........................................................................................... 30
Pre-Incident Preparedness .................................................................................................. 31
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Pre-Incident Preparedness ........................................................... 31
Los Angeles County Fire Department’s Pre-Incident Preparedness................................................................ 32
Office of Emergency Management Pre-Incident Preparedness ....................................................................... 33
County Supervisorial District 3 and Supervisorial District 5 Pre-Incident Preparedness ................................. 34
Supervisorial District 3 Office ...................................................................................................................... 34
Supervisorial District 5 Office ...................................................................................................................... 36
Joint Pre-Incident Preparedness .................................................................................................................... 36
Importance of Relationships and Training ......................................................................... 38
Pre-Incident Preparedness Messaging and Evacuation Messaging ......................................... 39
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Public Pre-Incident Preparedness and Awareness ............................................................. 39
Official Preparedness Messaging .................................................................................................................. 41
Local Media Coverage Impacting Public Pre-Incident Awareness ................................................................. 42
Enhancing County Preparedness Messaging ................................................................................................. 43
Emergency Alert Messaging Tools ...................................................................................... 44
Universal (No Opt-In or Subscription Required) Tools ................................................................................. 44
Self-Sought Emergency Information Sources and Opt-In Alert Systems ........................................................ 47
Considerations Accompanying the Use of Existing Alert Systems ................................................................. 48
Messaging and Public Response .......................................................................................... 49
Coordination and Resources .................................................................................................... 53
Roles of County Departments ............................................................................................. 53
Los Angeles County Fire Department ........................................................................................................... 54
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department .................................................................................................... 55
Evacuation Messaging.................................................................................................................................. 56
Office of Emergency Management ............................................................................................................... 57
Evacuation Processes and Public Safety Measures .................................................................. 60
Process and Decision-Making for Evacuation Issuance ..................................................... 60
Evacuation Decision-Making ....................................................................................................................... 60
Documentation of Evacuation Warnings and Orders ..................................................................................... 61
Communication of Evacuation Protective Orders to the Public ...................................................................... 62
Evacuation Execution .......................................................................................................... 63
Public Compliance Challenges ............................................................................................ 65
Findings and Recommendations .............................................................................................. 66
Strengths and Best Practices ............................................................................................... 66
Relationships ............................................................................................................................................... 66
Resources .................................................................................................................................................... 66
Evacuation Decisions ................................................................................................................................... 67
Critical Focus Area #1: Policies, Protocols, Standard Operating Procedures, and
Authority .............................................................................................................................. 68
Key Challenges: ........................................................................................................................................... 68
Priority Recommendations and Actions: ....................................................................................................... 69
Critical Focus Area #2: Training and Planning Coordination .......................................... 72
Key Challenges: ........................................................................................................................................... 72
Priority Recommendations and Actions: ....................................................................................................... 73
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Critical Focus Area #3: Resource Management ................................................................. 75
Key Challenges: ........................................................................................................................................... 76
Priority Recommendations and Actions: ....................................................................................................... 76
Critical Focus Area #4: Situational Awareness and Interoperability................................ 81
Key Challenges: ........................................................................................................................................... 81
Priority Recommendations and Actions: ....................................................................................................... 81
Critical Focus Area #5: Community Engagement and Public Information ...................... 86
Key Challenges ............................................................................................................................................ 87
Priority Recommendations and Actions ........................................................................................................ 87
Action Plan and Next Steps ...................................................................................................... 93
Appendix 1: Data Sources ........................................................................................................ 94
Appendix 2: Stakeholders Interviews ....................................................................................... 95
Appendix 3: Timeline Overview ............................................................................................... 96
Appendix 4: Community Listening Session Questions ........................................................... 102
Appendix 5: Themes in Community Feedback ....................................................................... 103
Community Sentiment on Key Challenge Areas in Alerting and Warning the Community ........................... 104
Community Sentiment on Areas to Sustain in Alerting and Warning the Community .................................. 104
Appendix 6: Acronym List ...................................................................................................... 106
Appendix 7: Genasys Population Estimates for Zones ........................................................... 108
Appendix 8: Public Safety Power Shutoff Events................................................................... 109
Appendix 9: Damaged Structures ........................................................................................... 112
Appendix 10: Evacuation Warnings and Orders .................................................................... 114
Appendix 11: 911 LAC Fire Dispatch Calls ........................................................................... 120
Appendix 12: Fire Front Progression .................................................................................... 122
FireGuard Front Progression and 911 LAC Fire Dispatch—Eaton Fire ........................................................ 123
FireGuard Front Progression and 911 Dispatch Calls—Palisades Fire ......................................................... 125
Appendix 13: McChrystal Group Team.................................................................................. 127
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Executive Summary
In January 2025, Los Angeles County faced a devastating series of wind-driven fire events
fueled by hurricane-force gusts and widespread power outages. Between January 7 and January
9, six separate fires ignited across the region. The Eaton and Palisades Fires became the most
destructive in the County’s history, together burning approximately 37,000 acres, destroying
over 16,000 structures, and claiming 31 lives.
The speed and scale of these incidents tested nearly every facet of the County’s emergency
response system, from the grounding of aerial firefighting capabilities to their communications
and power infrastructure. Despite these challenges, the unified command and interagency
partners (local and state supporting agencies and departments) contained the fires by January 31.
To protect residents, the County issued 51 zone status changes for the Palisades Fire (32
evacuation warnings and 19 evacuation orders) and 158 zone status changes for the Eaton Fire
(58 evacuation warnings and 100 evacuation orders). In total, the County placed nearly 250,000
residents under evacuation warnings or orders. The volume and complexity of these notifications
highlight the critical importance of a well-coordinated public alert and evacuation system.
To assess the performance of these systems, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
commissioned an independent After-Action Review (AAR) by McChrystal Group. As with any
AAR, the goal is to provide a comprehensive overview of actions taken during the response and
offer actionable recommendations for improvement or sustainment. This report does not
investigate wrongdoing or assign blame. Its purpose is to assess the County’s alert and evacuation
systems during the January 2025 fire events and provide actionable recommendations to strengthen
future response efforts.
Focused on public alert, warning, and evacuation operations, this review examined policies and
procedures and analyzed over 150,000 alert and evacuation data records, minute-by-minute GPS
tracking of responding units, community feedback from six public listening sessions, and
interviews with emergency responders and senior officials.
The review identified no single point of failure related to how the alerts, warnings, notifications,
and evacuations were conducted. Instead, a series of weaknesses, including outdated policies,
inconsistent practices, and communications vulnerabilities, impacted the system’s effectiveness.
These systemic issues did not manifest uniformly across the two major fires. The effects of these
weaknesses varied based on environmental conditions, community readiness, and operational
complexity caused by the variables of wind, power outages, and fire behavior. A comparison of
the Palisades and Eaton Fires provides important context for how the alert and evacuation
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systems functioned in practice, as well as where breakdowns occurred despite the efforts of first
responders.
The Palisades Fire, which ignited during daylight hours in a community familiar with wildfire
risk, benefited from strong interagency coordination, pre-positioned resources, and tested
evacuation strategies. In contrast, the Eaton Fire broke out at night amid extreme wind and
power outages. The fire occurred in an area of the County not accustomed to wildfire risks in
their neighborhoods and without the benefit of aerial surveillance and fire suppression. Some
residents in Altadena reported receiving little or no warning before the fire reached their
neighborhoods.
Beyond alerting and evacuation operations, this review identified systemic issues that impacted
the alert and evacuation response. Outdated and inconsistent policies, protocols, and standard
operating procedures (SOPs) created ambiguity around evacuation authority and responsibilities.
In many cases, decision-making roles were unclear, and pre-incident public messaging
responsibilities lacked standardization across agencies. These gaps contributed to nonuniform
preparedness strategies across jurisdictions and slowed coordinated efforts.
Longstanding challenges in training, staffing, resource management, and interagency
coordination further strained the response. During this review, law enforcement and emergency
managers reported inconsistent training around wildfire evacuations, highlighting the need for
cross-disciplinary exercises and clearer staffing models for surge scenarios. Equipment and
personnel shortages were magnified under the extreme conditions of this incident. Compounding
this were gaps in situational awareness tools and communications interoperability, which
impaired real-time coordination.
Meanwhile, despite strong grassroots efforts, residents expressed confusion and frustration over
inconsistent messaging and a lack of clear, accessible updates. Future preparedness efforts will
require a more integrated approach to public information in collaboration with interagency and
community partners to enhance clarity.
The January 2025 fire events revealed both the strengths and vulnerabilities of Los Angeles
County’s emergency response systems. While frontline responders acted decisively and, in many
cases, heroically, in the face of extraordinary conditions, the events underscored the need for
clearer policies, stronger training, integrated tools, and improved public communication. This
AAR provides an opportunity for the County to translate the hard lessons learned into lasting
change. The recommendations outlined in this report are more than corrective. They are
investments in resilience, coordination, and life-saving decision-making.
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How to Use This Document
This AAR is organized to help agency leaders, emergency managers, and County decision-
makers prioritize and implement improvements quickly and effectively.
Findings and recommendations are grouped into five critical focus areas:
1. Policies, Protocols, Standard Operating Procedures, and Authority
2. Training and Planning Coordination
3. Resource Management
4. Situational Awareness and Interoperability
5. Community Engagement and Public Information
Each section includes a summary of key gaps, supporting data and observations, and specific
recommendations for improvement. The recommendations are actionable and aligned with the
County’s broader emergency preparedness goals. A summary table is provided for quick
reference, while a detailed analysis follows in the main body of the report.
Critical Focus Area Summary
1. Policies, Protocols,
Standard Operating
Procedures, and
Authority
The County has conflicting and outdated policies, protocols, and
SOPs regarding who has what authority in the evacuation
decision-making and implementation process, except for
evacuation alerting protocols. This has led to inconsistencies in
preparedness strategies across the County and a lack of clear
documentation and communication processes. In terms of pre-
incident preparedness notifications and evacuation messages to
the public, the County should further define and clarify the
applicable roles.
2. Training and
Planning
Coordination
The County’s emergency response training can be improved to
boost overall readiness and effectiveness. Establishing a
structured training program for law enforcement will enhance
coordination during fire incidents and evacuations, as well as
improve traffic control strategies. Addressing these issues
through a solid cross-training initiative, formal staffing
guidelines, and enhanced teamwork will strengthen the County’s
emergency response abilities.
3. Resource
Management
The catastrophic nature of the Palisades and Eaton Fires would
have strained even fully staffed departments operating at peak
capacity. However, responding agencies entered this crisis
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already facing staffing shortages and resource constraints.
These pre-existing deficiencies, including personnel gaps in
critical positions, aging equipment, and stretched operational
budgets, were immediately magnified when the event’s scale
and complexity demanded resources far beyond standard
operational requirements. What were previously manageable
departmental challenges became limiting factors in the
emergency response, stressing deployment capabilities,
sustained operations, and effectiveness throughout the incident
timeline.
4. Situational
Awareness and
Interoperability
Situational awareness and interoperability are pivotal areas
requiring immediate enhancement. The lack of streamlined
coordination tools and common systems among County
agencies, coupled with gaps in existing antiquated systems,
impacted the ability to monitor the unfolding events and ensure
unified efforts across all operational levels to issue alerts and
execute evacuations.
5. Community
Engagement and
Public Information
Effective community engagement and public information
strategies are essential for fostering trust, ensuring clarity, and
enhancing preparedness in emergency situations. The County
must focus on revising policies and procedures related to
messaging the public while simultaneously addressing gaps in
proactive communication efforts. Streamlined processes,
coupled with innovative tools for situational awareness, will
empower responders and residents to act decisively during
critical incidents. A cohesive framework for public outreach and
education that is built in collaboration with local and state
partner agencies will strengthen resilience and bolster the
County’s ability to respond effectively to emergencies.
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Introduction
Purpose of the After-Action Review
This after-action review (AAR) provides a comprehensive review and evaluation of Los Angeles
County’s (County) emergency alert notification systems and evacuation policies and practices
used during the Eaton and Palisades Fires in January 2025. It analyzes the roles and actions of
various County departments, including the County’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM),
the Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACoFD), and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department (LASD), and does not account for actions or resources of federal, state, or
incorporated city partners.
Even before full containment of the Eaton and Palisades Fires on January 31, 2025, McChrystal
Group was hired as a result of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors passing a motion on
January 28, 2025, directing County Counsel to retain a third party to conduct this comprehensive
independent review.1
The goal of this report is to identify lessons learned, best practices, and any applicable new
requirements. It also intends to recommend corrective actions and improvements to the County’s
existing capabilities to support a more robust response in future emergencies by providing
actionable recommendations that guide the County in strengthening its emergency alert,
notification, and evacuation systems, as well as its policies, procedures, and protocols.
Scope of the Review
The scope of this AAR focuses specifically on the County’s emergency notification systems and
evacuation policies and processes during the Eaton and Palisades Fires in January 2025. The
review covers the period from December 31, 2024, to January 23, 2025, with the evaluation
concentrating on alert and evacuation activities from January 6–8, 2025.
Data for this review were collected through interviews with County staff, emergency service
personnel, and community stakeholders; the examination of official County records and incident
logs; and the review of public communications and evacuation warnings, and evacuation orders
1 LA County Board Motion 199710.pdf. As directed by County Counsel, McChrystal Group’s activities and work product pertaining
to the AAR are confidential and subject to the attorney–client privilege (and attorney work product doctrine), and,
notwithstanding the AAR, privilege is not waived; rather, privilege is expressly preserved. Last referenced September 24, 2025.
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issued during the fires. Site visits were conducted to key locations related to evacuations and
impacted communities to gather first-hand accounts and verify procedures.
The review focuses on the decision-making process related to the issuance of evacuation orders
and evacuation warnings; the sending out of notifications along with associated messaging to the
public and the related coordination among County agencies; and the execution/implementation
of evacuation orders.
While every effort was made to ensure the accuracy and comprehensiveness of this review,
specific operational details, such as fire containment tactics and the sufficiency and staffing of
the firefighting response, are not within the scope of this report. Other entities are conducting
additional AARs regarding these efforts. The scope of this AAR did not include the cause or
causes of the ignition of the Eaton or Palisades Fires, which remain under investigation as of the
release date of this AAR.
Data Collection
McChrystal Group employed its technical data-scraping capabilities to collect and process high
volumes of publicly available information, including weather forecasts and weather-related data;
social media content and engagement; and official government updates, alerts, and advisories.
By synthesizing data from County departments with targeted information from publicly available
resources, McChrystal Group built a unified and comprehensive set of data assets to support the
focus of the AAR. The specific data sources reviewed by McChrystal Group include those
identified in Appendix 1 (Data Sources).
Stakeholder Interviews
Over the course of the project, interviews were conducted with 147 participants from the various
stakeholder groups. Interviews were conducted in person and virtually. Appendix 2 (List of
Stakeholders Interviewed) provides a list of these stakeholders.
For due diligence, Appendix 2 (List of Stakeholders Interviewed) also lists the stakeholders the
County specifically requested engagement with who declined to participate or provided no
response.
Incident Timeline
The AAR includes an incident timeline that incorporates timestamped publicly available data and
data provided by key stakeholders. Only data with timestamped information was included.
Appendix 3 (Timeline Overview) provides an overview of the incident timeline in summary
detail. A time-lapse visual aggregation of some of this information has been provided to the
County.
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Community Listening Sessions
McChrystal Group also organized and facilitated six community listening sessions in
Supervisorial Districts (SD) 3 and 5. The sessions focused on gathering community feedback on
alerts, warnings, notifications, and evacuations. Input from staff from the districts’ supervisorial
offices contributed to the design of these sessions.
Small breakout groups participated in two segments. In the first segment, participants answered
questions requiring them to reflect on the timeline and key details of their own experiences with
the alerts and evacuations during the two fires. Appendix 4 (Community Session Questions)
provides a list of the questions in this segment.
The second segment involved a discussion on potential improvements to emergency alerts and
evacuation protocols based on the participants’ experiences during the disaster. These sessions
were important in providing direct feedback from the community and offered a neutral space
where the public could feel comfortable expressing candid feedback. These events also evolved
into informal opportunities for increasing community emergency preparedness and awareness.
Five community listening sessions were held in person, and one was conducted virtually. The
listening sessions took place on the following dates for each district:
SD3
• April 7, 2025, in person from 6:00 p.m.– 8:00 p.m. at Santa Monica College
• April 10, 2025, in person from 6:00 p.m.– 8:00 p.m. at the Topanga
Community Center
• April 29, 2025, in person from 6:00 p.m.– 8:00 p.m. at the Malibu Public
Library
SD5
• April 26, 2025, in person from 11:00 a.m.–1:30 p.m. at the Pasadena
Convention Center
• May 3, 2025, in person from 11:00 a.m.–1:30 p.m. at the First AME Church
• May 7, 2025, virtual from 6:00 p.m.– 8:00 p.m.
The registration process for these events provided community members from both districts with
the opportunity to complete a survey that collected information about each person’s experience
with the emergency alerts, notifications, and evacuations. Appendix 4: Community Session
Questions includes the surveys for both the Eaton and Palisades Fires. Appendix 5: Themes in
Community Feedback summarizes the thematic results of the community listening sessions.
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Final Report Compilation
Following the data compilation, document reviews, interviews, community listening sessions,
and output analysis, McChrystal Group began to draft this AAR. The McChrystal Group Team
appendix contains profiles of the McChrystal Group team members who worked on and prepared
this AAR. They include professionals with extensive experience in emergency management,
alerts and warnings, wildfires, law enforcement response, and meteorology.
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Incident Overview
A Perfect Storm
On December 31, 2024, the National Weather Service (NWS) first mentioned the potential for
Santa Ana wind-driven Red Flag conditions for the period of January 7–9, 2025. The NWS
issues a Fire Weather Watch or Red Flag Warning when the combination of dry fuels and
weather conditions supports extreme fire danger. On January 2, the NWS put out a warning for
potential moderate-to-strong Santa Ana winds and extreme fire weather conditions for the period
of January 6–9. This was followed by a Fire Weather Watch issued on January 3, again citing the
potential for Red Flag conditions during that same period. On January 5, at approximately 2:40
p.m. local time, the Fire Watch was upgraded to a Red Flag Warning.
Then, on January 6, the NWS updated its forecast to a life-threatening event warning of a
Particularly Dangerous Situation (PDS), emphasizing that this was a high-end Red Flag event
and clearly identified the areas under Red Flag Warnings. According to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) NWS Glossary, “PDS wording is used in rare situations
when long-lived, strong and violent tornadoes are possible. This enhanced wording may also
accompany severe thunderstorm watches for intense convective windstorms.”2 Appendix 3:
Timeline Overview contains a summary of the warnings.
Wind Conditions and Other Weather Factors
The most critical factor influencing the spread and size of the Eaton and Palisades Fires was the
unprecedented strength of the Santa Ana winds. Hurricane-force Santa Ana winds reached nearly
100 mph (160 km/h) in some places, with peak gusts at the Mount Lukens Truck Trail in the
eastern San Gabriel Mountains. This wind event became so extraordinary because winds in the
upper atmosphere grew stronger at the same time as the Santa Ana winds. The coupling of winds
and their proximity to the mountains resulted in exceptionally powerful winds.
Los Angeles County experienced its driest start to the wet season on record, with no measurable
precipitation.3 Rainfall between October 2024 and January 2025 was far below normal for that
time of year, at only about 4% of the typical amount,4 and the extreme dryness created tinder-
2 NOAA’s National Weather Service - Glossary. NWS Glossary. NWS and NOAA. Last referenced September 24, 2025.
3 The weather and climate influences on the January 2025 fires around Los Angeles | NOAA Climate.gov. Rebecca Lindsey. NOAA. February 19,
2025. Last referenced September 24, 2025.
4 4 Graphics Explain Los Angeles’ Rare and Devastating January Fires. James MacCarthy and Jessica Richter. World Resources Institute.
February 5, 2025. Last referenced September 24, 2025.
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box conditions. Key moisture measurements were only 2%–5% of averages for that time of year,
and by January 7, 2025, dead-fuel moisture was at the sixth lowest level on record for that date.5
6 The resultant level of fuel volatility would be notable in summer months but was extraordinary
for January.
Ignition
The Palisades Fire ignited on
January 7, 2025, in the Santa
Monica Mountains, southeast of
Palisades Drive in the Los Angeles
City portion of Pacific Palisades. A
live camera, operated by
AlertCalifornia, captured the first
sight of smoke at Temescal
Trailhead 1, at 10:20 a.m. Shortly
after, the Los Angeles City Fire
Department (LAFD) received 911
calls reporting the fire. The
California Department of Forestry
and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE)
lists 10:30 a.m. as the start time of
the fire, and by 10:38 a.m., the
LAFD notified the LACoFD.7 In
response, the LACoFD initiated a
first alarm brush assignment,
deploying a full ground and air
response to support the LAFD
through the California Master Mutual Aid System, as the fires started outside of the County’s
Initial Action Zone agreement. Public reporting of the fire began at 10:33 a.m. via WatchDuty, a
nonprofit public service app and website that provides updates on wildfires and other
emergencies. For the Palisades Fire, it was relaying images from the Temescal Canyon camera.
5 “Literally off the charts”: LA’s critically dry conditions stun scientists as fires rage. Alastair Bland. CalMatters. January 15, 2025. Last
referenced September 24, 2025.
6 “Dead fuel moisture” is defined as the moisture content of dead organic fuels and is controlled solely by exposure to environmental conditions
and is critical for determining fire potential. Understanding Fire Danger (U.S. National Park Service). Understanding Fire Danger. U.S. National
Parks Service. Last referenced August 29, 2025.
7 https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025/1/7/palisades-fire. Palisades Fire. California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. Last updated
August 26, 2025, at last reference.
Figure 1: Map of Palisades Fire ignition sites
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By 11:06 a.m., the fire had grown to ten acres. By 11:31 a.m., CAL FIRE noted that the fire had
grown to 200 acres.
The Eaton Fire started on the
evening of January 7, 2025, in the
Eaton Canyon area of the San
Gabriel Mountains of Altadena.
The first report of the fire to the
County came at 6:13 p.m., when
LASD received a call about a
possible brush fire in Eaton
Canyon. The LACoFD then
received a separate call at 6:17
p.m., regarding a brush fire.
Shortly after, the LACoFD
identified the fire and initiated its
response, coordinating with the
Pasadena Fire Department and the
Angeles National Forest Service,
which had already begun their
response. WatchDuty publicly
reported the incident at 6:23 p.m.,
describing emergency crews
responding to a large glow on the
hillside. By 6:27 p.m., LACoFD Dispatch reported that the fire had grown to ten acres. The
initial Incident Command Post (ICP) was established at Eaton Canyon Equestrian Park at 6:27
p.m., before being moved to Farnsworth Park and then to the Rose Bowl to accommodate
Unified Command and resources coming into the area as the fire rapidly expanded.
Escalation Due to Wind Conditions
Once the fires ignited, high wind speeds and highly variable wind directions made the firefight
challenging. In the Palisades area, winds steadily increased throughout the day on January 7 and
into January 8, reaching peak wind gusts of nearly 100 mph, and severely limiting firefighters’
tactics for fighting the Palisades Fire. Around the time of ignition and over the ensuing 24 hours,
wind gusts in the Palisades Fire area reached 50–70 mph, excluding an increase to 80–100 mph
for four hours from 8:00 p.m. on the night of January 7. The fire grew rapidly under these
conditions, consuming homes, cars, and anything else in its path, making firefighting efforts
nearly impossible. Within an hour, the fire covered 200 acres. Despite the challenging wind
speeds, fixed-wing retardant tankers, water scooping aircraft, and helicopters were still able to
Figure 2: Map of the Eaton Fire ignition site
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support some of the fire suppression, but they
were eventually grounded due to strong winds.
Without much resistance, the Palisades Fire
spread from the City of Los Angeles side of
Pacific Palisades to the County unincorporated
areas of Sunset Mesa, down to the coastline and
Pacific Coast Highway, and to eastern Malibu.
Meanwhile, the LACoFD reported that similar
wind conditions in the Eaton Fire area made it all
but impossible to establish any fire perimeter. At
6:00 p.m. on January 7, wind gusts in the Eaton
Fire zone had intensified to 68 mph, while nearby
Altadena experienced gusts up to 39 mph. Around
the time of ignition, and for the next 12 hours, the
Eaton Fire area saw wind gusts of 70–90 mph. In
Altadena, high winds made it impossible to fight
the Eaton Fire from the air, with Unified
Command grounding crucial helicopter and aerial
fire surveillance operations shortly after the start
of the fire.
High wind speeds prevented the use of fixed-wing
aircraft to assess the fire situation or to make
water or retardant drops to fight the fire. All aerial
aircraft, including helicopters, were only able to
operate for the first 30 minutes after their initial
mobilization before being grounded at 6:45 p.m.
due to the dangerous wind conditions. This
significantly decreased the first responders’ ability
to maintain real-time situational awareness of the
fire’s movement and behavior.
The winds created flames up to 200 feet long
horizontally and sent embers flying up to two
miles away, where they started spot fires. Firefighters observed the fire burning eastward when it
first started, then reported that they were facing a fire that would eventually spread everywhere
all at once rather than a single line of fire moving in one direction. Severe winds contributed to
the rapid spread and intensity of the Eaton Fire, leading to widespread evacuations and
significant resource mobilization.
Figure 3: Wind speed comparison in Altadena at critical
junctures on January 7
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The Eaton Fire eventually spread into the western and southern portions of Altadena and
Pasadena, and concerns were raised that the Eaton Fire would threaten the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL) near La Cañada Flintridge. These concerns centered around the significant
robotic space exploration work at the facility, along with the elevated level of risk of materials
such as lithium-ion batteries causing toxic fumes if ignited.8
In the Altadena area specifically, the intensity of the wind increased notably in the hours after
ignition and was accompanied by highly variable wind directions. In the first couple of hours
after the start of the Eaton Fire, an array of measurement stations across the Altadena area
recorded wind directions towards the South (S), South- Southwest (SSW), and South-Southeast
(SSE), depending on the location of the measurement station. By 3:00 a.m., those same
measurement stations had recorded sustained shifts in wind direction, with winds blowing
towards the S, West, and SSW. Although these readings provide valuable insight, it is important
to emphasize the limited localized precision of the data, even with the presence of measurement
stations. The topography and microclimates of the region can lead to significant variability that
existing monitoring infrastructure may not fully capture.
By 5:00 a.m. on January 8, gusts reached 90 mph in the Eaton Fire area and 65 mph in Altadena.
The sudden shift in the direction of the Eaton Fire and an increase in the wind’s intensity at
around 3:00 a.m. on January 8 prompted an urgent need to assess and coordinate priorities
among the various responding agencies.
8 https://llis.nasa.gov/lesson/3516. Lesson 3516. “Lithium-Ion Battery Fire.” National Aeronautics and Space Administration. May 17, 2010. Last
referenced September 24, 2025
Figure 4: Wind speed comparison in Altadena at critical junctures on January 8
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The Eaton Fire moved quickly with homes burning as a result of the main body of the fire
spreading or the wind-driven ember casts intensifying due to increasing wind speeds. The
shifting winds caused the flames to skip homes entirely while destroying others. Compounding
the urgency, the fire began to threaten a more densely populated area west of Lake Avenue.9
This area posed a unique set of risks, especially in such wind conditions, as many of the homes
were older and had been built with materials and designs that made them more vulnerable to
ignition. Once burning, these buildings contributed significantly to the fire’s fuel load,
accelerating its spread.
The pace and intensity of the fire’s movement in this area exceeded what first responders had
observed during earlier stages of the Eaton Fire. Heat from the fire created microclimates, and
the increase in wind speeds and shifts in wind direction in the early morning hours of January 8
made fire behavior and wind patterns within those microclimates extremely unpredictable,
challenging even the most experienced responders. All first responders who had worked on other
wildfires and were interviewed as part of this review, said they had never seen anything like the
Eaton Fire.
9 LA_Wildfire_Altadena_Black_Community_Report.pdf. LA Wildfires: Impacts on Altadena’s Black Community Rapid Response Data Brief.
Paul Ong, Chhandara Pech, Lorrie Frasure, Samyu Comandur, Eric Lee, and Silvia R. González. UCLA Ralph J. Bunche Center for African
American Studies, UCLA Center for Neighborhood Knowledge, and UCLA Latino Policy and Politics Institute. University of Southern
California. Last referenced September 24, 2025
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From the very beginning of the Eaton Fire, all agencies focused on evacuation. The Eaton Fire
initially spread east; however, in the early morning hours of January 8, an increase in wind speed
and changes in wind direction caused the fire to aggressively spread to the west. Reviews of
radio traffic, dispatch calls, and interviews with first responders indicated that ember cast from
the main fire and from downed powerlines caused spot fires west of Lake Avenue after midnight
on January 8th and accelerated in the following hours. At approximately 2:18 a.m., LACoFD
field personnel reported over the radio that they had eyes on the fire in the foothills north of
Farnsworth Park above Lake Avenue and that the fire front appeared to be moving west along
the foothills. The same LACoFD field personnel said they were going to the ICP to share more
details on their observations. While ICP staff were unable to confirm that LACoFD staff arrived
at the ICP, LACoFD Incident Command staff heard the 2:18 a.m. radio traffic indicating that the
fire was moving west and started evaluating more areas for evacuations, including those west of
Lake Avenue. With this new information from the field, additional evacuation orders and
evacuation warnings were sent out to address the new threat trajectory.
Satellite imagery from FireGuard, a National Guard satellite program, appears to show that the
fire front itself did not cross Lake Avenue into west Altadena until after 5:00 a.m. on January 8
but that spot fires impacted west Altadena in the early morning (see Appendix 12: Fire Front
Progression). This highlights the importance of tracking spot fires in volatile conditions, but
without aerial resources, tracking the spot fires in this incident was extremely difficult. The
direction shifts in the spread of the Eaton Fire required quick decision-making under pressure as
agencies prioritized saving lives, minimizing property loss, and controlling the perimeter in an
environment of escalating complexity and risk. Images from 5:00 a.m. also show that the Eaton
Fire threatened the Altadena Sheriff’s Station (approximately 250 feet west of Lake Avenue, at
780 E. Altadena Drive) (see Appendix 12: Fire Front Progression). The staff at the station had to
evacuate and LASD staff went to the station to help remove items from the armory and secure
the weapons. The Eaton Fire also threatened LACoFD’s Fire Stations 11, 12, and 66 in the area.
In summary, first responders faced a combination of record-breaking hurricane-force winds, fires
that created internal weather patterns at ground level, unprecedented drought, critically dry
vegetation, and dramatically shifting winds. This created conditions so extreme and fire-prone
that there appears to be little that could have prevented the rapid escalation to the wildfire-
initiated community conflagration once the fires had started. Extreme conditions rendered first
responders’ efforts incapable, at least in the short term, of subduing the wildfire threats.10
10 https://www.weather.gov/wrh/hazards. National Weather Service Weather and Hazards Data Viewer Historical Surface Observations. Last
referenced August 27, 2025.
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Seven Fires Strained Resources
In addition to the Eaton and Palisades Fires, three other fires that started in the Los Angeles
County region between January 7 and January 8, 2025, all of which necessitated the allocation of
resources, the issuance of evacuation warnings and orders, and the use of emergency alerts and
notification systems. The following fires occurred within these two days:
• Hurst Fire in Sylmar
• Lidia Fire in Acton
• Sunset Fire in Hollywood Hills
The Hurst and Lidia Fires required resources from the County, including from LACoFD, LASD,
and/or OEM. Some LACoFD teams that initially responded to the Eaton Fire had to leave to
assist with the Hurst Fire, which started at 10:29 p.m. on January 7. Additionally, as the response
to these fires continued, the Kenneth Fire started in West Hills on January 9, 2025. The Hughes
Fire began in Castaic on January 22, 2025, requiring LACoFD resources not long after the other
fires had been contained.
Figure 5: Location map of Hurst, Lidia, Sunset, Palisades, and Eaton Fire
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January 2025 LA Fire Ignition and Containment Timelines 11
11 https://www.fire.ca.gov/Incidents. Current Emergency Incident Database. CAL FIRE. Last referenced August 27, 2025.
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Terrain, Fuel Load, and Fire Behavior
The Palisades Fire, which ignited on January 7, 2025, in the Santa Monica Mountains, presented
significant challenges due to the rugged terrain, characterized by steep slopes and deep canyons.
This topography hindered firefighter access and contributed to the rapid spread of the fire. The
fire began near Skull Rock in the Pacific Palisades portion of the City of Los Angeles and
quickly advanced across Topanga Canyon Road and Palisades Drive, moving toward the County
unincorporated areas and Malibu within the first few hours. Crews had to hike into remote areas
to combat the blaze, with the terrain’s steep slopes influencing the fire’s behavior and intensity.
The dense chaparral and coastal sage scrub in the area were exceptionally dry, creating a
landscape primed for explosive fire activity. Additionally, brush management responsibilities for
fire prevention purposes across the region are split between local, county, and state jurisdictions,
complicating suppression efforts.
The fire’s rapid expansion and unpredictable behavior, including short- and long-range spotting,
were initially fueled by Santa Ana wind gusts of around 60 mph at time of ignition. Firefighting
Figure 6: Before and after aerial photos of the Santa Monica Mountains
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efforts included direct suppression by
fire engines, aerial retardant drops, and
the construction of indirect
containment lines by hand crews and
bulldozers. Previous burn scars in
some areas also aided containment by
limiting available fuel.12
The Eaton Fire, which also ignited on
January 7, started in the San Gabriel
Mountains, and, as it spread, began
impacting the canyons and foothills
near Altadena and Pasadena. The
area’s steep and rugged terrain also
challenged firefighting efforts,
especially as the fire spread into
foothill communities, particularly
Altadena, complicating evacuation and
firefighting efforts. The terrain’s
complexity and proximity to
residential neighborhoods further
hindered containment efforts.13
The fuel load in the Eaton Fire area
was high, consisting of both chaparral
and mixed conifer forests. These fuel
loads, combined with warm
temperatures, prolonged dry
conditions, and strong Santa Ana
winds, created an environment highly
susceptible to rapid fire spread.
12 Palisades Fire: Incident Update on 01/09/2025 at 8:11 AM | CAL FIRE. Palisades Fire Incident Update on 01/09/25 at 8:11 a.m. CAL FIRE.
Last referenced on August 27, 2025.
13 Using Lidar to Understand the Impacts of the 2025 Palisades and Eaton Fires, Los Angeles, CA | OpenTopography. Using Lidar to Understand
the Impacts of the 2025 Palisades and Eaton Fires, Los Angeles, CA. Cassandra Brigham, Chelsea Scott, and Christopher Crosby.
OpenTopography. February 10, 2025. Last referenced September 24, 2025
Figure 7: Before and after aerial photos of the Altadena area
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The fire exhibited extreme burning conditions, including short- and long-range spotting, which
significantly complicated containment efforts.
Transition to a Wildfire-Initiated Community Conflagration
While both the Eaton and Palisades Fires began as wildfires, both quickly transitioned to
wildfire-initiated community conflagration fires. A wildfire-initiated community conflagration
fire is a large, uncontrollable blaze that spreads quickly through densely populated areas, causing
widespread destruction. Fires that ignite near tightly spaced buildings and infrastructure are
particularly susceptible to escalating into conflagrations, especially when driven by high winds,
and usually occur under conditions where fire suppression efforts are overwhelmed. Additional
factors, such as prolonged dry weather, outdated building materials, and inadequate vegetation
clearance around structures, further increase the risk and severity of these destructive fires.
These factors were all present during the ignition and transition into conflagration in both the
Eaton and Palisades Fires. Despite strong winds, January and February are not typically high-risk
months for fire in Los Angeles County, as these months usually have around five inches of rain.
However, in this case, there had been no appreciable rain since April 2024, leaving the region
exceptionally dry in the lead-up to the fires. At the time of the fires, fuel moisture levels were
below 60%, with dead-fuel moisture in the brush as low as 20%–40%. This unusually dry fuel
load, combined with the strong Santa Ana winds that reached hurricane force speeds, created
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particularly hazardous conditions that contributed to the rapid escalation of both fires into
conflagration events.14
The Palisades Fire transitioned to a wildfire-initiated community conflagration shortly after its
ignition. By 11:30 a.m. on January 7, just one hour after it was first reported, the fire had grown
to 200 acres. It consumed homes, vehicles, and other structures in its path, prompting the County
and City of Los Angeles to issue evacuation orders extending from the fire ignition area to the
Pacific Coast Highway. The strong winds fueled the fire’s rapid expansion, making it one of the
most destructive fires in Los Angeles County’s history.
Shortly after ignition, the Eaton Fire transitioned to a wildfire-initiated community conflagration
once it moved into established residential neighborhoods. House-to-house ignition significantly
influenced the fire’s behavior and spread. Protecting nearby residential areas, local infrastructure,
and critical facilities further challenged containment efforts. Interior flare-ups and smoldering in
heavy fuels hampered firefighting crews throughout the fire.
The Eaton Fire also occurred in the evening, in darkness and intense smoke, as Southern
California Edison (SCE) public safety shutoffs ensued and the fire impacted power lines in the
Altadena and Pasadena areas, which took out streetlights and ambient lighting in homes in some
of the areas.
Evacuation
Messaging During the Eaton and Palisades Fires
OEM sent messages communicating evacuation warnings and orders only after receiving
directions from the LACoFD and/or the LASD to do so. Appendix 10: Evacuation Warnings and
Orders lists all messages sent by OEM communicating evacuation warnings and orders for the
Eaton and Palisades Fires. For the Palisades Fire, OEM sent a message with the first emergency
alert and notification at 11:30 a.m. on January 7, 2025, based on Incident Command’s decision to
issue an evacuation warning for Sunset Mesa. Given their prior experience with the Woolsey
Fire in 2018 and Franklin Fire in 2024, along with the Santa Monica Mountains’ high-risk
designation for wildfires, LACoFD and LASD were side by side as they were part of Incident
Command and joined forces in Unified Command at 11:36 a.m.
The first emergency alert and notification for an evacuation order issued by Incident Command
was sent by OEM at 11:52 a.m. on January 7 for east Sunset Mesa. This was followed shortly
after by another emergency alert and notification sent by OEM for an evacuation order from
Incident Command at 12:42 p.m. for Malibu (see Appendix 10: Evacuation Warnings and
14 https://gacc.nifc.gov/oscc/fuelsFireDanger.php. Southern California Predictive Services Area 8, 100-hour fuel moisture chart. Southern
California Geographic Coordination Center. Last referenced August 27, 2025.
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Orders for more information). Subsequent evacuation orders covered areas from the town of
Topanga Canyon in the north to the Pacific Coast Highway to the south. Incident Command also
directed OEM to send emergency alerts, notifications, and evacuation warnings for nearby areas.
The final evacuation warning issued by Incident Command for the Palisades Fire was sent by
OEM on January 8 at 1:12 a.m.
OEM sent an advisory alert to the 12 evacuation zones (areas of Pasadena/Eaton Canyon, North
of I-210, South of Eaton Canyon, Altadena East of Lake Ave) at potential risk of the Eaton Fire
at approximately 6:48 p.m. on January 7, at the direction of Incident Command. The alert
advised the public to “BE ALERT AND MONITOR.” At 7:26 p.m. on January 7, Incident
Command directed OEM to send the first Eaton Fire evacuation orders for the seven evacuation
zones shown in the table below.
ZONE EVACUATION ZONE NAME DESCRIPTION OF AREA
Zone 1 US-CA-XLA-PAS-E019
Pasadena—North of NY Drive, South of FairPoint
Street, East of Edgecliff Lane, West of Sierra
Madre
Zone 2 US-CA-XLA-ALD-EASTLOMA
North of East Altadena Drive, South of Zane Grey
Terrace, East of Sunny Oaks Circle, West of
Altadena Drive
Zone 3 US-CA-XLA-ALD-EATONCANYON
North of Eaton Canyon Drive, South of Mount
Wilson Toll Road, East of Altadena Drive, West of
Eaton Canyon Drive
Zone 4 US-CA-XLA-ALD-GARFIAS North of Galbert Road, South of NY Drive, East of
North Hill Avenue, West of Meguiar Drive
Zone 5 US-CA-XLA-ALD-MENDOCINO All four zones in Mendocino ABCD
Zone 6 US-CA-XLA-ALD-MIDLOTHIAN North of NY Drive, South of Altadena Drive, East
of North Allen Avenue, West of Altadena Drive
Zone 7 US-CA-XLA-KIN-KINNELOA Zones A and B in Kinneloa Mesa
Additional evacuation warnings and orders were sent throughout the night as the Eaton Fire
continued to spread. By 9:00 p.m., evacuation orders and warnings were expanded to include 11
more zones, followed by 16 more by 10:30 p.m.
Before issuing further evacuation warnings and orders, Incident Command needed to confirm the
fire’s trajectory and ensure that information being shared with OEM, and the Emergency
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Operations Center (EOC) was accurate and aligned with updates from sheriff and fire personnel
on the ground and at Incident Command.
The LACoFD first received a call suggesting that the fire may have been west of Lake Avenue at
10:50 p.m. The call originated from 512 Calaveras Street. However, it is not clear that the fire
front or spot fires were in that location at that time, as neither the address (512 Calaveras Street)
nor any houses on the same block appear on the CAL FIRE Damage Inspection (DINS) reports.
Furthermore, no fire damage was observed in the 500-block area when it was visited. This visit
also determined that 512 Calaveras Street was not an official street or house number.
The DINS reports represent structures impacted by wildland fire that are inside or within 100
meters of the fire perimeter. There were multiple calls in the LACoFD’s dispatch records for
houses on fire or people trapped in burning homes that were not on the DINS reports for either
the Eaton or Palisades Fires. Although there were reports of fire west of Lake Avenue as early as
10:50 p.m. on January 7, the data shows that none of the locations cited in those 911 calls are
listed in the DINS reports. The first validated instance of a structure on fire west of Lake Avenue
(as identified in the DINS report) was at 500 E Las Flores Drive at 12:55 a.m. on January 8.
Between 1:12 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on the morning of January 8, OEM did not receive direction
from LACoFD or LASD to send any evacuation warnings or evacuation orders for the Eaton
Fire, as all areas LACoFD believed were directly impacted by or at risk from the Eaton Fire had
already received an evacuation warning or order. OEM was again directed to send evacuation
messages with both evacuation orders and warnings by Incident Command at approximately 3:00
a.m. The evacuation orders and warnings were relayed to OEM staff in the EOC, who then sent
out the evacuation messages at 3:25 a.m. for the Eaton Fire, with the initial alert covering areas
west of Lake Avenue.
OEM was directed by Incident Command to send the final evacuation warnings of the Eaton
Fire’s first 24 hours for Scholl Canyon on January 8 at 8:22 a.m., and the only other evacuation
orders issued after that were those for Mt. Wilson at 11:57 a.m. on January 9.
Once LACoFD at the ICP made the decision to issue an evacuation warning or evacuation order,
that decision was quickly communicated from the field to OEM personnel at the EOC so that
OEM could send evacuation notifications to the public. However, deciding which zones to put
under evacuation was often difficult due to the fire’s unpredictability and the complex operating
conditions. It was difficult to maintain situational awareness to predict fire behaviors and,
therefore, challenging to issue warnings and orders aligned to predicted behavior, which left the
public feeling inadequately warned and underprepared to evacuate. This highlights the
challenges of messaging the public in fast-evolving emergencies where the speed of events can
outpace public warning systems.
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Figure 8: Alert Campaign Volumes (Historical Fires vs January 2025 Fires (First 24 hours))
Additionally, the County had concerns about over-warning. Issuing evacuation orders for areas
not under immediate threat could have added to public confusion, contributed to unnecessary
panic, and led to greater congestion on roads, potentially hindering the movement of those truly
at risk. The complexity and speed at which the incident unfolded highlights the critical need for
precise coordination and underscores the inherent challenges of real-time emergency
communication.
Some residents, both west and east of Lake Avenue, reported not receiving alerts at all, or
receiving notifications as if they were preparing to leave or after they had already evacuated.
This could have been attributed to a variety of variables such as a public safety power shutoff
(PSPS), downed powerlines, or cell towers being impacted by the wind, fire, or smoke. Some
individuals left the area on January 7, while others
reportedly found themselves unable to evacuate before the
fire front reached their neighborhoods and they were faced
with just-in-time, spontaneous evacuation, or chose to
remain and defend their homes.
Impact Summary
The Eaton and Palisades Fires had a profound impact on
the local population and infrastructure. The Palisades Fire
affected over 20,000 people and destroyed 6,837
structures, including homes, businesses, and critical
infrastructure such as power, sewer, and water systems.15
16 Similarly, the Eaton Fire impacted nearly 23,000
residents, destroyed approximately 9,400 structures, and
15 Assessment of the January 2025 Los Angeles County Wildfires: A Multi-Modal Analysis of Impact, Response, and Population Exposure.
Assessment of the January 2025 Los Angeles County Wildfires: A Multi-Modal Analysis of Impact, Response, and Population Exposure. Seyd
Teymoor Seydi. January 20, 2025. Department of Civil Engineering. Boise State University. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
16 Palisades Fire—LA County Recovers. Palisades Fire Damage Maps. Los Angeles County. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
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OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 28
damaged over 1,000 more.17 18 Both fires led to significant disruptions to daily life and
necessitated extensive evacuation efforts.19 20
The fires resulted in a tragic loss of life and numerous injuries. The Palisades Fire claimed 12
lives and caused at least four non-fatal injuries. The Eaton Fire resulted in at least 19 confirmed
deaths and nine non-fatal injuries.21 22 Additionally, several LACoFD firefighters and LASD
deputies sustained injuries while battling the blazes.23
The economic impact of both fires is substantial and still not fully known, with estimates
suggesting that the combined damage from the Eaton and Palisades Fires could cost the local
economy up to $9 billion over the next five years.24 Property damage alone is estimated to be
between $28 billion and $53.8 billion.25 The fires also caused severe environmental damage,
burning approximately 37,000 acres of land, including parks, nature centers, and trails.26 27 The
17 Assessment of the January 2025 Los Angeles County Wildfires: A Multi-Modal Analysis of Impact, Response, and Population Exposure.
Assessment of the January 2025 Los Angeles County Wildfires: A Multi-Modal Analysis of Impact, Response, and Population Exposure. Seyd
Teymoor Seydi. January 20, 2025. Department of Civil Engineering. Boise State University. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
18 Eaton Fire—LA County Recovers. Eaton Fire Damage Maps. Los Angeles County. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
19 Assessment of the January 2025 Los Angeles County Wildfires: A Multi-Modal Analysis of Impact, Response, and Population Exposure.
Assessment of the January 2025 Los Angeles County Wildfires: A Multi-Modal Analysis of Impact, Response, and Population Exposure. Seyd
Teymoor Seydi. January 20, 2025. Department of Civil Engineering. Boise State University. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
20 LAEDC-2025-LA-Wildfires-Study.pdf. Impact of 2025 Los Angeles Wildfires and Comparative Study. Matt Horton, Shannon M. Sedgwick,
Justin Adams, Dan Wei, and Matthew Skyberg. Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation Institute for Applied Economics.
February 2025. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
21 Eaton Fire: Incident Update on 01/27/2025 at 10:04 AM | CAL FIRE. Eaton Fire Incident Update on 01/27/25 at 10:04 A.M. CAL FIRE. Last
referenced September 3, 2025.
22 WILDFIRE UPDATE | 18 Victims Identified by Medical Examiner—County of Los Angeles Medical Examiner January 24, 2025. Last
referenced September 24, 2025.
23 LA County Sues Edison Over Eaton Fire, Seeking to Recover Costs and Damages Due to Widespread Devastation—LA County Recovers
March 5, 2025. Last referenced September 24, 2025.
24 LAEDC-2025-LA-Wildfires-Study.pdf. Impact of 2025 Los Angeles Wildfires and Comparative Study. Matt Horton, Shannon M. Sedgwick,
Justin Adams, Dan Wei, and Matthew Skyberg. Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation Institute for Applied Economics.
February 2025. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
25 LAEDC-2025-LA-Wildfires-Study.pdf. Impact of 2025 Los Angeles Wildfires and Comparative Study. Matt Horton, Shannon M. Sedgwick,
Justin Adams, Dan Wei, and Matthew Skyberg. Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation Institute for Applied Economics.
February 2025. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
26 LA County Sues Edison Over Eaton Fire, Seeking to Recover Costs and Damages Due to Widespread Devastation—LA County Recovers Last
referenced September 3, 2025.
27 Eaton Fire—LA County Recovers. Eaton Fire Damage Maps. Los Angeles County. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
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destruction of natural habitats and wildlife, along with the long-term effects on air and water
quality, poses significant challenges for environmental recovery.28 29 30
28 LA County Sues Edison Over Eaton Fire, Seeking to Recover Costs and Damages Due to Widespread Devastation—LA County Recovers Last
referenced September 3, 2025.
29 Palisades Fire Damage Inspection Dashboard | Emergency Management Department City of Los Angeles, Emergency Management
Department Last referenced September 3, 2025.
30 City of Los Angeles/Palisades Fire Recovery Information & Resources—LA County Recovers Last referenced September 3, 2025.
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County Pre-Incident Preparedness
In preparation for the January
wind event and the increased fire
risk it posed, the County took
proactive measures and
implemented strategies to enhance
the readiness of its emergency
response staff and the public. This
section discusses the proactive
staffing, coordination, and
resourcing measures, as well as
preventative public education on
fire risk and evacuation
procedures, pre-established
emergency communication plans,
and the utilization of various alert
systems.
It is important to note that the
preparedness activities undertaken
by County stakeholders varied
between the two impacted areas
examined in this report. Due to the
historical fire risk in the Santa
Monica Mountains and the
Palisades area and the lessons
learned from the Woolsey Fire;
the stakeholders of the Palisades
Fire area had significantly more
fire response experience with their
communities than those in the
Eaton Fire area in Altadena. The
Eaton Fire burned into areas and
communities that historically and
presently do not appear in high fire risk areas on CAL FIRE’s fire hazard severity zone (FHSZ)
maps; those communities had not previously experienced this type of fire event. Figure 9 shows
the designated high fire risk areas in Los Angeles County prior to 2025.
Figure 9: High fire risk areas in Los Angeles County
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Pre-Incident Preparedness
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Pre-Incident Preparedness
LASD undertook several fire-related preparation activities leading up to the Eaton and Palisades
Fires in January 2025. It did so in the face of other events and challenges, including the LASD’s
involvement in the Rose Parade in Pasadena, California; the recurring failure of its 38-year-old
computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system; preparing for the anniversary of the January 6, 2021,
U.S. Capitol attack; and the Presidential Inauguration.
Resource Coordination
On January 6, 2025, the LASD notified the Sheriff Information Bureau (SIB) to begin collecting
Mobile Field Force rosters for all shifts in preparation for the Red Flag Warnings. LASD also
notified Incident Management Team (IMT) 1 and Department Operations Center (DOC) Team 1
to be ready for possible activation based on the expected wind event. The incident management
teams are activated when an incident escalates or is anticipated to escalate beyond the local
station level response. The teams are responsible for evacuation planning, resource deployment,
and interagency coordination. The coordination of resources in January 2025 included collecting
rosters of available personnel from all stations who could assist in the event of a fire. The
Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB) assigned an LASD representative to the County
Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) prior to the onset of the January 7 fires and developed a
72-hour staffing roster to ensure continuous LASD representation. The EOB maintains a 24-hour
on-call duty sergeant, deputy, logistics deputy, and law enforcement technician to support large-
scale incidents and emergencies countywide and assist outside agencies if requested. The
Sheriff’s department also discussed the allocation of resources, including holding over LASD
personnel, coordinating with other stations, and mobilizing special teams to assist with
evacuations.
Proactive Emergency Operations Center Opening
As part of 2024 preparedness efforts and prior to this incident, the EOB provided EOC station
training and/or initial critical incident response and management training to EOC personnel at
Malibu/Lost Hills, Altadena, Crescenta Valley, and Santa Clarita stations, which are fire-centric
stations. Once the Palisades Fire started, LASD was proactive in opening the Malibu EOC
station before the Palisades Fire reached the County unincorporated area of Sunset Mesa,
facilitating early warning and evacuation efforts. Early activation ensured that all necessary
personnel and resources were in place to respond effectively. This included appointing scribes,
tracking personnel, and maintaining communication with LASD’s DOC.
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Los Angeles County Fire Department’s Pre-Incident Preparedness
The LACoFD began their pre-planning activities on January 2, 2025. The LACoFD identified
pre-planning as important in their preparation for a possible incident response and focused on
staffing and coordination as their primary preparedness activities.
Augmented Staffing, Pre-positioning Resources, and Coordination Decisions
On January 2, the LACoFD began preparing for possible wildfires that the NWS predicted for
January 7 and 8. The LACoFD discussed the upcoming weather event and prepared an
augmented staffing plan. On January 3, the LACoFD determined that a request to the California
Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) to pre-position resources would be necessary.
On January 4 and 5, multiple discussions regarding the augmented staffing plan took place
between the LACoFD and CalOES, and the initial staffing plan was sent out to staff. On January
5, the LACoFD contacted CalOES and submitted the official packet requesting CalOES pre-
position resources, which was approved. As the NWS confirmed the wind event was severe, the
LACoFD held additional discussions on January 6 to adjust the staffing plan.
The adjustments to the initial staffing plan included the addition of three strike teams, water
tenders, and other resources to enhance coverage and preparedness, as well as adding augmented
LACoFD staffing and CAL FIRE Southern Region staffing pattern resources. CAL FIRE also
provided two additional strike teams that LACoFD deployed to Fire Station 126 and Fire Station
150.
In addition, at
approximately 7:18 a.m.
on January 7, the LACoFD
held over the outgoing
shift from the previous
day, effectively doubling
the number of staff
available when combined
with the incoming shift.
The LACoFD determined
this would provide the
personnel necessary, if
needed, to staff all
available fire apparatus
and fill critical command
and control positions.
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Finally, all other LACoFD personnel were placed on telephone standby effective January 7.
Resource Mobilization
In anticipation of critical fire weather, the LACoFD pre-deployed resources, including three
LACoFD strike teams and two CAL FIRE strike teams (pre-positioned for the State
Responsibility Area (SRA) State Mission) that were available to all areas throughout the County;
staffed and deployed additional engine companies, wildland hand crews, Incident Command
teams, and brush patrols; and brought in water tenders, firefighting aircraft, bulldozers,
dispatchers, and other resources. These resources were strategically positioned in areas of
greatest concern, particularly the Highways 118/210 corridors, San Gabriel, Santa Susana, Santa
Monica Mountains and foothills, and the San Gabriel and San Fernando Valleys.
Notifications
On January 6, the LACoFD issued a memo to each of the County board supervisors advising
them of the distinct threat of the windstorm and its potential impact on areas “not normally
impacted,” including the San Gabriel Valley.
Office of Emergency Management Pre-Incident Preparedness
On January 2, OEM began preparing for the wind event. Their efforts included coordinating with
partners, general preparations, and resource and staff planning. On January 6, OEM took several
steps toward general preparedness for this event. This included activating the County EOC in
preparation for the January 7 wind event and ensuring that all its necessary and available
personnel and resources were in place. OEM also maintained regular communication with
federal, state, and local partners, including the NWS, which had a representative physically
located in the EOC during the Eaton and Palisades Fires, and closely monitored weather
conditions, anticipating strong winds and preparing accordingly.
Resources and Staffing
On January 3, well in advance of the wind event, OEM began developing its EOC staffing roster.
In organizing the response team, OEM relied on a skills matrix and the department’s master
calendar to assess staff availability and capabilities. However, OEM staff noted that the skills
matrix was not optimal for determining the staffing needs of operations for this emergency.
A specific focus when developing the staffing roster was to ensure that OEM staff assigned to
manage emergency evacuation notifications were dedicated solely to that role and not assigned
any other tasks or responsibilities. Additionally, OEM attempted to assign the most qualified
individuals to critical roles. However, OEM has a limited number of staff overall, so staffing
critical 24/7 positions is problematic when a staff member is unavailable to perform their
function. An OEM staff member who was proficient in sending out alert notifications was at a
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prescheduled training opportunity outside the County prior to the issuance of the PDS warning.
As a result, several less experienced staff members were placed in key positions. In addition,
Genasys ALERT was a relatively new system for OEM. However, while the general
functionality of Genasys ALERT differed from OEM’s previous system, CodeRED, the process
for developing and sending emergency alerts and notifications was similar. At the time of the
incident, four OEM staff members had working knowledge of the new system, leaving the alert
and notification function less than optimally resourced for a catastrophic disaster.
Partner Coordination
OEM regularly coordinates with cities and County partners for evacuation planning and alerting,
stressing the importance of unified command and timely communication. OEM later reported
that during the incident, incorporated cities were responsible for verifying and adjusting their
designated evacuation zones, while the County provided support and ensured overall
coordination.
As an SOP, OEM initiates and coordinates the Unified Command Group (UCG) calls. UCG
meetings proved valuable in ensuring that all County departments were kept up to date. These
meetings helped the departments share situational knowledge and coordinate response efforts.
For this wind event, OEM initiated and ran the UCG calls at 10:00 a.m. on January 6; at 10:00
a.m. on January 7, prior to the start of the Palisades Fire; and every day at 10 a.m. thereafter until
January 27.
County Supervisorial District 3 and Supervisorial District 5 Pre-Incident
Preparedness
Both impacted Supervisorial District Offices in District 3 and District 5 participated in and
supported various pre-incident preparedness activities leading up to the January windstorm event
and the Eaton and Palisades Fires.
Supervisorial District 3 Office
Community Preparedness
Due to the historical risk of fires in Supervisorial District 3 (SD3) in the Santa Monica
Mountains and the Woolsey Fire in 2018, SD3 implemented and supported several initiatives
related to preparedness. SD3 emphasizes the importance of continuous education and training for
the community, hosts annual emergency preparedness events at each of their district offices, and
provides training and resources to the community. These events cover a wide range of topics
related to emergency preparedness.
SD3 also supports community organizations, such as the Community Emergency Response
Team (CERT) program and Arson Watch and has provided financial assistance to entities such
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as the Santa Monica Mountains Regional Fire Safe Council, Emergency Preparedness in
Calabasas—A Fire Safe Council, Topanga Coalition for Emergency Preparedness (TCEP), Los
Angeles Emergency Preparedness Foundation, and Emergency Network Los Angeles. These
organizations play a crucial role in emergency preparedness and response in their communities.
The Community Brigade program also exists in SD3 and appears to be the first of its kind in the
country.31 The Community Brigade program trains volunteers to help their communities prepare
for and respond to wildfires and other hazards. With intimate local knowledge of their
communities, the Community Brigade can be a key resource for first responders. This program
was developed by the Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Foundation in partnership with
LACoFD and supported by the Board of Supervisors and has been successful in multiple fires. It
involves rigorous training and community participation to be effective.
Community Engagement
SD3 builds and maintains a broad-based mailing list and social media following to ensure
effective communication with the community during emergencies. Their mailing list comprises
over 50,000 subscribers across SD3 and is used to send out advisories and updates during
emergencies. Their community affairs team keeps in regular contact with community
organizations and leaders to keep them informed and gather updates.
Alert and Messaging
During emergencies, SD3 receives notifications from LACoFD, LASD, OEM, and other law
enforcement agencies. This information is then escalated to Supervisor Lindsey Horvath and
disseminated to the public through various channels, including text messages, emails, and social
media. SD3 collaborates with cities to ensure that its communications colleagues in those
jurisdictions have the necessary information to share with their communities. SD3 also leverages
various social media platforms, including X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, Facebook, and
Nextdoor, to disseminate information. Nextdoor enables SD3 to target specific neighborhoods in
need of protection. They also collaborate with cities and local media to disseminate information.
On January 5, 2025, Supervisor Horvath amplified the NWS’s post about the high wind watch
expected on January 7 via social media.
31 https://www.communitybrigade.org/ Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Foundation. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
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Supervisorial District 5 Office
Preparedness Activities
The Supervisorial District 5 (SD5) office tracked the wind event via social media, using
platforms such as X, Facebook, and Instagram to monitor updates from the NWS and other
sources. They also issued a press release on January 7, urging individuals to prepare for the
upcoming windstorm. This press release was posted on Supervisor Kathryn Barger’s website and
social media. SD5 supports and promotes community engagement in fire and emergency
preparedness efforts, working alongside the LACoFD’s Community Services Liaison to educate
residents on Genasys, Ready-Set, Go, and other platforms for alerts.
Alert Messaging Amplification
Like SD3, during emergencies, SD5 receives notifications from LACoFD, LASD, OEM, and
other law enforcement agencies. This information is then escalated to Supervisor Barger and
disseminated to the public through various social media platforms, including X, Facebook, and
Instagram.
Community Preparedness
SD5’s community preparedness efforts are ongoing throughout the year and include supporting
local LASD sheriff and LACoFD fire stations both directly—using discretionary funding—and
indirectly—through their non-profit branches like Boosters—with the goal of enhancing their
access to critical equipment and overtime budgets to protect public safety. SD5 has also funded
CERT training and hosts regular press conferences and community events to raise awareness
around wildfire risk and preparedness. It also promotes platforms such as Nixle, as well as
utilizing community service liaisons from LACoFD and LASD departments for community
events. SD5 also builds and maintains a broad-based mailing list and social media following to
ensure effective communication with the community and the ability to amplify preparedness
messaging shared by partners across the County family. Their mailing list comprises over 99,800
subscribers across SD5. SD5 also has a field deputy dedicated to reaching out to community
organizations, churches, and leaders to keep them informed and gather updates.
Joint Pre-Incident Preparedness
County partners engaged in and conducted a number of pre-incident preparedness activities.
Specifically, in the areas of the County designated as “high fire hazard severity zones,” the
LACoFD, LASD, and OEM established significant day-to-day coordination and preparedness
efforts with their response partners and the communities. Daily efforts in emergency
preparedness are often referred to as taking place on “blue sky” days, which alludes to being
prepared for times of incident response, or “gray sky” days.
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Blue Sky Preparedness
The LACoFD, LASD, and/or OEM undertake pre-fire preparations throughout the year, outside
of specific incident preparedness efforts. These blue-sky preparations include, but are not limited
to:
• Activities conducted by the Malibu/Lost Hills Sheriff Station and Fire Station 70 in
Malibu, including meetings with fire officials, training events, tabletop exercises, and
community engagement to prepare for potential fires and evacuations.
• Regular meetings between the LACoFD, LASD, and OEM to discuss fire scenarios,
evacuation plans, and community-specific strategies.
• Various training and exercise events; for example, a full-day event was held at Camp 2,
during which past fires were reviewed, and response strategies were discussed.
• Tabletop exercises, which follow the Incident Command System (ICS) format and involve
multiple agencies and engagements with community organizations, such as the TCEP and
various homeowner associations, to discuss evacuation procedures and conduct driving
tours of vulnerable areas. LACoFD and LASD also coordinated with the TCEP to develop
a contraflow plan for the Topanga area. While it was not necessary to implement the plan
during the Palisades Fire, it is a tool they can use in the future.
• The LACoFD and Pepperdine University’s annual review of the university’s
comprehensive shelter-in-place plan; LACoFD has a strong presence on the campus and
supports the plan as the safest course of action. This has proven very successful in
mitigating fires and has resulted in national recognition of the university as a leader in
wildfire and emergency response.32
• General preparedness measures, including creating fire bags with personal protective
equipment (PPE) for LASD deputies, conducting radio advertisements during high-wind
events, implementing resident-only closures in Topanga Canyon, and encouraging schools
in that area to close during Red Flag days.
• Joint monthly meetings between the LACoFD, LA City Fire Department, U.S. Forest
Service, Pasadena Fire Department, Glendale Fire Department, and the Mountains,
Recreation & Conservancy Authority aim to build relationships, discuss operations and
best practices, review incidents, and pre-plan for incidents that frequently occur on a
jurisdiction’s borders.
32 Brush Fires « Pepperdine Emergency Information Pepperdine University Emergency Information Last referenced September 3, 2025.
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Importance of Relationships and Training
During the interviews for this AAR, County staff
highlighted the importance of established relationships
and training between fire and law enforcement agencies,
which facilitates better coordination during incidents.
They noted that the annual Susana Workshop is a key
training program that brings together various agencies
to practice and improve their response to an incident,
and they placed particular emphasis on the need for
better training for law enforcement officers to
understand the fire ICS and their role within it.
Participants from LASD, LACoFD, and OEM
emphasized the need for continuous engagement and
improved communication and coordination to ensure
agencies remain prepared for future incidents.
UCG Meetings: As previously mentioned, UCG meetings are the standard operating procedure,
facilitated by OEM, for response organizations in the County during a significant event. The
establishment of these meetings cultivates relationship and trust building and fosters situational
awareness. The first UCG meeting for the January wind event was held on January 6. During this
first call, County departments discussed staff augmentation, resource allocation,
communications, and coordination in preparation for the predicted possible fire event.
Multi-Threat Zone (MTZ) Plan: The County is involved in the MTZ plan, which establishes
the roles of Ventura County, Los Angeles County, and the City of Los Angeles in managing fire
incidents in this zone. The MTZ has a high risk of fire incidents and includes various
jurisdictions and agencies, each with specific roles and responsibilities. The MTZ includes areas
such as the 118 Santa Susana Pass, known for its frequent fires driven by the Santa Ana winds.
The MTZ plan takes into account historical fire patterns, ensuring a proactive approach to fire
management in these high-risk areas.
Each year, stakeholders from Ventura County, Los Angeles County, and the City of Los Angeles
meet to review and update the MTZ plan. This ensures that all parties are prepared and
coordinated in the event of a fire, reducing the need for negotiations during an actual incident. As
contracted counties with CAL FIRE, Ventura County and Los Angeles County fire departments
provide watershed fire protection for SRAs within the MTZ, while the City of Los Angeles
handles local responsibilities. This division of roles helps streamline the response and
management of fire incidents in the area.
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Pre-Incident Preparedness Messaging
and Evacuation Messaging
This section discusses the County’s efforts to increase the public’s engagement and awareness of
preparedness messaging protocols before the ignition of the Eaton and Palisades Fires. It
explores the systems used to distribute pre-event preparedness messaging; provides an overview
of the channels the County leveraged to distribute alert messages; discusses the public response
to the County’s emergency preparedness messaging; and highlights gaps, challenges, and
opportunities to elevate public awareness of fire readiness and evacuation preparedness in
response to an increased fire risk.
Public Pre-Incident Preparedness and Awareness
In the days leading up to the Eaton and Palisades Fire, the NWS issued increasingly urgent
warnings about dangerous fire weather conditions. On January 6, at around 2:00 p.m., the NWS
posted a tweet that highlighted the severity of the incoming windstorm, calling it life-threatening
and destructive. At 9:47 p.m. on January 6, they tweeted that it was now a Red Flag Warning and
that there was high fire risk. Despite these early notifications, public awareness of the fire risk
and preparedness varied across individuals and communities due to several factors.
Primary among these factors was
the frequency of fires in the
communities. In the community
listening sessions, County
residents reported being
desensitized to fire notifications,
preparedness, and evacuation
messaging content, and they felt
that messaging did not provide
sufficient context on the severity
of a fire, potentially due to the
character limitations of wire
emergency alerts (WEAs)
constraining how much detail
can be included in a message. A
common theme in the sessions
was that residents vividly Figure 10: Example of the NWS’s December 30, 2024, critical fire weather warning
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recalled receiving their first notification about the Eaton or Palisades Fires but were reluctant to
act, as the severity of the fires was not discernible in the notification messaging.
For residents in SD3, fires are frequent and have necessitated strong, battle-tested public
communication and interagency coordination efforts among official preparedness and response
entities, including the LACoFD, LASD, OEM, City of Malibu, City of Los Angeles, and SD3
Office. Many in the community experienced the Broad and/or Franklin Fires in November and
December 2024, and a significant number participated in and were aware of community
preparedness programs, with an increase in participation following the devastating Woolsey Fire
in 2018.
In the Altadena area of SD5, which was impacted by the Eaton Fire, it had been a very long time
since a fire prompted an evacuation. Areas west of Eaton Canyon had not burned since the 1930s
and areas east had likely not been evacuated since the Kinneloa Mesa Fire in 1993.33 Prior to the
Eaton Fire, Altadena was not classified as a high-hazard area for wildfires in CAL FIRE’s FHSZ
maps, whereas the entire perimeter of the Palisades Fire was within a very high FHSZ. While
fires do burn in the area, they have rarely threatened the urban unincorporated areas of Altadena
and Pasadena and have remained within the San Gabriel Mountains and Angeles National Forest,
which borders Altadena. Significant fires in the area include the Station Fire in 2009 and the
Kinneloa Fire in 1993. While those two fires prompted evacuations along the base of the
33 Wildfire Ravages Eaton Canyon, Destroys Nature Center 30 Years Ago Today—MyEatonCanyon.com, Edgar McGregor. Last referenced
September 3, 2025.
Figure 11: Fire Hazard Severity Zone Maps for Palisades Fire, Eaton Fire, and LA County
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foothills in Altadena, other fires in the area rarely resulted in large-scale urban impact or
evacuations. While the LASD and LACoFD have strong ties to the Altadena and Pasadena
community, their public communication and coordination efforts in response to fire events have
not been thoroughly tested due to the lower frequency of fires in these areas in recent years.
Official Preparedness Messaging
Official preparedness messaging to
the public prior to the ignition of
the Eaton and Palisades Fires was
disseminated in several phases.
The earliest public preparedness
messaging for the dangerous wind
event forecast for the week of
January 6 came from the NWS’s
Los Angeles/Oxnard office.
Messaging began with fire weather
forecasts for the week of January 6
on December 31, 2024, with the
NWS first issuing a Red Flag
Warning. Later on December 31,
wind projections were
downgraded, and NWS Los
Angeles/Oxnard communicated via
X that all Red Flag Warnings had
been cancelled but that an elevated fire danger still existed. However, on January 2, NWS Los
Angeles/Oxnard communicated via X and other platforms about the potential for moderate to
strong Santa Ana winds and extreme fire weather conditions from Tuesday through Thursday of
that week. This tweet garnered over 191,000 views and was retweeted 57 times. The NWS
increased the frequency of warning messages in the days leading up to the event. Its advisories
warned of increased severity in the subsequent days, leading to messaging on X and other social
media platforms on January 6 that warned of a “life-threatening and destructive” rare event
category called a PDS.
As previously mentioned, a memo from the LACoFD leadership on January 6 (the day before the
Eaton and Palisades Fire ignitions) advised the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors of a
PDS Red Flag Warning that was projected to impact parts of the County “not normally prone to
Figure 12: Example of the NWS’s social media messaging on January 5, 2025, warning
of high winds and fire risk
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strong winds.”34 This memo likened the potential impact of these winds “to the
November/December 2011 wind event,” which caused widespread damage throughout the
County. On January 6 and 7, OEM informed staff for the Board of Supervisors of the County’s
preparedness actions and highlighted the risk and threats posed by this weather event.
Following the memo to the Board of Supervisors, press releases and statements with
preparedness messaging were issued by Supervisor Horvath and Supervisor Barger as follows:
• January 6, 2025: At 4:22 p.m., SD3 issued an advisory titled “Prepare for the Red Flag
Warning,” urging residents to be aware of their surroundings and monitor the situation
closely.
• January 7, 2025: At 5:00 a.m., SD5 issued a statement on the upcoming windstorm and
high fire risk, urging residents to prepare for the extreme weather conditions and potential
fire hazards.
In addition to the advisory and press releases from SD3 and SD5 (as noted above) and LACoFD
on January 7, and the LACoFD’s memo to the Board of Supervisors, most other official
preparedness messaging from the County and its departments was the reposting and
amplification of NWS information, primarily via X, Instagram, and Facebook. OEM also issued
original posts in addition to amplifying NWS messaging. These messages are essential tools the
County leverages to increase community awareness of fire hazard information shared by the
NWS.
For preparedness messaging shared via social media to be effective, residents must follow and
pay active attention to these County accounts. Anyone not following these accounts could also
be notified of fire risk and dangerous weather conditions through local media coverage or other
non-official channels, such as WatchDuty. This means that official messaging serves as an
important information source not only for the public but also for media outlets that amplify this
messaging to broader public audiences who do not follow County-official social media accounts.
Therefore, the content and frequency of this messaging are crucial in ensuring the public is
adequately notified of potential fire threats.
Local Media Coverage Impacting Public Pre-Incident Awareness
In the days leading up to January 7, 2025, local news outlets covered the intensifying fire risk,
echoing the warnings issued by the NWS and other official entities. On January 5, 2025, news
34 Memo from Chief Anthony Marrone to all LA County Supervisors re: Life Threatening and Destructive Widespread Windstorm and Fire
Weather, January 6, 2025 (physical document).
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broadcasts reported on the looming wintertime fire threat in Southern California, underscoring
the significant potential for fire activity driven by the anticipated windstorm.
By January 6, news reports highlighted the NSW’s prediction of the life-threatening nature of the
windstorm forecast to batter Ventura and Los Angeles counties. The coverage stressed the
threatening and destructive nature of the impending storm and the heightened fire risk it posed,
with outlets continuously reporting on the wind event and warning residents about the severe fire
weather conditions accompanying the powerful windstorm.
On the morning of January 7, updates from local news outlets were punctuated with reports of
fires igniting in various locations, the critically severe fire weather conditions, and the life-
threatening windstorm sweeping through Southern California. This vital coverage served as an
additional warning call, urging residents to heed the warnings and take necessary precautions,
just as the official messages from other sources had earlier emphasized.
Enhancing County Preparedness Messaging
There are four main mechanisms through which County preparedness messaging can flow to the
public for a weather event such as the one that led to the January 2025 fires: primary weather
reports deriving from the NWS, amplification efforts of NWS messages through official County
departmental mechanisms and cities/municipalities, Board of Supervisors’ offices, and local
media reports. All channels must be leveraged to ensure the public is aware of upcoming risky
weather events.
However, responsibility for who leads the County’s efforts to disseminate preparedness
messaging in cases of extreme weather risk and danger is not clearly identified in County
policies, the County’s Emergency Operating Plan (EOP), or the operating manuals and/or
policies for the LASD, LACoFD, or OEM. This means that, despite the actions taken and
described above, messaging the high level of risk to the public regarding the Santa Ana wind
event in early January 2025 was not emphasized as effectively as it could have been. Knowledge
existed at the County level about the danger of the PDS/Red Flag Warning for the week of
January 6, and incident response teams were preparing internally to respond. However, official
communication to the public indicating the high risk and potential impact of this weather event
and its associated fire risk did not go out in a universally accessible format from County sources
beyond a handful of posts and the amplification of NWS language through County social media
and press releases. The County reposted and amplified messaging but did not send out any stand-
alone countywide preparedness messaging to residents. The lack of an official message from the
County is particularly concerning because the County knew that this was a PDS event, which
signals a significantly higher risk than regular Red Flag events.
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Emergency Alert Messaging Tools
Following preparation efforts to ready
emergency responders and notify the
public of the potential impact of a fire
event, ignition of both the Eaton and
Palisades Fires prompted the County
and its partners to employ multiple
systems to communicate emergency
evacuation warnings and orders
information to the public. These
systems included WEAs sent by OEM
through the Genasys ALERT platform,
NOAA Weather Radio, social media
platforms, vehicle sirens, door knocks,
and other emergency communication
tools, as summarized in Figure 9 and
described in detail below.
Universal (No Opt-In or Subscription Required) Tools
Universal tools available to Los Angeles County residents include:
• WEAs: WEAs are free, 90 to 360-character emergency text messages sent to mobile
devices within range of cell towers broadcasting in an affected area. Residents do not
have to sign up for WEAs. In Los Angeles County, OEM can send WEAs from the
Genasys ALERT system. WEAs can be sent countywide or targeted to specific
areas/zones and provide alerts to both residents and visitors in the targeted area. Within
the Genasys ALERT system, OEM can target messages directly to identified zones in the
accompanying Genasys EVAC system. WEAs are limited to English and Spanish but
cannot include special characters in Spanish. They are also limited to text/URLs—
photographs and maps cannot be included. It should be noted that many of the 88 cities in
Los Angeles County can disseminate alert and warning messages to their residents and
visitors, and most of them have different systems from the County for doing so. This
creates a level of complexity regarding responsibilities and consistent messaging. Some
jurisdictions are Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) Alerting
Authorities and can send WEA messages, while others are not, so in multi-jurisdictional
incidents, the coordination of alert and warning efforts is essential. If local authorities
cannot send messages, the California State Warning Center operated by CalOES can
issue alerts within the Los Angeles County operational area.
Figure 13: Los Angeles County’s Protective Action Notification Hierarchy
(County of Los Angeles Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan)
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• NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR): The nationwide NWR network broadcasts
forecasts, warnings, and emergency information 24 hours a day. A special weather radio
receiver is required to receive NWR broadcasts. While accessing a weather radio is
optional, no sign-up is necessary to receive alerts when they go out. These radios can
receive alerts about fires and other hazards, including dangerous weather conditions.
Weather radios with battery backup are not dependent on power, internet, or cell towers.
Approximately 3500 NOAA weather radios had been distributed in SD3 by the time of the
Palisades Fire.
• IPAWS: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manages IPAWS, which
is used to send notifications for three alert categories—Presidential, AMBER, and
Imminent Threat. Residents do not have to sign up for IPAWS alerts. IPAWS includes
systems such as the Emergency Alert System (EAS) and WEAs. The County also
manages IPAWS Aware through its Internal Services Department. IPAWS Aware
automates IPAWS monitoring and increases situational awareness by providing activation
reports emailed to stakeholders with message details, images of impacted areas,
geographic information system (GIS) shapefiles, etc.
• EAS: The EAS is a national public warning system that allows authorized officials to
broadcast emergency alerts and warning messages to the public via various media,
including cable, satellite, and broadcast television, as well as AM, FM, and satellite radio.
EAS messages can be delivered to all listeners/viewers of stations across Los Angeles
County, regardless of the location impacted by an incident. While the EAS is a far-
reaching and well-intentioned system, it has notable shortcomings, especially during fast-
spreading emergencies like wildfires because EAS messages rely on people actively
watching television or listening to the radio; those who are not tuned in or are asleep at the
time the alert is sent out will not receive the EAS messages. Additionally, the system’s
limitation to English-only messages can reduce accessibility for non-English speakers. So,
although the EAS is a valuable tool during emergencies, these gaps highlight the need for
complementary alert systems to ensure that timely warnings reach everyone at risk.
• Tactical Evacuation Alerts by the LACoFD and LASD: The LASD and LACoFD also
use various tactical methods to alert residents, including running vehicle sirens,
announcing evacuation messages on loudspeakers, and individual door-to-door
notifications. LASD deputies knocked on doors during the Eaton and Palisades Fires to
instruct citizens to evacuate immediately, and some played pre-recorded messages on their
vehicles’ public address (PA) systems. LACoFD firefighters also assisted with
evacuations during the Eaton and Palisades Fires when they received calls to assist with
rescues and encountered residents in neighborhoods threatened by the fires.
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• Public Broadcasting Service Warning, Alert, and Response Network (PBS WARN):
The PBS WARN acts as a crucial backup system in emergency communications. In the
event of a crisis, an alert originator, such as a local emergency manager or authorized
government agency, sends an alert through FEMA’s IPAWS system. FEMA then
disseminates the alert, primarily through mobile carriers, which deliver it to user devices,
such as smartphones. Simultaneously, FEMA routes the alert to the PBS WARN, which
uses satellite uplinks to deliver the message to public television stations. This ensures
alerts are broadcast even if mobile networks are down, providing redundancy and broader
public reach.
In addition to this broadcast capability, the PBS WARN website displays every WEA
issued in the United States and its territories. FEMA and public safety professionals rely
on the PBS WARN site for real-time situational awareness, alert validation, and historical
searches for expired alerts to support AARs and training. Complementing this tool is the
Eyes on IPAWS app, which provides emergency managers with real-time access to
WEAs. The app receives alerts directly from local PBS member station airwaves using a
television antenna and receiver. It is completely independent of internet or cellular
networks, making it an invaluable backup resource for EOCs.
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Self-Sought Emergency Information Sources and Opt-In Alert Systems
Emergency Messaging tools available to Los Angeles County residents to learn about and
maintain awareness of emergencies include a range of resources including opt-in emergency
notification messaging, subscription-based applications, relevant social media accounts and
channels, local news outlets, and public information sources like the Los Angeles County
emergency webpage:
• Alert LA County: Alert LA County is the County’s branded mass notification tool. The
County can send mass notifications using Genasys ALERT, which can send text, email,
teletypewriter, and voice phone call messages to registered users and a select number of
landline phones within the County’s 911 database.
• LACounty.gov/Emergency: LACounty.gov/Emergency is the County’s website activated
during an emergency. The website provides a range of information for the public’s
reference. It indicates the areas affected by an emergency, impacts to County services and
facilities, information regarding human and animal shelters, water and health alerts, road
closures, and transportation information, and provides links to media releases and other
public information sources.
• Ready LA County: Ready LA County (ready.lacounty.gov) is the County’s emergency
preparedness website, which has resources available to residents on how to plan for
emergencies, keep supplies, stay informed, and get involved in preparedness efforts.
Figure 14: Examples of opt-in alert systems
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• Genasys PROTECT: Genasys PROTECT allows residents to view a map of evacuation
zones and any corresponding warnings or orders via the Genasys PROTECT website or
through an application for smart devices.
• WatchDuty: WatchDuty provides real-time updates on fire incidents, evacuation orders,
and warnings. While it is a third-party application unaffiliated with the County, it
aggregates information from several official sources, including the County. During the
community listening sessions and in the community surveys, many community members
referred to it as their best and most consistently reliable source of information throughout
both the Eaton and Palisades Fires. LACoFD and LASD personnel also mentioned using it
during the Eaton and Palisades Fires. Although it proved to be useful for many, it is a
privately owned platform and requires users to opt in to receive notifications through the
WatchDuty app or website.
• Social Media: Social media platforms, particularly X, were actively used by NWS Los
Angeles/Oxnard to communicate the impending fire threat and by local County and city
officials to amplify important messaging and provide updates throughout the event.
• Local News Outlets: Many local news outlets offer opt-in services where residents can
sign up to receive alerts and updates via email or text messages. Local outlets, such as
KNX News Radio, were heavily messaging about the impending threat and reporting on
the Eaton and Palisades Fires following ignition.
Considerations Accompanying the Use of Existing Alert Systems
While many methods exist for Los Angeles County to communicate emergency preparedness
and alert information to its 10 million residents, several factors impact their efficacy. Many alert
and notification services are opt-in, which, although openly available to the public, do not reach
every resident. If residents are not aware of or do not sign up for these services, such as Alert
Los Angeles County, Genasys PROTECT, and WatchDuty, they will not benefit from the alerts
and notifications sent from these systems.
Despite the multiple ways they allow the public to receive notifications, issues with opt-in and
universal emergency alert notification systems are exacerbated by their reliance on adequate
cellular, radio, and Wi-Fi signals and coverage, and, most importantly, commercial power. While
redundancies in communication mechanisms exist in the county, they still rely on effective
cellular coverage and do not work when there is poor cellular coverage or when commercial
power is lost to an area. Cellular coverage is weakened when there are fewer cell towers in an
area, while signal quality suffers when its use exceeds available capacity or when heavy smoke
from a fire interferes, reflects, or absorbs radio signals.
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Cell towers are particularly vulnerable—a PSPS can shut down their power, or a fire can destroy
them. In these cases, it is difficult and sometimes impossible for Alert LA County notifications
to get through, decreasing the reliability of receiving a message relayed through any of the
existing methods. In such conditions, the only reliable redundancy to ensure residents are made
aware of a protective order impacting their area is field-based notifications by public safety
officers, often in the form of door knocks or announcements made over a vehicle-mounted
loudspeaker.
Messaging and Public Response
The County issued numerous evacuation orders and warnings and sent evacuation messages: 51
total zone status changes for the Palisades Fire (32 evacuation warnings and 19 evacuation
orders), and 158 total zone status changes for the Eaton Fire (58 evacuation warnings and 100
evacuation orders). In total, almost 250,000 people were under evacuation warnings or orders for
the Eaton and Palisades Fires.
Before evaluating the effectiveness of evacuation messaging during the Eaton and Palisades
Fires and the public’s response to such messaging, it is essential to acknowledge that some
residents during the community listening sessions and through the community surveys stated that
they did not receive an evacuation warning or evacuation order before deciding to evacuate or
only received the messaging hours after they had already self-evacuated. Additionally, some
individuals reported not receiving any official evacuation messaging, even as the fire approached
their homes. For at least some people, then, formal evacuation messaging had no bearing on their
decision to evacuate; they determined they might be in danger and took action.
Reasons why some residents did not receive any of these alerts may have been the limited
cellular coverage in the Santa Monica Mountains and San Gabriel Mountains, PSPSs shutting
down the power of commercial cell towers that would have transmitted the messages (see
Appendix 8: Public Safety Power Shutoffs for a summary of the PSPSs that impacted the Eaton
and Palisades Fire areas), downed power lines, or signal strength degradation due to heavy
smoke from the fires.
Residents highlighted gaps in the efficacy of evacuation messaging, beginning with what they
perceived to be the underwhelming urgency and severity of preparedness messaging to
adequately communicate the potential impact of a PDS Red Flag Warning versus a regular Red
Flag Warning (the difference between the two is discussed earlier in the document).35 Many
35 See page 12, paragraph 1 in section titled “A Perfect Storm.”
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residents had experienced Red Flag Warnings before and had trouble discerning the greater risk
conveyed in a PDS. Many residents noted this as an issue, as it impacted their readiness posture.
Residents also described having
trouble with the format of the
evacuation messages they did
receive, as the messages required
them to click a link to get the
information, rather than
providing detailed information in
the alert. Due to the limited
number of characters allowed in
alerts, each evacuation message
sent provided a link to the
County’s emergency information
website,
(lacounty.gov/emergency, also
known as alertla.org), where they could then access updated information and available resources
on shelters, traffic and transportation routes, and other information.
Some residents said that they relied on third-party apps, such as WatchDuty, or social media for
updates; some were alerted by neighbors or family members; and some observed the conditions
outside their homes and made the decision to leave. The feedback indicates that there was no
clearly recognized, centralized source of accurate information that community members knew
about or were able to use for guidance, particularly regarding available resources and the latest
evacuation routes.
Residents also noted other issues that occurred after the fires ignited and evacuation warnings
and orders began being issued and sent to the public:
• Fire Update Communication Gaps: The communication system for alerts and warnings
did not provide complete information about the fire’s progression, including the names
and locations of evacuation zones or general areas of evacuation. The extreme and rapidly
moving fire conditions challenged the situational awareness of fire and law enforcement
first responders, making it difficult to communicate the fire’s location to the public. This
was especially prevalent during the Eaton Fire, when wind conditions grounded aerial
resources, including surveillance, almost immediately after the fire started. As a result,
residents expressed frustration over wanting more frequent updates and their reliance on
unofficial sources, such as social media and community groups.
Figure 15: Example of a WEA
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• Messaging Timing: The County made decisions to issue evacuation warnings and
evacuation orders to the public as soon as the County ascertained the fires’ status, which
rapidly evolved throughout the incident. This sometimes left residents with little time to
prepare and evacuate. Evacuation decisions and messages could not keep pace with the
fire. Once Unified Command communicated an evacuation decision, the fire had already
impacted another zone. Some areas did not receive an evacuation warning before residents
decided to leave, as was the case in many neighborhoods west of Lake Avenue in
Altadena during the Eaton Fire. This contributed to confusion and panic, with many
evacuating residents feeling that they had little time to collect essential belongings.
• Power Outages: PSPS and unplanned outages caused by wind and fire damage
significantly disrupted the effectiveness of evacuation messaging. These power
interruptions hindered residents’ access to emergency notifications, especially in areas
with limited cellular backup or where internet service was compromised. In some
neighborhoods, automated call systems failed to operate due to the loss of electricity,
while residents without battery-powered radios or charged devices missed critical
evacuation updates. The compounded effect of PSPS and infrastructure damage created
communication gaps, delayed public awareness, and added complexity to coordinated
evacuation efforts, underscoring the importance of redundant, multi-channel alert systems
in wildfire-prone regions.
• Challenges in Evacuation Process Due to Inadequate Information in Evacuation
Messages: Residents reported that evacuations were chaotic due to a lack of clear
instructions in evacuation messaging, and many reported that they evacuated based on
their own observations or advice from neighbors rather than on official guidance. Some
said that while evacuating, they encountered blocked roads and did not witness any
emergency personnel helping to direct traffic—this applied to both the Eaton and
Palisades Fires. Many reported having no support from first responders to evacuate and
experiencing difficulties navigating through smoke, fallen trees, and debris.
For many, evacuation alert fatigue played a role in their decision to leave or not leave their
homes. This was especially true for residents in SD3, who experienced frequent wildfire threats
and associated evacuation warnings and alerts. Just a few months prior to the Eaton and
Palisades Fires, SD3 residents received approximately three different PDS messages from the
NWS. While these earlier PDS events were significant and did result in destructive fires (Broad
Fire, Mountain Fire, and Franklin Fire) that posed significant risk to life and resulted in property
loss, many residents who received the three PDS messages did not experience the fires since they
did not reach their neighborhoods. As a result, many residents did not take the NWS’s PDS on
January 6, 2025, for a notable wind event and potential fire hazard seriously. Community
members frequently described this as warning fatigue.
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Community members also reported that deciphering language used in the messages for
evacuation warnings and evacuation orders alerts was challenging, with language such as “fast-
moving wildfire in your area” reportedly not being specific or actionable enough for residents.
Names of evacuation zones also posed a challenge—residents highlighted the need for
messaging about evacuation zones to include street names and/or landmarks as geographic
boundaries instead of the current system of letters and numbers. Some residents indicated they
did not know the name of their evacuation zones, which made understanding the evacuation
messaging more difficult.
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Coordination and Resources
Roles of County Departments
This section provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of the three main County
entities involved in the decision-making process to issue evacuation warnings and evacuation
orders, send evacuation messaging, and effectuate evacuations.
Working in close coordination with city-level partners and other mutual aid partners, the
LACoFD, LASD, and OEM are the critical decision-makers and implementors of messaging and
evacuations during a fire event. Each of these three organizations has a distinct role, and they are
reliant on input from and coordination between each other to execute a safe and successful
evacuation process. The LACoFD and LASD decide whether there is a need to issue evacuation
warnings and evacuation orders during a fire event, while OEM is tasked with evacuation
messaging to the public regarding evacuation decisions. Although multiple agencies have the
flexibility to decide whether an emergency notification should be sent, in practice, OEM sends
the WEAs once the decision has been made.
Determining which entity has the authority to make evacuation decisions varies from event to
event and is often based on expertise related to the nature of the incident. During the interviews
for this AAR, Unified Commanders from LASD, LACoFD, and OEM, almost universally
acknowledged that for a wildfire LACoFD would typically make evacuation recommendations
for its jurisdiction with input and community knowledge from LASD and other jurisdictional law
enforcement and fire officials.
The LASD shared their EOB’s SOPs for fire, which states, “Evacuation Branch Managers of
both Fire and Law…co-located and making joint decisions” at the ICP.36 This was the procedure
that was supposed to be followed during both the Eaton and Palisades Fires, with the LACoFD
leading decision-making on which evacuation zones to call for warnings or orders, the LASD
advising based on its knowledge of the community and the operational resources needed to
execute the evacuation, and OEM sending evacuation messaging to the public. Each of these
three County entities had a distinct role to play in the process, as described in interviews
summarized below and featured in Figure 16.
36 Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department EOB SOP Fires
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Los Angeles County Fire Department
LACoFD provides firefighting, medical emergency, ocean lifeguard, and health hazardous
materials services for the unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County and 13 cities through
contractual agreements and to another 47 areas that became part of the Fire District when the
district was formed. In addition to its local government responsibilities, LACoFD operates as a
contractor with CAL FIRE and is responsible for wildland fire protection on SRA lands through
a cooperative agreement with the State of California. LACoFD also serves as CalOES’s Fire and
Rescue Mutual Aid Coordinator for Region I, coordinating local government fire resources in
Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, Santa Barbara, and San Luis Obispo counties.
As of the LACoFD 2024 Statistical Summary, LACoFD is responsible for 3,965,562 residents,
1,301,527 housing units, 60 district cities, and all unincorporated communities over 2,311 square
miles. LACoFD employs 3,114 firefighting personnel (Internal Document – Staffing Ratio
Information). This equates to roughly one firefighter for every 1,284 residents. In total, Los
Angeles County is home to approximately 9,000 firefighters, including those from LACoFD and
29 other independent fire agencies that operate within the County.
LACoFD operates a robust network of resources, including 176 fire stations, 163 engine
companies, 76 paramedic units, nine helicopters, ten bulldozers, and nine fire suppression camps.
Figure 16:Summary of evacuation decision-making and alerting roles and responsibilities based on stakeholder interviews and review of
County documents.
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In terms of specialized resources, the department maintains four hazardous materials squads, two
urban search and rescue squads, and two fireboats.
During a fire incident, fire agencies serve as the primary monitoring entities of fire behavior at
the ICP and are tasked with determining evacuation warnings and orders based on their
specialized knowledge of fire behavior patterns and progression. According to the established
procedures outlined in the LACoFD’s Fire Manual, V11-C1-S1, the Incident Commander (IC) is
responsible for evaluating and determining the need for evacuation. When an evacuation is
deemed necessary, the IC contacts Command and Control to request assistance from the local
law enforcement agency.37 Command and Control then request that a law enforcement agency
representative report to the Command Post to prepare evacuation plans. The IC is to coordinate
closely with law enforcement in the development of these evacuation plans, while the law
enforcement agency implements the finalized evacuation plan.38
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
The LASD executes evacuations and issues field evacuation notifications aligned with the
appropriate evacuation order declared, be it a warning or an order. LASD notifies the public of
threats and evacuation orders through direct door-to-door notifications and vehicle-embedded PA
systems while also leading traffic control efforts by implementing necessary road closures to
facilitate safe evacuation routes.
As the largest Sheriff’s department in the United States, with approximately 17,000 staff
members, including sworn officers and professional staff, the LASD plays a fundamental role in
ensuring public safety and coordinating emergency response efforts.39 The LASD works closely
with various agencies and organizations to effectively respond to emergencies, maintain law and
order, and protect the community’s well-being. The LASD’s responsibilities encompass a broad
range of tasks, including search and rescue operations, evacuation coordination, traffic control,
and ensuring order in affected areas. Deputies are deployed to disaster sites to provide immediate
assistance, assess situations, and support relief efforts. Additionally, they establish law
enforcement command structures and collaborate with emergency management to establish vital
communication channels for disseminating critical information to the public.
37 LACoFD Wildland Fire Manual V11-C1-S1 November 1994
38 LACoFD Wildland Fire Manual V11-C1-S1 November 1994
39 Executive Staff | Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Staff Bios. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
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With respect to the decision to issue an evacuation warning or evacuation order according to Los
Angeles County’s Emergency Operations Plan (2023) and the LASD’s internal Manual of Policy
and Procedures, the LASD’s role during a fire incident is primarily supportive.40
According to the LASD’s Emergency Operating Procedure, EOP 2-6 (Evacuations) (2006), the
established evacuation policy for the LASD indicates that, normally, the decision to evacuate an
area during a fire will be made by the LACoFD IC.41 Once this decision has been made, they
communicate the need to the Law Enforcement IC. The responsibility to conduct the evacuation
in the field rests with the Law Enforcement IC. However, if the Law Enforcement IC receives
conflicting information regarding the need to evacuate, if there is an unreasonable delay in
receiving this information, or if, in their professional opinion, an evacuation is warranted, it is
the Sheriff department’s policy to evacuate and protect the health and safety of the community
affected by the incident.42 Similarly, Los Angeles County’s EOP identifies the LACoFD as the
leading agency that manages wildfires.
In practice, these seemingly conflicting guidelines, plans, and procedures have caused
uncertainty around who has the responsibility to make the decision to issue an evacuation
warning or order during fire emergencies.
Evacuation Messaging
County policies lack the direction and specificity needed for residents to make informed
evacuation decisions. Evacuation notifications and messaging to the public are detailed in
County Code 2.68.160 (Authority for Alerts, Warnings, and Emergency Notifications to the
Public), which provides “The Chief Executive Officer, the Sheriff, the Fire Chief and the County
Director of Public Health authority to issue, disseminate and coordinate alerts, warnings and
emergency notifications to the public. With respect to such alerts, warnings, and emergency
notifications, the Office of Emergency Management is authorized to coordinate consistency of
messaging.” Based on this, LACoFD, LASD, and OEM each have the authority to message and
communicate evacuation warnings and orders. In practice, during a wildfire, OEM has the
critical role of capturing decisions made by ICs and message evacuation decisions using
emergency alert and notification systems. There is a need to review County Code 2.68 and give
further clarity and direction around messaging to the public when evacuation warnings and
evacuation orders have been issued.
40 Fig 7, Page 29 County of Los Angeles Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan November 2023. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
41 LASD EOP 2-6 Evacuations May 2006
42 LASD EOP 2-6 Evacuations May 2006
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Office of Emergency Management
OEM is an all-hazards emergency management organization responsible for the coordination of
all phases of the disaster continuum—planning, preparedness, response, recovery, and
mitigation—for large-scale emergencies and disasters across Los Angeles County. OEM is
organizationally located within the Chief Executive Office, Administrative Services Division,
and has a staff of 37 personnel and no dedicated operating budget. Compared to OEMs in
jurisdictions of similar size (although not as large or complex), Los Angeles County’s OEM has
significantly less staff, budget, and autonomy over its operating capabilities. The table below
provides a comparison for reference.
Emergency Management Staffing and Funding for Population-Comparable Counties and Cities
Location Population Staffing Level Budget*
Los Angeles County 10,000,000 37 $15 Million**
New York City 8,500,000 200+ (current)
93 (2026 Preliminary)43
approx. $88 Million
(FY26 Preliminary)44
Cook County, IL 5,183,000 54 $131,653 Million 45
San Diego County46 3,300,000 43 $12.3 Million
City of Chicago47 2,600,00048 815 Approx. $110 Million
OEM acts as the day-to-day coordinator for the County’s entire geographic area, working with
88 cities, 137 unincorporated communities, and 288 special districts. OEM maintains, activates,
and operates the CEOC and operates a 24/7 emergency management watch center to address
43 New-York-City-Emergency-Management.pdf. Page 4, Report on the Fiscal 2026 Preliminary Plan and the Fiscal 2026 Preliminary Capital
Commitment Plan for the Committee on Fire and Emergency Management. New York City Council. Last reference September 3, 2025.
44 New-York-City-Emergency-Management.pdf. Page 2, Report on the Fiscal 2026 Preliminary Plan and the Fiscal 2026 Preliminary Capital
Commitment Plan for the Committee on Fire and Emergency Management. New York City Council. Last reference September 3, 2025.
45 https://www.cookcountyil.gov/sites/g/files/ywwepo161/files/documents/2025-02/Volume%202%20%20Adopted%202025_Web.pdf Cook
County, IL Budget Report. Last referenced September 17, 2025.
46 https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/hr/jobs/Director_OES.pdf San Diego County, CA Director of Emergency Services position announcement.
Last referenced September 14, 2025.
47 Number of Employees by Department - Based on Current Employee Names, Salaries, and Position Titles | City of Chicago | Data Portal Last
referenced September 3, 2025.
48 Chicago, Illinois Population 2025 World Population Review. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
*Some of these comparison budgets and staffing levels may include functions and responsibilities not currently included in LA County’s Office
of Emergency Management’s functions or responsibilities.
**Budget number represents operational staff budget managed under CEO’s office.
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emergency conditions. OEM also plays a crucial role in public education and information,
building community resilience by performing preparedness functions.
OEM captures finalized decision information on evacuation zones and evacuation orders from
Unified Command to update the Genasys EVAC platform and subsequently launch WEAs
through Genasys ALERT. This role positions OEM as the central coordination hub for ensuring
consistent and accurate messaging reaches the public through established emergency notification
systems.
In addition to this central role in coordinating messaging of evacuation decisions, OEM has
several other emergency preparedness and response responsibilities. According to Section
2.68.270 (Powers and Duties) of Part 5 (Emergency and Disaster Activities and Operations—
Roles and Responsibilities) of County Code 2.68 (Emergency Services), the Director of OEM
has extensive duties that support the overall emergency response framework.49 These
responsibilities include organizing and coordinating the emergency organization of the County,
which encompasses coordinating training, developing and reviewing the Los Angeles County
Operational Area Emergency Plan and Board-ordered departmental emergency plans, as well as
County emergency preparedness activities. The director establishes and maintains liaison with
city governments within Los Angeles County and other governmental and quasi-governmental
agencies, as well as volunteer organizations relating to emergency preparedness.50
49https://library.municode.com/ca/los_angeles_County/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT2AD_DIV3DEOTADBO_CH2.68EMSE_PT5EM
DIACOPOLRE_2.68.270PODU June 24, 2025. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
50https://library.municode.com/ca/los_angeles_County/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT2AD_DIV3DEOTADBO_CH2.68EMSE_PT5EM
DIACOPOLRE_2.68.270PODU June 24, 2025. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
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LACoFD, LASD, and OEM work together and with additional partners to decide on,
communicate, and implement evacuation decisions. Significant forethought and preparation are
required to prepare for incidents where evacuation is possible. An overview of the steps followed
by key stakeholders to determine and
communicate evacuation decisions is
described in further detail in subsequent
sections.
It is worth noting that in addition to the
roles of the three County departments, other
jurisdictions covering the City of Los
Angeles and surrounding unincorporated
areas play an important role. The City of
Los Angeles (including LAPD, LAFD, and
the Department of Emergency
Management), as well as the emergency
management agencies of the City of
Pasadena and City of Malibu, were involved
in managing the Eaton and Palisades Fires.
They were a part of Unified Command and
were often the first responders on scene. Figure 17: Map of incorporated an unincorporated areas in
Los Angeles County (Source)
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Evacuation Processes and Public Safety
Measures
The Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Plan (2023) defines an evacuation as the
organized and systematic process of relocating people from an area or location that is at risk or
threatened by an imminent hazard or disaster to designated evacuation centers or safer areas, out
of harm’s way.51 The County uses the state approved evacuation terminology when making
evacuation-related decisions and sending notifications regarding such decisions:
1. Evacuation Warning: Potential threat to life and/or property. Those who require
additional time to evacuate and those with pets and livestock should leave now.
2. Evacuation Order: Immediate threat to life. This is a lawful order to leave now. The
area is lawfully closed to public access.
Planning, deciding upon, communicating, and executing evacuation-related actions is a multi-
step process. This rest of this section discusses how evacuations were determined and executed
for the Eaton and Palisades Fires, highlights gaps or deviations from the established processes,
and causative factors affecting evacuation efforts.
Process and Decision-Making for Evacuation Issuance
Evacuation Decision-Making
Evacuation warnings and evacuation orders are issued based on pre-defined zones, which are
developed in the County’s evacuation planning system, Genasys EVAC. While pre-defined,
these zones are modifiable as needed during an incident. During a fire event, Unified Command
monitors fire behavior and should coordinate to determine evacuation zones and issue evacuation
warnings and evacuation alerts. Zone recommendations are made based on real-time assessments
of the fire’s progression and knowledge of the operational area. Once a decision on protective
action is made (whether an evacuation warning or an order), this decision needs to be
documented in Genasys EVAC.
For the Palisades Fire, the zones receiving evacuation warnings and evacuation orders were
identified by Unified Commanders, including the LACoFD and LASD. The zones were
communicated directly to OEM’s agency representative (A-Rep) in the field at Incident
Command. OEM’s A-Rep then communicated these zones by phone call and/or text with OEM
51 County of Los Angeles Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan November 2023. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
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staff in the EOC, who then updated the zones in the Genasys EVAC system and thereafter sent
evacuation messaging out via Genasys ALERT. In a few instances, OEM’s A-Rep was able to
select the zones in the Genasys EVAC system while in the field prior to calling or texting the
zone updates to their teammates in the EOC.
For the Eaton Fire, the evacuation zones receiving evacuation warnings and orders were
identified by LACoFD staff as part of Unified Command. They were then communicated to
OEM’s A-Rep in the ICP. OEM’s A-Rep then communicated the zones by phone call and/or text
with OEM staff in the EOC, who then selected the zones in the Genasys EVAC system and
thereafter sent evacuation messages out via the Genasys ALERT system. It does not appear that
LASD staff were always initially aware in real time of what zones were designated for
evacuation orders or warnings by Unified Command, because while they were co-located in the
same area at the ICP, they were not physically side by side when all evacuation warning and
order decisions were made.
During the interview process, LACoFD staff in the field in Altadena recall suggesting to Unified
Command LACoFD staff a little before 12:00 a.m. on January 8 that due to high winds,
evacuation orders should go out for the foothills of Altadena, all the way to La Canada. Unified
Command staff did not recall this occurring and reported that the fire front for the Eaton Fire was
not moving west into those areas at that time (see Appendix 12: Fire Front Progression). What is
clear, however, is that Unified Command was dealing with a multitude of issues caused by the
catastrophic wind-driven fire and the concerns raised regarding the Eaton Fire reaching the JPL
during the same time frame and having potentially catastrophic impacts across the San Gabriel
Valley. Alerts were not sent out to this area until later in the early morning of January 8, but they
were sent before the fire front crossed west of Lake Avenue.
All evacuation decisions appear to have been communicated to OEM staff in the EOC via phone
call and/or text message. Some stakeholders stated that they had taken field notes about this;
however, those notes were either incomplete, not time-stamped, or not maintained. No official
form or documentation was used by LACoFD, LASD or OEM to jointly and formally record
which zones should receive evacuation orders or warnings, the time the decision was made, or
the time the zones were communicated to OEM staff at the EOC.
Documentation of Evacuation Warnings and Orders
Once OEM receives the information to message an evacuation warning or order for a zone, a
trained individual from OEM logs it into the Genasys EVAC system, selects a zone or zones on
the map, and changes the zone’s status to “Warning” or “Order,” identifiable as a yellow or red
color on the map in the system. Depending on the pace and severity of an incident, this
documentation step is typically done by OEM staff within the County EOC who receive zone
and alert instructions via phone call or text from the designated OEM A-Rep assigned to the
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incident, but this step can sometimes be done in the field by the OEM A-Rep at the ICP if they
have connectivity to Genasys EVAC.
Once a protective action is documented in Genasys EVAC by OEM staff, it should be visible to
anyone, including members of the public, monitoring the Genasys PROTECT application.
However, documenting an evacuation action in Genasys EVAC does not mean that the
emergency alert for that action has been sent—only those closely monitoring Genasys
PROTECT will know that a protective action has been put in place. For the broader public in the
affected area to be notified, a WEA or EAS alert must be issued. When these notifications are
issued, they trigger updates to third-party apps, like WatchDuty and some websites, but the
public must be subscribed to and/or monitor these third-party sources to get these notifications.
Communication of Evacuation Protective Orders to the Public
Once an evacuation decision is determined in the field and documented in the Genasys EVAC
system, it is ready to be communicated to the public via a WEA, which is sent through the
Genasys ALERT system. To accomplish this, trained OEM staff use the zones documented in
Genasys EVAC to log pre-templated messaging in English and Spanish into the Genasys
ALERT system, which then uses geofencing technology to launch that messaging to all
cellphones in the corresponding location for those zones. As long as they are turned on, have
reception, and local cell towers are transmitting the message, cell phones should receive the
WEA shortly after it is sent. OEM does not have the authority to issue evacuation WEAs for any
given zone until its A-Rep in the field or the Unified Commanders explicitly notify it of Incident
Command’s decision to issue an evacuation order or warning and instruct it to issue said order or
warning.
The average time between an evacuation decision being communicated by Unified Command to
OEM A-Reps, OEM A-Reps contacting OEM EOC staff, OEM EOC staff updating the zones in
Genasys EVAC, and OEM EOC staff launching evacuation messages in Genasys ALERT so that
they can be communicated to the public, was approximately 20–30 minutes during these fires.
Despite the newness of this process and the Genasys ALERT system for County OEM staff, this
is a marked improvement in the time taken between an evacuation decision being made and it
being communicated to the public. Previously, the process using the CodeRed platform
reportedly took 30–60 minutes from receiving the evacuation decision to messaging the public.
This demonstrates that some of the many successes with emergency alerts and notification
during the January 2025 wildfires were due to the initiative and adaptability of the relevant OEM
staff members. These staffers specifically acknowledged the quick thinking and composure of
those who sent out WEAs during the intense pressure of the Eaton and Palisades Fires.
In parallel, as WEAs were sent out through the Genasys ALERT system, a select number of
landline phones within the County’s 911 database also received calls via the Genasys ALERT
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system. In addition, emails were sent and voice phone call messages made to registered users of
Alert LA County, the County’s branded mass notification tool for Genasys ALERT.
As previously discussed, WEAs and EAS alerts are not the only way decisions regarding
evacuation actions are shared with the public. While WEAs and emergency alerts can broadly
inform the public, there are additional ways to ensure residents understand the danger of the
situation and the necessity to evacuate. Primary among these is the execution of evacuations,
which are conducted primarily by the LASD. LASD deputies drive through impacted
neighborhoods using their vehicles’ PA systems to alert residents to the threat and order to leave.
Deputies also knock on the doors of homes in the impacted area to ensure residents are aware of
the threat and order them to leave. Evacuation execution is discussed in the next section.
Evacuation Execution
The Palisades Fire erupted in the Santa Monica Mountains before spreading rapidly toward
Pacific Palisades and was initially under LAPD jurisdiction. However, because input from the
LAPD was not provided for this review, official insight into the initial evacuation management is
limited. As the Palisades Fire grew, County LASD began its own evacuation efforts, for which
emergency alert and warning messages were disseminated. The Malibu/Lost Hills Sheriff Station
was among the first to respond, deploying deputies door-to-door and using PA systems with
prerecorded messaging to urge evacuations in the Sunset Mesa community. Prior to LASD’s
DOC assuming full operational control, the SIB immediately coordinated initial response
actions, the mobilization of resources, and critical information flow, and initiated notifications
until DOC personnel arrived and assumed incident oversight. Recognizing the escalating
complexity and intensity of the fires, field personnel recommended activating their IMT 2, a
pivotal move that improved coordination, resource allocation, and strategic decision-making.
The LASD DOC was activated to manage high-level coordination and logistical support. The
DOC oversaw resource tracking, personnel assignments, and asset deployment across multiple
fire zones. Its early activation allowed a timely response to resource requests, including
deploying squads to both the Eaton and Palisades Fire areas. Structured tools such as Microsoft
Lists and ICS 213 resource request forms ensured the organized management of personnel and
equipment. Additionally, the EOB embedded representatives within the DOC and IMT teams to
streamline operations and reduce duplication.
Once the Eaton Fire started, LASD’s Altadena and Crescenta Valley Sheriff staff began
evacuations in the neighborhoods initially impacted, and as more resources were deployed to the
area, they continued evacuations throughout the night and early morning hours. On January 7,
before the Eaton Fire started, LASD staff and patrol cars were sent to assist in the Palisades Fire,
but they subsequently returned to Altadena to assist with evacuations. Additional personnel and
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mobile field forces from nearby Sheriff Stations (Crescenta Valley, Industry, San Dimas, and
Pico Rivera) and Twin Towers Correctional Facility were also deployed to the area to assist,
along with LASD search and rescue (SAR) teams.
Once a formal Unified Command was established for the Eaton Fire—initially at Eaton Canyon
Equestrian Park and later relocating to Farnsworth Park and finally to the Rose Bowl—LASD
staff were co-located in the same parking lot with the LACoFD, OEM, and other local partners,
like the Pasadena Police Department and California Highway Patrol, to handle incident
management and dispatch personnel in real time. They dispatched resources for evacuation
missions to LASD units and LASD SAR teams. Despite utilizing additional personnel, a
shortage of LASD duty vehicles hindered comprehensive coverage across all impacted
neighborhoods. Vulnerable populations, especially older residents who were not monitoring
alerts due to a digital divide and possible mobility challenges, faced increased risks of delayed
evacuation.
The LASD and LACoFD were also involved in evacuating residents from several senior care
facilities, including the Pasadena Park Healthcare and Wellness Center within the first hour of
the fire and the MonteCedro Senior Care Community in Altadena from approximately 4:00 a.m.
on January 8. LASD staff worked to mobilize Pasadena transit buses to these facilities, with
some LASD staff leading bus drivers into and through the impacted fire areas. The use of these
buses allowed the quick evacuation of many vulnerable residents.
For both the Eaton and Palisades Fire, the LACoFD participated in and/or assisted with
evacuations when they encountered residents in neighborhoods or structures or received dispatch
calls to homes for assistance.
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Given the catastrophic nature of the Eaton Fire and the demand for resources to assist with
evacuations, both LASD and LACoFD command level personnel in the field either conducted
individual evacuations or ordered evacuations directly in neighborhoods. This heroic response
was driven by urgency and their commitment to save lives, but it also added additional
complexity to their responsibilities as they worked to maintain broader operational oversight in
the field. However, other staff in the field and at the ICP were available and also handled
incident command and operational responsibilities.
For both fires, some LASD and LACoFD personnel conducting evacuations and rescues of
residents where fires were already burning homes performed heroic actions. In some areas, they
worked with limited to no visibility due to thick smoke or with downed trees and power lines
blocking road access.
Public Compliance Challenges
During the Eaton Fire, information being shared on
social media exacerbated compliance issues. A trending
phrase, “The fire is moving east,” fostered some
complacency and reluctance in residents in Altadena and
those west of Lake Avenue to evacuate and remain
vigilant of potential risks. Vulnerable groups, including
the elderly and non-ambulatory individuals, often relied
on caregivers, family members, or neighbors for
evacuation alerts. Many older residents remained
unaware of the danger during the early hours of January
8, leading to a reluctance to evacuate.
In certain areas, for both fires, some homeowners
believed their properties were safe or had confidence in
extinguishing flames with garden hoses, while others,
particularly those in generational homes, resisted
evacuation due to emotional ties. Some citizens who
used garden hoses to battle the flames held the view that
not enough fire resources had been deployed to defend their homes.
In addition, community members observed citizen volunteers managing traffic at key
intersections instead of law enforcement, raising citizen concerns about the visibility and
availability of official personnel. This highlights the need for a review and possible updating of
the LASD’s evacuation procedures and training to account for fast-moving fire scenarios.
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Findings and Recommendations
The findings and recommendations in this section are grounded in factual evidence and practical
experience. The goal is to provide valuable insights that can inform the development of more
effective and coordinated emergency response strategies for future emergencies.
This section first discusses the strengths and best practices related to evacuation messaging and
processes that emerged during the incidents and identifies which practices that have not yet been
institutionalized should be. Following this, specific areas for improvement in the current systems
and processes are identified. Finally, recommendations for policy and technology enhancements
that address these weaknesses and improve overall preparedness and response are provided.
Strengths and Best Practices
This AAR’s in-depth analysis identified several areas where coordination, resource allocation,
and communication strategies were particularly effective. By recognizing and building upon
these best practices, the County can develop its framework for future emergencies to better
protect the community’s safety and well-being.
Many of the best practices outlined below were derived from activities and strategies
implemented in the Palisades Fire area and represent lessons learned from the Woolsey Fire.
Additionally, formalized partnerships with community groups led to successful self-evacuations,
and the co-location of incident management teams helped the decision-making process.
Relationships
Cultivated relationships between the various organizations played a critical role in the response
to the fires. All stakeholders interviewed in this AAR discussed the close coordination and
relationships built between the LACoFD, LASD, OEM, and community organizations, city
partners, and other fire and law enforcement agencies in the Santa Monica Mountains area.
These relationships and coordination partnerships have been built over the years due to the
historical risk of fire in that area. The use of formalized fire preparedness partnerships with
community groups in the Pacific Palisades, Sunset Mesa, Topanga Canyon, and Malibu led to
many successful self-evacuations in the absence of evacuation notifications being received by
some residents; many individuals had the necessary tools and habits already in place to prepare
themselves for evacuation.
Resources
Activating the UCG and County EOC ahead of time established a County structure that
identified the strategic priorities and resources that would be required. Establishing Unified
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Command early in the response facilitated the co-location of ICs in a single ICP. This was
beneficial for effective coordination and information flow, ensuring that all teams identified
priorities and collaborated effectively. Additionally, the role of LASD’s DOC was crucial in
coordinating LASD resources, ensuring that, despite its limited staffing resources, requests from
the field were fulfilled and that personnel were deployed effectively in alignment with Unified
Command.
Two best practices that should be formalized are the utilization of public transit buses for
evacuations, as was done in the Eaton Fire, and the activation of ambulance companies.
Requested by law enforcement, the use of the buses was praised for its effectiveness in
transporting a large number of people quickly. The activation of emergency medical services
(EMS), including private ambulance providers and other contracted EMS service operators in
Southern California, was highlighted as a successful strategy that ensured that sufficient
ambulances were available for evacuations.52 Another valuable aspect of this strategy was
having ambulance company supervisors co-located at the Unified Command post to ensure that
vehicles were deployed as they were requested.
OEM’s A-Rep program played a critical role during this catastrophic, fast-moving emergency
event. While these efforts were not institutionalized during the Eaton and Palisades Fires and
depended heavily on the initiative of individual OEM staff, it is a valuable program that should
be further formalized. Clear opportunities exist to introduce more structure, consistency, and
regular training to ensure that OEM staff are better prepared and equipped in the future.
Evacuation Decisions
In certain instances, for both fires, ICs applied a systematic approach to decide which zones
should be issued with evacuation warnings and evacuation orders—when an evacuation order
was issued, any zone adjacent to that order would be issued an evacuation warning. This is a best
practice that should be codified as an SOP for future fires.
52 Heroes of the Eaton Fire: California EMS Professionals Recognized With Star of Life Award EMS World Print Online. Rob Lawrence, MCMI,
March 14, 2025. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
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Critical Focus Area #1: Policies, Protocols, Standard Operating
Procedures, and Authority
Figure 18: Chart of policies, procedures, protocols, and SOPs showing the evacuation procedures and policies of each agency,
and where they conflict or do not align 53
The County has conflicting and outdated policies, protocols, and SOPs regarding who has what
authority in the evacuation decision-making and implementation process, except for evacuation
alerting protocols. This has led to inconsistencies in preparedness strategies across the County
and a lack of clear documentation and communication processes. In terms of pre-incident
preparedness notifications and evacuation messages to the public, the County should further
define and clarify the applicable roles.
Key Challenges:
• Policies and protocols are outdated and unclear regarding the roles and responsibilities
involved in the decision to issue an evacuation warning or evacuation order.
• Protocols do not explicitly outline the process or chain of command for the decision to
issue an evacuation warning or evacuation order.
53 Internal LACoFD training document—PowerPoint Presentation named “The Evacuation Need—how it comes together” 2024,
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• Standard procedure does not include having County departments issue general
preparedness notifications and messaging through any of the communication mechanisms
they use.
• The County Code and policies should be aligned and clarified regarding roles and
protocols for messaging evacuation decisions to the public.
Given the complexities and ambiguities surrounding the current evacuation protocols, a more
structured and clear approach is necessary. The challenges highlighted above underscore the
need for a comprehensive review and update of existing policies and procedures, and relevant
County Code sections. Addressing these issues will ensure that all relevant parties are well-
informed and prepared to act decisively in emergencies.
The priority recommendations and actions listed below will help streamline and formalize
policies, authorities, and processes, ensuring a more efficient and effective response during
critical times.
Priority Recommendations and Actions:
• Update policies, procedures, and the County Code to ensure that first responders and
emergency management clearly understand their roles and responsibilities related to
making the decision to issue evacuation warnings and orders, messaging evacuation
decisions, and conducting evacuation procedures.
• Revise key departmental policies, procedures, and processes related to the process for
deciding and sending evacuation warnings and orders so that they align with each other.
• Formalize all aspects of the evacuation process.
• Formalize the process of knowing who sends preparedness messaging, how it is sent, and
when it is sent.
The next section discusses the specific findings that support the priority recommendations and
actions and provide more detailed recommendations for implementation.
Finding
Policies And Protocols of LASD And LACoFD Regarding Evacuation Warnings and
Orders are Often Unclear and Contradictory
LASD and LACoFD policies and protocols regarding making the decision to issue evacuation
warnings and evacuation orders are frequently unclear and contradictory and create an overly
complex process for issuing evacuation warnings and orders. In addition, the County Code
authorizes the LASD, LACoFD, and OEM to message evacuation warnings and orders to the
public. It also provides that OEM is authorized to coordinate the consistency of messaging.
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These roles are not fully defined in the County Code and are not captured in other policies or
protocols.
Recommendations
The County’s three primary emergency response agencies, LACoFD, LASD, and OEM, must
develop and implement a comprehensive countywide strategy that addresses evacuation and
emergency communication challenges identified across their operations. While these agencies
serve as the County’s core emergency response framework, they must establish formal
coordination mechanisms with the 29 other fire agencies and 88 cities within Los Angeles
County that also play critical roles in evacuation operations. The strategy should establish clear
County policies, assign appropriate agency responsibilities, and formalize collaborative
structures with municipal partners to ensure effective implementation and execution. The
overarching objective is to enhance the County’s preparedness capabilities, streamline decision-
making processes, improve public safety messaging, and strengthen both internal agency
accountability and external coordination with local jurisdictions.
Develop a Unified Alert, Warning, and Evacuation Policy Framework
• Update the evacuation roles for the LASD, LACoFD, and OEM based on scenario-
specific needs.
o Clarify that during a fire, the LACoFD determines which zones to evacuate based
on fire behavior; the LASD implements evacuations in the field; and OEM manages
evacuation messages sent to the public.
o Reiterate that LACoFD and LASD deputies in the field have the authority and are
empowered to initiate evacuations as an incident unfolds as they deem it warranted.
Moreover, field staff require additional training to ensure they communicate if they
initiate evacuations to the ICP for official evacuation orders or warnings to be
issued.
• Reduce decision latency by empowering and equipping the A-Rep in the ICP to initiate
zone updates in Genasys EVAC while coordinating with EOC for public communication.
• Establish a clear and unified leader’s intent between the LASD, LACoFD, OEM, and
appropriate partners regarding authorities, roles and responsibilities, cooperation, and
expectations during emergencies.
Revise and Standardize Evacuation Procedures
• Create a defined flow path for the initiation and implementation of evacuations to
eliminate unnecessary handoffs between the field, command, and OEM for the messaging
of evacuation alerts and orders.
• Establish a formal policy that requires that a protective order, whether it be an evacuation
warning or shelter-in-place order, be determined by the ICs and that it is always issued for
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any zone adjacent to a zone being placed under an evacuation order. This codification will
require that Incident Command is consistent in determining protective orders when an
emergency is unfolding quickly, ensuring the public is informed of potential risks sooner.
• Establish clear documentation and communication mechanisms within the process of
capturing decisions and execution.
• Develop and distribute comprehensive system job aids with alert templates, escalation
instructions, and troubleshooting steps.
• Call log documentation—While a new system integration is being finalized, obtain and
provide screenshots of call logs before midnight each day to facilitate cross-referencing
data and identify any gaps in information from the field to the EOC.
Finding
OEM Operates with Critical Structural and Resource Deficiencies Hindering Emergency
Management
OEM faces substantial difficulties in fulfilling its emergency management responsibilities due to
a lack of organizational autonomy, a fragmented authority framework, and critical resource
deficiencies. The absence of clear authority undermines OEM’s ability to enforce standardized
practices across County organizations, creating accountability gaps and reducing the
effectiveness of coordinated planning and response efforts. OEM also lacks permanent
emergency management staff. OEM’s insufficient operational resources, including the lack of
dedicated response vehicles equipped with essential emergency systems, creating reliance on
personal vehicles, increases liability risks and diminishes response capacity. These issues are
compounded by insufficient funding to procure and maintain necessary equipment, modernize
technologies, and support adequate staffing during emergency activations. Addressing these
structural and resource gaps is vital to enable OEM to operate as a cohesive and effective entity
capable of safeguarding community preparedness and managing emergencies efficiently.
Recommendations
The County should initiate and authorize a restructuring of OEM to address the lack of autonomy
and fragmented authority that currently undermines its ability to coordinate emergency
management effectively. When determining what organizational framework should be put in
place, the County should consider the factors that would enhance OEM’s autonomy and
authority. Establishing clear authority frameworks and standardized operational protocols should
be the priority, including updates to SOPs for emergency activations, messaging protocols, and
partner coordination. These measures will enable OEM to facilitate consistency across County
organizations and improve accountability in preparedness functions.
To strengthen its internal capacity, OEM should assess whether its current structure aligns with
its coordination responsibilities and best practices in emergency management. This evaluation
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should inform the establishment of a dedicated operating budget, an increase in permanent
staffing capable of supporting community preparedness activities, funding for staffing surges
during activations, the modernization of essential technologies, and the enhancement of field
representation capabilities.
To enhance effectiveness, leadership engagement should be prioritized to foster a shared sense of
purpose and ensure strategic alignment across all emergency management functions. Clear
policies must be established to define roles, responsibilities, and authority levels, eliminating
operational confusion and guiding staff toward common objectives and enhancing trust and unity
within the organization. This restructuring initiative should bridge gaps in coordination,
planning, and communication, cultivating a unified approach and aligning emergency
management efforts throughout the County with overarching strategic goals.
Simultaneously, critical resource gaps must be addressed urgently. Dedicated response vehicles
equipped with emergency lighting and communication systems must be procured to eliminate a
reliance on personal vehicles, reduce liability risks, decrease travel time to the ICP, and enhance
response capacity. This will require that staff take the necessary level of training to operate these
types of vehicles.
Critical Focus Area #2: Training and Planning Coordination
The County’s emergency response training can be improved to boost overall readiness and
effectiveness. Establishing a structured training program for law enforcement will enhance
coordination during fire incidents and evacuations, as well as improve traffic control strategies.
Addressing these issues through a solid cross-training initiative, formal staffing guidelines, and
enhanced teamwork will strengthen the County’s emergency response abilities.
Key Challenges:
• There was a marked difference in the collaboration and preparedness of the response
organizations and community members for the Palisades Fire compared to the Eaton Fire.
• Formalized training programs are essential to improve preparedness and coordination
during fire and evacuation scenarios.
• Residents noted that traffic control during future incidents is an area that could be
enhanced.
These challenges underscore the necessity for a comprehensive cross-training program,
standardized staffing protocols, and enhanced collaboration and preparedness efforts throughout
the County.
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Priority Recommendations and Actions:
• Standardize collaboration and preparedness training across all County departments and
partners.
• Enhance wildfire- and evacuation-specific training and planning for all responders.
This review emphasized the necessity to develop and implement a more strategic and intentional
cross-training program within the County, specifically focusing on wildfire and evacuation
scenarios.
Finding
Standardized Collaboration and Preparedness Training is Needed Across County
Departments
As noted earlier, there was a difference in how response organizations and community members
collaborated and prepared in the area impacted by the Palisades Fire and in the area impacted by
the Eaton Fire. The level of collaboration and preparedness demonstrated in the Palisades Fire
was the result of a long-term partnership between the LACoFD and LASD’s leadership in the
region. This relationship developed over several years and numerous incidents due to the area
being a high FHSZ. The Eaton Fire area was not a designated high hazard area, and the last
significant fire in the Altadena area was in 1993. The preparation discussed earlier in this report
encompassed establishing training initiatives, forming community response groups, coordinating
with homeowners’ associations, and working alongside schools. It involved building
relationships, maintaining regular communication, and assessing improvements post-event. Such
efforts should be standard practice rather than exceptions throughout the County.
Recommendations
It is recommended that the efforts and expectations established in the Palisades area be used to
develop standard baseline efforts, processes, and activities across the County for fire
preparedness. These should include, but not be limited to:
• Conducting annual joint training and tabletop exercises involving the LACoFD, LASD,
OEM, and city emergency managers.
o The training and exercises should address the more complex scenarios in other parts
of the County that involve multiple cities, fire departments, and law enforcement
agencies, particularly focusing on areas that were previously not typically
considered vulnerable to wildfire.
• Providing focused training on fire dynamics, evacuation warning and order issuance,
evacuation messaging and evacuation execution, and interagency coordination.
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• Engaging with, and supporting the formation of community groups, such as those in the
Palisades, in other parts of the County.
It is also recommended that OEM, LACoFD, and LASD co-lead the development, organization,
and facilitation of a cross-department training for LACoFD, LASD, and OEM leadership and
staff. This, of course, will only be possible if the recommendations regarding organizational
changes noted above are implemented, and department command chains emphasize the
importance of participation.
Finding
Enhance LASD’s Department Training on Fire and Evacuation Operations
While some parts of the LASD have completed fire response and evacuation operations training,
not all have. It was noted during the review process that some surge staff brought in to support
the operations did not have the full training to understand these types of events and operations.
Enhanced and consistent department-wide training is required to effectively support fire response
and evacuation operations. Gaps in role clarity, chain of command integration, and field-level
coordination during recent wildfire events underscore the need for a formalized training and
exercise program tailored to the LASD’s operational responsibilities.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Emergency Management Council (as authorized by Los Angeles County
Code Section 2.68.180(A)) should direct and support the LASD in developing a targeted wildfire
and evacuation operations training initiative for all staff, modeled on best practices from high-
risk jurisdictions such as Sonoma County,54 55 CA; Boulder County, CO;56 and San Diego
County, CA.57 The training program should be executed in close collaboration with the LACoFD
and OEM and include the following key actions:
• Develop an LASD-Specific Wildfire Evacuation Training Program: Create
mandatory, scenario-based training modules that define LASD roles in each phase of
evacuation: warning dissemination, traffic control, perimeter enforcement, and re-entry
authorization.
54 Evacuation Annex Operational Area EOP - Sonoma County Operational Area EOP, August 2021. Last referenced September 23, 2025.
55 Sonoma County Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan Annex – Community Alert and Warning, March 2021. Last referenced
September 23, 2025.
56 2022-2027- Boulder County Hazard Mitigation Plan Last referenced September 23, 2025.
57 Unified San Diego County Emergency Services Organization and County of San Diego, Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan, Sept
2022. Last referenced September 23, 2025.
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• Formalize Training in Policy and SOPs: Finalize the ongoing review and revision of the
LASD’s EOPs, including evacuation-specific procedures initiated prior to this incident,
and ensure station-level training is conducted upon completion to align field response with
the countywide Wildfire Protection Plan.
• Establish Performance Evaluation and Accountability Measures: Integrate evacuation
preparedness metrics into the LASD’s training compliance system. Sonoma County
Sheriff’s Office adopted a similar model post-2017,58 requiring documented participation
in wildfire training and the use of structured AARs to improve performance.59 60
• Leverage Technology for Situational Awareness Training: Incorporate GIS-based
evacuation modelling tools and alert system simulations (e.g., Genasys PROTECT) into
the LASD’s emergency operations training curriculum to improve spatial awareness and
decision-making during evacuations.
• Specialized Wildfire Evacuation Response Team: The LASD may want to consider
having a standing specialized wildfire evacuation response team, similar to the IMTs, that
receives specialized training on evacuation for wildfires that can be deployed during
emergencies like the January 2025 fires.
By embedding these practices into the LASD’s annual training cycle and aligning them with
interagency planning efforts, the County will enhance operational effectiveness, reduce
confusion during evacuations, and improve outcomes for communities at risk of wildfire threats.
Critical Focus Area #3: Resource Management
The catastrophic nature of the Palisades and Eaton Fires would have strained even fully staffed
departments operating at peak capacity. However, responding agencies entered this crisis already
facing staffing shortages and resource constraints. These pre-existing deficiencies, including
personnel gaps in critical positions, aging equipment, and stretched operational budgets, were
immediately magnified when the event’s scale and complexity demanded resources far beyond
standard operational requirements. What were previously manageable departmental challenges
became limiting factors in the emergency response, stressing deployment capabilities, sustained
operations, and effectiveness throughout the incident timeline.
58 Sonoma County, October 2017 Complex Fires, Emergency Operations Center, After Action Report and Improvement Plan – June 2018. Last
referenced September 23, 2025.
59 Boulder County Marshall Fire Operational After-Action Report (AAR), December 30,2022. Last referenced September 23, 2025.
60 Sonoma Operational Area and the County of Sonoma, Department of Emergency Management, 2019 Power Shutoffs After Action Report –
March 2020. Last referenced September 23, 2025.
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Key Challenges:
• Current staffing limitations constrain response capabilities during events.
• OEM lacks a formal A-Rep program.
Staffing limitations have constrained response capabilities, resulting in insufficient personnel
trained in essential functions, which has created an environment for potential single points of
failure.
Priority Recommendations and Actions:
• Undertake additional planning within the LASD to identify surge resources and strategies.
• Formalize staffing protocols, training, equipment needs, and the field A-Rep program
within OEM.
The next section discusses the specific findings that support the priority recommendations and
actions and provides more detailed recommendations for implementation.
Finding
Shortages of Law Enforcement Personnel
The emergency response revealed deficiencies in staffing levels, resource allocation, and the
deployment of trained personnel, although these shortcomings must be understood within the
context of extraordinary operational demands resulting from catastrophic wildfires and more
than 900 LASD deputy vacancies. While the LASD had developed a staffing strategy utilizing
available personnel in anticipation of the PDS, staffing challenges did occur because the LASD
was involved in managing five simultaneous fires during the same timeframe while also
maintaining essential public safety services countywide.
The staffing challenges were compounded by structural limitations, including a recent 50%
reduction in the SIB, which left the department with insufficient public information officers
(PIOs) during a crisis requiring extensive community communication. Additional LASD
divisions faced similar constraints, and custody and court services operated without the
personnel and patrol vehicles required to meet operational needs. These cumulative resource
limitations forced the DOC team to adjust and reallocate personnel and equipment to where they
were needed most.
While these staffing deficiencies significantly hampered response capabilities, they reflect
broader systemic resource challenges from a shortage in staffing due to more than 900 LASD
deputy vacancies. These deficiencies should be resolved by the County, and in the interim,
additional strategies to increase personnel for emergency response should be considered given
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the importance of having comprehensive staffing and resources that can handle multi-incident
scenarios.
Several interviewees experienced communication challenges in the field, many of which were
attributed to an outdated dispatch system and the absence of the internet at the command post.
The already-activated EOB and the Fleet Management Bureau were critical in providing
essential services and technological support to overcome these challenges. Furthermore, the
LASD had been occupied with preparations for multiple planned events, including the Rose
Parade, the anniversary of the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol, and the Presidential
Inauguration. While the department had resources in place for a potential extreme wind and fire
event, the competing priorities understandably stretched their capacity.
Recommendations
To address the critical staffing and resource shortages affecting emergency response capabilities,
this review recommends that the LASD implement the following strategies:
• Expansion of Personnel Capacity: Conduct a comprehensive audit of current staffing
levels and develop a prioritized hiring plan to fill essential roles. Focus on divisions such
as custody, court services, and patrol to ensure adequate personnel and vehicle availability
during emergencies. Additionally, increase emphasis and pipeline into existing
departmental CERT training and volunteer programs.
• Implement Tiered Response and Resource Typing: Continue to implement and adopt a
tiered response model, where personnel are assigned to missions based on training and
risk level. Use typed law enforcement resource packages, like Type 1-4, to facilitate
scalable deployment. Sonoma County uses pre-defined mission sets (traffic control,
security patrols, evacuation support) and assignments based on resource type and
availability during wildfire evacuations.61
• Strategically Leverage Existing Reserve and Volunteer Officer Programs: Similar to
the Fire Brigade Program in the Palisades area, the LASD maintains a trained reserve
deputy program and/or auxiliary law enforcement corps to support routine, non-
enforcement duties during surges. These reserves can be activated during wildfires for
road closures and perimeter security, freeing sworn deputies for high-priority work. While
this type of program already exists within the LASD, better strategic deployment of these
resources in future incidents may assist with mitigating some of the resource challenges.
• Maximize Mutual Aid: Strengthen collaboration with already established mutual aid
partners and implement targeted training programs for both new recruits and seasoned
61 Sonoma County Operational Area EOP Annex: Evacuation -August 2021. Last referenced September 23, 2025.
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personnel to build resilience and enhance capabilities during future crises. Ensure mutual
aid partners are aware and engaged as part of pre-event preparedness activities.
By adopting these measures, the LASD can significantly enhance its emergency response
effectiveness, ensure operational continuity, and develop a resilient workforce. This proactive
approach will further mitigate vulnerabilities and bolster public safety during critical events.
Finding
OEM Staffing, Protocols, Training, and Formalizing the Agency Representative Program
Three interrelated challenges hindered the operational performance of OEM during the event:
• The limited staffing and funding necessary to adequately respond
• The absence of formalized staffing protocols for major incidents
• The informal and under-resourced A-Rep program
Current staffing limitations significantly impacted OEM’s ability to support sustained operations.
There were not enough personnel trained in essential EOC roles, particularly in alert and warning
systems, planning, and situational awareness. Because of this, OEM relied on the few individuals
who were sufficiently trained, which created the potential for single points of failure. While
OEM staff demonstrated remarkable resourcefulness and adaptability by leveraging both the old
system (CodeRED) and the new alerting platform (Genasys ALERT) to issue evacuation orders
within 15 minutes (for example, the January 8, 3:25 a.m., evacuation order sent to zones in
Altadena west of Lake Avenue), it is critical that the County continues to invest in regular
training and system drills. This will help ensure that all team members can fully utilize the new
system’s capabilities efficiently and confidently.
Due to significant staffing constraints at OEM, even essential staff attendance at critical training
directly affects the department’s ability to respond to incidents. For instance, when non-
leadership personnel are required to participate in necessary pre-event training during periods of
elevated risk, the organization faces difficult tradeoffs that compromise operational capacity and
effectiveness. Over time, these constraints introduce inefficiencies, lead to staff frustration, and
ultimately undermine overall organizational readiness.
Additionally, while A-Reps were critical to field coordination and operational success, the lack
of a formal program structure, such as defined roles, pre-deployment briefings, reliable
transportation, safety protocols, and appropriate shift rotations, resulted in avoidable safety
concerns, inconsistent field performance, and logistical complications. For example, A-Reps
were required to use personal vehicles to travel between the EOC, home, and field command
posts, often with minimal rest, creating potentially unsafe and difficult conditions.
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Recommendations
OEM has a staff of 37 for a population of 10.5 million people and does not have a dedicated
operating budget. We recommend that OEM and County leadership address these challenges and
build sustainable operational resilience by taking the following strategic and actionable steps:
Increase Permanent Emergency Management Staff
OEM requires adequate permanent staffing commensurate with other major metropolitan
jurisdictions that face similar threat profiles and manage comparable emergency management
functions, activities, and duties. The current staffing model has proven fundamentally inadequate
for Los Angeles County’s complex emergency management needs. OEM has faced persistent
challenges in securing stable staffing and an adequate budget, and its needs have not been
prioritized in recent years. Although some staffing increases have been approved, these increases
have not been sufficient to build the professional capacity necessary for effective emergency
management in the nation’s most populous county.
Our recommendation is to assess the organizational structure of OEM as an office under the
chief executive officer (CEO), provided that organizational authority and budget stability are
obtained to address critical staffing deficiencies. Reporting directly to the CEO, and ultimately
the County Executive, would be consistent with Measure G requirements in Section 11.36,
where:
“Subject to State law, the County Executive shall be responsible for initiating,
coordinating, and directing the County’s activities and operations relating to emergency
and disaster preparedness, response, and recovery, and shall be the designated operational
area coordinator and the chair of the County’s Emergency Management Council. Any
ordinance adopted by the Board of Supervisors relating to the County’s emergency and
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery, and the exercise of the County’s emergency
powers shall be consistent with this Section.”62
However, residing at the executive level may bring challenges to add staff and direct funding for
OEM. OEM must develop a strategic hiring approach focused on filling essential roles, including
a dedicated preparedness team and regional coordinators who are OEM employees to replace the
disaster management area coordinators and support collaboration with all 88 cities throughout
the Los Angeles County region. Inadequate resources extend beyond personnel numbers to basic
operational resources. OEM currently lacks funding for the proper PPE necessary for staff
deployment to command posts during emergencies and lacks the vehicles needed for countywide
62 https://measureg.lacounty.gov/ Measure G Government Reform County of Los Angeles. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
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mobility before, during, and after disasters. These gaps directly compromise response
effectiveness.
While OEM and the County work to achieve appropriate permanent staffing levels, interim
measures must be implemented to better position OEM for future events:
• Develop a structured cross-training and credentialing program that ensures multiple
OEM staff are qualified in each core EOC function, including planning, operations,
logistics, and public information.
• Establish a minimum staffing matrix for major incidents and planned events, aligned
with FEMA’s National Incident Management System guidance and scalable to incident
complexity.
• Implement a succession planning strategy for critical roles, particularly positions such as
EOC manager, situation unit leader, and alert & warning coordinator.
Implement Formalized Staffing Protocols
• Develop written staffing activation protocols that define staffing thresholds for each
incident type and phase (preparedness, response, recovery).
• Create “red zone” staffing restrictions that limit non-essential leave and off-site training
during elevated threat periods.
• Establish a pre-incident readiness policy that defines criteria for personnel availability,
pre-staging, and standby status based on predictive hazard indicators.
Formalize and Resource the A-Rep Program
• Codify the A-Rep program with defined roles, responsibilities, position descriptions, and
reporting protocols.
• Develop standardized job aids and quick-reference guides to support consistent
performance in the field.
• Require all A-Reps to complete scenario-based training modules focused on field
coordination, evacuation support, public warning implementation, and ICS integration.
• Assign County-owned vehicles with lights and communication equipment to designated
A-Reps and provide necessary and required training for using these types of vehicles to
support safe, timely, and mission-ready deployment.
• Create a staffing and scheduling framework for A-Reps that ensures adequate rest
periods and minimizes fatigue during extended operations.
By implementing these recommendations, OEM will be better positioned to manage extended
emergency operations; eliminate operational single points of failure; and ensure safer, more
effective field coordination through a properly staffed and supported A-Rep program.
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Critical Focus Area #4: Situational Awareness and Interoperability
Situational awareness and interoperability are pivotal areas requiring immediate enhancement.
The lack of streamlined coordination tools and common systems among County agencies,
coupled with gaps in existing antiquated systems, impacted the ability to monitor the unfolding
events and ensure unified efforts across all operational levels to issue alerts and execute
evacuations.
Key Challenges:
• Gaps in communications systems, making it challenging to maintain clear situational
awareness
• Outdated and inconsistent use of technology tools
• Process gaps for new evacuation systems and processes
These challenges underscore the need for robust policies, training protocols, and integrated tools
to ensure that personnel across all levels can respond effectively during high-risk periods.
Priority Recommendations and Actions:
• Align situational awareness and interoperability across County departments and agencies.
• Update obsolete systems and technology and enable all emergency response
communications to leverage the Los Angeles Regional Interoperable Communications
System’s Land Mobile Radio System.
• Ensure consistent implementation, training, and use of tools and systems.
The following specific findings support our priority recommendations and actions. We also
provide more detailed recommendations for implementation.
Finding
Situational Awareness and Interoperability Across Departments
Despite aligned priorities among departments, significant challenges with situational awareness
and interoperability hampered effective coordination during fires. Field personnel and command
staff operated with inconsistent access to real-time information due to unreliable cellular
connectivity; inconsistent field reporting methods; and the use of disparate, non-integrated
platforms—such as Genasys ALERT/EVAC, Tablet Command, and outdated dispatch systems
(e.g., the LASD’s 38-year-old CAD platform).
LASD introduced a Teams channel to consolidate operational information within its department
one hour after the Palisades fire began, with incident coordination conducted through that
channel for the duration of the response. LACoFD employed several resource-tracking tools, but
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these were inconsistently used and lacked full integration across field and command
environments. OEM platforms from the same vendor (Genasys) did not operate in a unified
manner, leading to information fragmentation. Most importantly, the three departments within
the LACoFD, LASD, and OEM did not have a single technology-based interdepartmental
common operating platform (COP) to coordinate their efforts beyond face-to-face collaboration
at the command post and calls, emails, texts, and radio communication. As a result, personnel
lacked a COP, limiting cross-agency coordination and impeding timely, informed decision-
making at all levels.
Recommendations
To improve operational coordination and ensure shared situational awareness, the County should
implement a multi-pronged strategy that prioritizes system integration, SOPs, and frontline
accessibility.
Establish a Unified Situational Awareness Framework
• Convene a multi-agency technology integration working group, led by the chief
information officer and including representatives from OEM, LACoFD, LASD, and other
key departments (e.g., the Department of Public Works), to evaluate current platforms and
define interoperability requirements.
• Finalize the customization and implementation of WebEOC as the COP for the County
and ensure it is capable of ingesting data from existing platforms (Tablet Command,
Genasys, SharePoint, CAD) and sharing it in real time with both command and field
personnel. Also, develop and implement a comprehensive transition and training plan for
the use of the platform.
Implement Field-Accessible Mobile Dashboards
• Ensure field personnel across all agencies have mobile-enabled access to live situational
dashboards showing evacuation zones, resource assignments, incident maps, and status
updates.
• Deploy offline-capable apps or data caching tools to maintain functionality in areas
with limited or no connectivity.
Integrate Tools into Post-Incident Documentation and AARs
• Create a standardized process for archiving digital field inputs (e.g., notes, photos, maps,
voice logs) into a central repository for post-incident review and analysis.
• Ensure that situational awareness tools and outputs are consistently captured and
evaluated during AARs to inform future improvements.
By integrating these technologies, protocols, and redundancies, the County will establish a
shared, real-time understanding of incident dynamics—empowering both field responders and
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command personnel to make faster, better-informed decisions and work as a unified team during
complex emergencies.
Finding
38-Year-Old CAD System
A key resource for many first responder organizations is the use of a CAD system, but it is
almost 40 years old and extremely outdated. This limits situational awareness and coordination
capabilities for field staff. Updating and modernizing the CAD system will streamline
communication, improve resource allocation, and enhance overall operational efficiency.
Recommendations
The LASD is in the process of replacing its existing CAD system with a new and more modern
system. It is recommended that, as part of that upgrade, the department conduct a full system
audit of the current CAD platform and deploy a phased replacement plan that prioritizes
integration with the LACoFD, OEM, and local law enforcement systems, as well as determine if
it is capable of CAD-to-CAD between the LACoFD and LASD. The new system should
incorporate modernized capabilities and functionality, including zone overlays, evacuation
tracking, and GIS data syncing for real-time updates. Since the January fires, the LASD has
taken steps to launch a comprehensive tracking tool called the Citizen Evacuation Tracker, which
provides real-time visibility into who has been evacuated, who needs to be evacuated, and where
resources are needed most. This is a strong initiative by the LASD and should prove useful in
future incidents for evacuation coordination and planning.
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Finding
Knowledge and Process Gaps for New Evacuation Technology
Figure 19: Interplay of Genasys EVAC, Genasys ALERT, and Genasys PROTECT
There was a clear gap in the transition between the previously used alert and notification system,
CodeRED, and the new system, Genasys ALERT, including the need for more training and
familiarity with Genasys ALERT. While transitioning between the two systems did not appear to
cause significant messaging issues, there are opportunities to enhance real-time situational
awareness through improved interoperability measures and system integration, as discussed
below.
Recommendations
OEM should develop a more comprehensive SOP and training program that all OEM staff and
partner agencies can participate in. This would include the update and/or development of job aids
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with detailed instructions and templates for various incident scenarios. It would also include in-
person training sessions for the Genasys ALERT system, including quarterly drills and annual
exercises, to ensure all staff are comfortable and proficient with the system.
OEM should also work with the vendor to identify any additional functionality for the system,
including but not limited to:
• Integrated login capabilities—logging into Genasys EVAC to update the zones that will
be notified of a warning or order, and then logging into Genasys ALERT separately, is
inefficient and error-prone. This could be resolved by integrating the two systems or
creating a single sign on, so that when Genasys EVAC is updated, an alert is sent to
Genasys ALERT notifying the user to send out a specific message. This way, if a zone is
updated in the field, the staff responsible for sending evacuation messages will be notified
directly, instead of relying on someone else to make a call and update a separate system.
• Archived records—requiring alert entry logs and screenshots to be archived will allow
them to be reviewed during post-incident AARs.
Finding
Inconsistent Access and Use of Information Sharing Tools
The LACoFD utilizes a variety of situational awareness and information-sharing tools; however,
their application across the department and among mutual aid partners is inconsistent. Many of
these platforms are not uniformly available to all units, particularly those in the field or from
assisting agencies. This lack of access and standardization created a disconnect between field
personnel and command staff. Incident Commanders were often unable to see what field units
were observing in real time, limiting their ability to make informed decisions about evacuation
timing, resource deployment, and incident escalation. A streamlined, two-way flow of real-time
information between field and command would significantly enhance operational efficiency,
safety, and decision-making. Additionally, the over-reliance on cellular connectivity and cellular
data was often cited as a challenge, as coverage was limited at times due to tower outages.
Access to reliable satellite data and internet connectivity would allow for more consistent
information sharing, including access to satellite-powered situational awareness tools in real time
(such as FireGuard).
Recommendations
To address these information-sharing challenges and enhance situational awareness across all
levels of the LACoFD and its mutual aid partners, this review recommends the following:
Technology Audit
• Audit all current tools in use (e.g., Tablet Command, Genasys, ArcGIS, FireMapper).
o Evaluate their effectiveness, overlap, and gaps in coverage.
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o Identify opportunities for integration and alignment with external systems used by
partners such as CAL FIRE, CalOES, and local law enforcement.
Standardize Access and Deployment of Information Tools
• Ensure all frontline personnel, including mutual aid units, have access to core situational
awareness platforms via mobile devices or vehicle-mounted systems.
• Establish minimum technology requirements and field kits for incident deployment,
including pre-loaded applications, user credentials, and connectivity solutions (e.g.,
satellite technology).
• Evaluate and deploy satellite resources to provide information and data, and for
connectivity that is not dependent on cellular connections.
• Provide brief, field-friendly training or quick-reference job aids to ensure consistent use
across varied personnel and agencies.
Integrate Emerging Technologies and Real-Time Data Feeds
• Actively participate in and support ongoing efforts with CAL FIRE, CalOES, and
Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies to pilot and
implement cutting-edge fire detection and monitoring tools, including:
o FireGuard, satellite-enabled hotspot tracking
o NASA/NOAA-based thermal imaging platforms
o Unmanned aerial vehicles/drones for near-real-time mapping
• Develop SOPs for how data from these systems is accessed, validated, and used during
incident response and planning.
Implement Feedback Loops Between Field and Command
• Develop a process to allow field crews to push real-time observations, images, and
geotagged data directly to command dashboards.
• Use tools like ArcGIS Survey123 or Tablet Command enhancements to enable
structured field reporting that feeds into the COP.
By implementing these actions, the LACoFD can create a more cohesive and integrated
information environment that empowers both field units and command staff with shared, timely
data—ultimately improving safety, resource allocation, and operational outcomes.
Critical Focus Area #5: Community Engagement and Public
Information
Effective community engagement and public information strategies are essential for fostering
trust, ensuring clarity, and enhancing preparedness in emergency situations. The County must
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focus on revising policies and procedures related to messaging the public while simultaneously
addressing gaps in proactive communication efforts. Streamlined processes, coupled with
innovative tools for situational awareness, will empower responders and residents to act
decisively during critical incidents. A cohesive framework for public outreach and education that
is built in collaboration with local and state partner agencies will strengthen resilience and
bolster the County’s ability to respond effectively to emergencies.
Key Challenges
• Fragmented messaging due to not establishing a joint information center (JIC) ahead of
the event or at the onset
• Insufficient public education on evacuation zones, personal preparedness, expectations,
and preparedness resources
• Missed opportunity to use elected officials in community preparedness initiatives and
activities
Addressing these key challenges is vital to enhancing the County’s emergency response
capabilities. By establishing a cohesive communication framework and prioritizing coordinated
community outreach, the County can transform fragmented messaging into unified, actionable
information.
Priority Recommendations and Actions
• Establish a consistent and formalized JIC.
• Develop a robust and consistent public education campaign across the County.
• Engage elected officials at a more grassroots level in the preparedness initiatives.
• Foster a sense of responsibility for personal preparedness.
These actions will not only elevate public understanding of risks but also strengthen partnerships
between emergency management agencies, elected officials, and residents. Below are detailed
findings and recommendations designed to tackle these challenges and pave the way for a more
resilient approach to crisis management.
Finding
Establishment of a Joint Information Center
Early in the incident, County department communication teams, along with ICP JICs, led
communications for the disaster. Due to staffing limitations, OEM staff that maintain a
communications skill set were not able to establish a countywide JIC until January 9, with the
support of countywide communications organization from the Chief Executive Office. The
purpose of a JIC is to coordinate and disseminate accurate, consistent, and timely messages to
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the public, stakeholders, and media, before, during, and after an emergency or coordinated event
when the EOC is activated. A JIC also ensures the coordination of public information during
incidents involving multiple agencies and/or jurisdictions.
Given the scope of this wind event and the risk it posed, there was a clear need for cross-
jurisdictional coordination. Los Angeles County has many emergency management jurisdictions,
each with responsibility for its designated area. There does not appear to be any written policy or
procedures in place to ensure that the County, local emergency management officials, the LASD,
and LACoFD coordinate and communicate a unified message about the event.
Additionally, based on community input, the public did not effectively understand the potential
impact of the PDS issued by the NWS. Even with extensive media coverage and public
messaging prior to the event, some residents did not feel they were informed enough and/or feel
the potential risk was effectively communicated.
As early as January 2, the County was sharing consistent real-time updates to the public through
its social media channels and centralized emergency website. Between January 2 and January 9,
before OEM established a JIC, the County shared 122 preparedness and emergency messages on
its @CountyofLA social media channels, and the emergency website had more than three million
views from the public. The earlier establishment of a JIC would have surged communications
support to the emergency response and could have played a critical role in providing
coordinated, accurate and consistent real-time updates to the public at the onset of the fires.
Recommendations
Joint Information Center Readiness
In complex events or incidents involving more than one agency, organization, or jurisdiction, it
is best practice to establish a JIC, especially in advance of a known event. The establishment of a
JIC in Los Angeles County in the case of a countywide event should be OEM’s responsibility.
Given the coordination responsibilities during an event, this review recommends that OEM
maintain this responsibility and establish an increased level of readiness and staffing. However,
the County Communications Office should serve as a backup to support opening the JIC,
especially when OEM has staffing limitations. Steps the County can take to achieve this include,
but are not limited to:
• Improving outreach to vulnerable, non-English-speaking, and transit-dependent
populations
• Pre-identifying multilingual PIOs and back-up, trained PIOs
• Establishing or using mutual aid for additional support
• Developing pre-approved message libraries to reduce delays in alerts and public updates
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• Establishing a standard cadence for press conferences and notifications leading up to an
event
o Notifications should be pre-scheduled leading up to a known event and then pushed
out as information changes or at regular intervals.
• Developing and initiating a community information campaign, in coordination with other
County departments and partners, to help educate the community on expectations and
sources of information during an event
• Suggesting the use of social science to evaluate the public’s understanding of evacuation
messaging and recommend language and messaging prototypes that are easily understood
by the public
As a best practice to expand outreach and public education, partnering with existing
preparedness programs to increase awareness and training opportunities is effective. May is
Wildfire Awareness Month, and many organizations and agencies plan activities throughout the
month. The County could use the opportunity to:
• Increase public awareness of zone-based evacuation protocols and alert systems
• Implement evacuation drills that involve real-time evacuation of residents within a
predetermined area, which would involve utilizing alert and warning tools, as well as
door-to-door visits, to evacuate residents to a predetermined location, then using the
gathering to debrief the exercise and educate residents
Recommendations
Public Information Strategy (Joint Information Center)
County departments need to collaborate in establishing a strategy for providing the public with
information and establishing a JIC. This strategy should include, but not be limited to:
• Activation: Standing up the JIC as soon as the EOC is activated should be standard
practice to ensure consistent, coordinated messages are transmitted to the public. It is also
essential to ensure that media outlets, such as television, radio, and print, are aware of the
activation and understand who they should expect to receive information from.
• Cross-Jurisdictional Coordination: A directed coordination call can facilitate the
exchange of critical information and help ensure that all entities communicate the same
information to the public.
• Informing the Public: Over 10 million people live in Los Angeles County. Reaching
them during critical events presents a significant challenge. As previously discussed, there
are multiple ways to communicate information to the public, including FEMA’s IPAWS,
the EAS, social media, television, radio, newspapers (apps and social media), NOAA
Weather Radio, police and fire sirens, and Alert LA County, among others. The public
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needs to be able to receive emergency messages through multiple channels, using two or
three of the methods mentioned. However, it was noted that, given some of the variables
experienced in the January fires, such as power outages and cell towers being down, less
technological ways of sharing information need to be utilized. This can be accomplished
by identifying information that LASD deputies and firefighters are sharing as they manage
the incident and using PA systems to communicate risk and evacuation warnings and
orders. Most importantly, all messaging must be concise and offer simple, straightforward,
and direct courses of action.
Finding
Gaps in Public Understanding of Evacuation Zones and Alerts
Interviews and field observations revealed gaps in the public’s understanding of evacuation
zones, alert types (e.g., WEA vs Genasys), alert and notification access, and expected behaviors
during fast-moving wildfire events. With the LASD responsible for executing evacuations,
community preparedness directly affects response speed, officer safety, and public compliance.
Recommendations
Develop and implement an OEM-led Public Education and Community Preparedness Program
focused on wildfire evacuation awareness, zone-based planning, and knowledge of the various
alert and notification systems. This could include:
• An update of the existing “Ready! Set! Go!” program to promote awareness of Genasys
and WEA alerts, and the reinforcement of “GoEarlY” behavior in high-risk events63
• Annual community evacuation drills in high-risk fire zones, which can also be used to
simulate alert reception, route familiarization, and public Q&A sessions
• Targeted outreach for vulnerable populations by partnering with faith groups, schools,
nonprofits, and senior centers to disseminate evacuation readiness materials
• Public dissemination of a “Do’s and Don’ts” list including actions that the public should
or should not do during an incident. Examples of “do’s” would include checking on
neighbors throughout an emergency (as many members of the public did during both the
Eaton and Palisades Fires). Examples of “don’ts” include calling 911 with false reports to
prompt movement of first responder resources to a given location; while individuals may
do this out of fear if they can see smoke in the distance, doing so slows the response to
calls about active fires that callers can see and provide detailed information about so
responders can take action.
63 City of San Diego, Wildfire Ready Set Go! – Evacuation Guide. Last referenced September 24, 2025.
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Establish a dedicated public information platform that consolidates all available alert and
notification methods in one accessible location. This platform should include a comprehensive
webpage and distributable materials for community meetings that explain how residents can
connect to emergency alerts, while also addressing community concerns about notification tools.
For example, many residents have inquired about sirens as an alert method, but the County’s
previous research demonstrated that this approach is not feasible for the region’s geography and
infrastructure. By transparently communicating both available options and the rationale behind
decisions about other potential tools, the program can build public trust while ensuring residents
understand how to access reliable emergency information.
Finding
Leveraging Elected Officials for Community Engagement
Engagement with and by the Board of Supervisors Offices is a critical component in helping
communities prepare for and stay informed during an event, making the district supervisors and
their staff a valuable resource at the grassroots level. This review has highlighted how elected
officials can be leveraged in relation to community engagement around preparedness and
information sharing.
Recommendations
• Create a formal liaison protocol between the EOC and Board of Supervisors during major
incidents.
• Assign a dedicated point of contact to brief each supervisor’s office with timely updates
and coordinated messaging.
• Provide training to supervisors’ staff on emergency communications, resource activation,
and constituent support roles during incidents.
• Involve Board of Supervisors staff in policy workgroups, evacuation exercises, and pre-
event planning meetings.
Finding
Lack of Community Preparedness
Individuals and communities play a crucial role in emergency preparedness. It is essential for
everyone to take responsibility for their own safety and well-being during emergencies. Many
community members noted that they were waiting for someone to tell them to evacuate, which in
many cases resulted in them leaving at a point in the fire that was much riskier than if they had
left sooner. Additionally, many community members noted that they were not prepared for a fire
and were not aware of the resources available to them to stay informed, specifically in the area
impacted by the Eaton Fire.
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Recommendations
We recommend that individuals and communities be and/or remain proactive in staying informed
about potential risks, creating and practicing emergency plans, and ensuring that necessary
supplies are readily available. Communities can enhance their preparedness by fostering strong
relationships and communication channels among residents, local organizations, and emergency
services. By working together, communities can build resilience and ensure a coordinated
response when disasters strike. Ultimately, being prepared for emergencies can significantly
reduce the impact of such events and save lives.
While the best practices in the Palisades area provide useful guidance, for example, the dedicated
relationship building and community exercising mentioned in previous sections, some additional
recommendations for the whole County include:
• Individual Preparedness: Individuals and families should prepare an emergency plan
that considers specific risks and vulnerabilities for where they live and regularly discuss
and practice the plan. A number of resources are available for creating a personal
emergency plan.64
• Disaster Preparedness Councils: The County should develop disaster preparedness
councils, similar to the Topanga Coalition for Emergency Preparedness, in vulnerable
areas across the county.
• Map Your Neighborhood: In addition to some of the community group examples from
the Palisades area, there is a structured program that neighborhoods, community groups,
and homeowner associations can utilize to organize together. The Washington State
Emergency Management Division developed the Map Your Neighborhood program,
which provides instructions for how communities can come together and plan for an
emergency. The program includes guided activities to identify the capabilities and
vulnerabilities of each community member, assign responsibilities, and develop a
community plan.65
• Buddy System: A buddy system can be implemented for people with access and
functional needs. This would ensure that vulnerable individuals have neighbors or
community members assigned to assist them during evacuations.
64 https://www.ready.gov/ Ready.Gov Department of Homeland Security. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
65 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KMOFtk8xeV0&list=PLaYp9JZofBz3RSYyvL57jo_95G8ziwuTV Map Your Neighborhood Video for
Facilitators EMD Prepare, and 5dbc4d5ff2af3 Map Your Neighborhood Overview. Last referenced September 3, 2025.
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Action Plan and Next Steps
The final exercise in this review process was to conduct an After-Action Action Planning
Meeting. This is a structured method organizations use to translate the findings, lessons learned,
and recommendations from an AAR into actionable steps for improvement. While the AAR itself
documents what happened, what worked well, and what gaps or challenges were identified, the
action planning process ensures that these insights lead to concrete changes in policy, training,
procedures, or resource allocation.
McChrystal Group worked with County stakeholders to conduct a focused review of the AAR’s
strengths, gaps, and recommendations and assign prioritization to issues that pose the highest
operational or organizational risk. Once prioritization was validated by County stakeholders,
corrective actions were defined with more specificity to include measurable outcomes or
deliverables and a timeline for implementation. Each action was assigned to an individual,
department, or agency with the authority and resources to implement the change. The action
planning process also included the identification of any anticipated integration challenges the
County would face, including regulatory concerns, budget, and organizational hurdles.
Given the number of recommendations outlined in this report, McChrystal Group led the County
through the action planning process for a handful of recommendations. The County will now
follow this process to internally work through plans for the remaining recommendations.
The County anticipates establishing a reporting process for regular check-ins or progress reviews
to monitor completion and adjustments. The action planning process is critical because it:
1. Closes the loop between identifying problems and implementing solutions.
2. Provides a roadmap for continuous improvement.
3. Enhances accountability by assigning owners and deadlines.
4. Builds organizational resilience by ensuring lessons learned are institutionalized.
The ultimate outcome is not just a written report but a cycle of improvement that strengthens
future performance, readiness, and response capabilities.
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Appendix 1: Data Sources
Publicly Available Data Sources County-Provided Sources
• WatchDuty
• PBS WARN
• NWS forecasts
• Genasys Protect
• CAL FIRE
• Official communications
• NWS weather data
• Social media posts and comments
• News articles
• Community-generated content (photos,
blogs, videos, etc.)
• Genasys ALERT
• Genasys EVAC
• IPAWS logs
• LACoFD call logs
• LASD call logs
• Fire incident timelines
• Dispatch logs
• FireGuard
• Situation reports
• Tablet Command
• Interviews
• DINS logs
• Policies
• Procedures
• Automatic vehicle location data for both
Fire and LASD
• SCE PSPS event notifications
• LACoFD radio traffic
• LASD radio traffic
• LASD body-worn camera footage
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Appendix 2: Stakeholders Interviews
Stakeholders Interviewed
County Agency/Department Stakeholder Third-Party Stakeholders
• LASD/Sheriff
• LACoFD/Fire
• Los Angeles County Chief Executive
Office’s Office of Emergency
Management/CEO
• Los Angeles County Chief Executive
Office of Communications
• Supervisorial District 3 Office
• Supervisorial District 5 Office
• SD3 community members
• SD5 community members
• City of Los Angeles Emergency
Management Division
• U.S. Forest Service, Region 5 Angeles
National Forest
• KNX News Radio
• Digital Glue
• NWS Oxnard
• Genasys, Inc.
• Wildfire Forecast and Threat Intelligence
Integration Center, CalOES
Stakeholders who Declined Interviews
• LAFD
• Los Angeles City Police Department
• FEMA
• Federal Communications Commission
• CalOES
• JPL
• Sierra Madre Fire Department
• City of Pasadena Fire Department, OEM, and Police Department
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Appendix 3: Timeline Overview
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Figure 20: Timeline of significant events related to alerts, warnings, notifications, and evacuations for the Eaton and Palisades Fires based on
the scope of our review and analysis of information.
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Appendix 4: Community Listening
Session Questions
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Appendix 5: Themes in Community
Feedback
The following themes are derived from information shared by Los Angeles County residents in
community listening sessions held in the spring of 2025. These themes span the entirety of all six
community listening sessions held by McChrystal Group between April 7 and May 7. Three
sessions were held for residents impacted by the Palisades Fire, and three sessions were held for
residents impacted by the Eaton Fire. Themes in community feedback are as follows:
1. Need for Preparedness Warnings from Credible Sources: Sentiment that no advance
warnings were given to encourage people to prepare or pack “go bags” ahead of time.
2. No Central Source of Truth leading to Evacuation Confusion: Sentiment that there
was no single, credible source providing consistent information and guidance throughout
the fire incident. Additional sentiment that residents lacked a trusted channel for
accessing critical resources and updates.
3. Warning Fatigue: Sentiment that residents experience fatigue from frequent high-speed
wind warnings in recent months, which may reduce the perceived urgency of future
alerts.
4. Need for Expert Input on Warnings: Sentiment that County should engage
psychologists to help craft warning messages to reduce warning fatigue and increase
effectiveness.
5. Community Preparedness: Sentiment that preparedness efforts should be better
advertised or potentially made mandatory through homeowner associations (HOAs), local
fire departments, or OEM initiatives.
6. Community Wildfire Prevention Plan: Sentiment that there is a clear need for a
comprehensive and well-communicated wildfire prevention plan. The County must
leverage the already existing County’s Countywide Community Wildfire Protection Plan,
a voluntary, community-driven document designed to outline fire protection strategies
tailored to the unique needs of unincorporated, at-risk communities. To ensure the plan’s
effectiveness and relevance, it is essential that its goals, strategies, and resources are
clearly communicated to residents. This can be achieved by increasing the frequency and
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reach of community workshops, which serve as a critical platform for education,
engagement, and collaborative planning.66
7. Need for Non-Digital Notification Methods: Community members emphasized their
belief in the importance of employing low-tech alert methods—such as blow horns,
loudspeakers on fire and LASD vehicles, and neighborhood sirens—to ensure all
residents are reached regardless of connectivity or access to technology.
8. Need for Sirens: Resident communicated that they believed sirens to be an essential alert
and warning tool, especially in areas where power or cellular service may fail. They can
serve as a reliable alert system for all residents, including the most vulnerable.
Community Sentiment on Key Challenge Areas in Alerting and Warning the
Community
1. Ineffective Traffic and Evacuation Management: Residents shared their perception
that the Sheriff’s Department was unable to manage traffic or provide clear evacuation
directions to residents.
2. Lack of Resources for Vulnerable Populations: Residents shared the sentiment that
medically and socially vulnerable individuals were disproportionately affected due to
limited access to timely information and support.
3. Power Outages Disrupted Communication: Residents shared that the loss of electricity
prevented many residents from contacting family members and accessing accurate
information during the emergency, and in some cases believed this to be the reason they
did not receive an alert.
Community Sentiment on Areas to Sustain in Alerting and Warning the
Community
1. Championing Expanded Use of Fire Incident Apps and KNX News Radio: Residents
reported that third-party applications like WatchDuty and PulsePoint were helpful for
real-time incident tracking and suggested they be more widely advertised as tools to
follow to support emergency preparedness, as they aggregate information from many
sources, including Genasys EVAC and other County-run resources.
2. Encouraging Formation of Community Facebook/WhatsApp Groups: Residents
reported that their self-organized local Facebook and WhatsApp groups were effective in
keeping residents informed and sharing real-time resources throughout the incident.
66 Countywide Community Wildfire Protection Plan—LA County Planning Last referenced September 24, 2025.
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3. Leveraging Reach of Community Influencers: Residents reported relying on local
community influencers as a key source of information, such as a local meteorologist with
a strong social media presence who played a key role in disseminating information
through unofficial channels during the Eaton fire.
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Appendix 6: Acronym List
AAR: After-Action Review
A-Rep: Agency Representative
CAD: Computer-Aided Dispatch
CAL FIRE: California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
CEOC: County Emergency Operations Center
CERT: Community Emergency Response Team
DOC: Department Operations Center
EOB: Emergency Operations Bureau
EOC: Emergency Operations Center
FIRESCOPE: Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies
HOA: Homeowner Association
IC: Incident Command
ICP: Incident Command Post
ICS: Incident Command System
IMT: Incident Management Team
JIC: Joint Information Center
LACoFD: Los Angeles County Fire Department
LASD: Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
NWS: National Weather Service
OEM: Office of Emergency Management
PIO: Public Information Officer
PSPS: Public Safety Power Shutoff
SCE: Southern California Edison
SIB: Sheriff Information Bureau
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SOP: Standard Operating Procedure
UC: Unified Command
WEA: Wireless Emergency Alerts
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Appendix 7: Genasys Population
Estimates for Zones
Figure 21: Cumulative population under evacuation—Palisades Fire (*Includes LAFD city evacuations and warnings)
Figure 22: Cumulative population under evacuation—Eaton Fire
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Appendix 8: Public Safety Power Shutoff
Events
Figure 24: PSPS events for the Palisades Fire area
Figure 23: PSPS events for the Eaton Fire area
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Figure 25: PSPS de-energized circuits in Altadena
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Figure 27: PSPS de-energized circuits in the Eaton Fire area, with an overlay of the Eaton Fire perimeter
Figure 26: PSPS de-energized circuits in the Palisades Fire area, with an overlay of the Palisades Fire perimeter
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Appendix 9: Damaged Structures
Figure 29: CAL FIRE DINS—Eaton Fire area damaged structures density
Figure 28: CAL FIRE DINS—Eaton Fire area damaged structures
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Figure 30: CAL FIRE DINS—Palisades Fire area damaged structures
Figure 31: CAL FIRE DINS—Palisades Fire area damaged structures density
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Appendix 10: Evacuation Warnings and
Orders
Figure 32: Altadena Genasys zone evacuation warning and order times
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Alert Time Alert Type Genasys Zones General Location
1/7/25 6:49 PM Advisory
ALD-EASTLOMA, ALD-
EATONCANYON, ALD-GARFIAS, ALD-
MENDOCINO, ALD-MIDLOTHIAN, KIN-
KINNELOA, PAS-E014, PAS-E015,
PAS-E016, PAS-E017, PAS-E018, PAS-
E019
Pasadena/Eaton
Canyon, North of I-210,
South of Eaton Canyon,
Altadena East of Lake
Ave
1/7/25 7:26 PM Order
PAS-E019, ALD-EASTLOMA, ALD-
EATONCANYON, ALD-GARFIAS, ALD-
MENDOCINO, ALD-MIDLOTHIAN, KIN-
KINNELOA
Kinneloa Mesa, Eaton
Canyon, East of Lake
Ave, North of
Washington Blvd
1/7/25 7:55 PM Warning
ALD-MENDOCINO, ALD-MOUNTLOWE,
PAS-E014, PAS-E015, PAS-E016, PAS-
E017, PAS-E018
East of Lake Ave,
Mendocino, Pasadena
Zones North of I-210
1/7/25 9:00 PM Order ALD-MENDOCINO, ALD-MOUNTLOWE Altadena/Mendocino,
East of Lake Ave
1/7/25 9:26 PM Order SMD-E007, SMD-E008 North Sierra Madre
1/7/25 9:34 PM Order LAC-E183 East of Kinneloa Mesa
1/7/25 10:27 PM Order
SMD-E004, SMD-E005, SMD-E006,
SMD-E007, SMD-E008, SMD-E009,
SMD-E010, SMD-E011, SMD-E012,
SMD-E013, SMD-E014, SMD-E017,
SMD-E019
Sierra Madre North of
W. Sierra Madre Blvd
1/7/25 10:39 PM Order PAS-E022 West Sierra Madre
1/7/25 10:43 PM Warning PAS-E018, PAS-E020 South of Kinneloa Mesa
1/7/25 11:08 PM Order SMD-E001, SMD-E002, SMD-E003,
SMD-E015, SMD-E016
Sierra Madre between
Michillinda and Lima,
North of W. Grand View
Ave
1/7/25 11:11 PM Order ARC-001, ARC-002, ARC-004 Arcadia East of Sierra
Madre
1/7/25 11:17 PM Warning SMD-E018, MRV-101, ARC-003, ARC-
005
South Sierra Madre,
Arcadia, West Monrovia
1/8/25 12:41 AM Warning SMD-E018, MRV-101, ARC-003, ARC-
005
South Sierra Madre,
Arcadia, West Monrovia
1/8/25 12:51 AM Warning MRV-102, MRV-201, MRV-202, MRV-
203, MRV-204 North Monrovia
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1/8/25 3:25 AM Order
ALD-ARROYOSECO, ALD-CANON,
ALD-CASITAS, ALD-CHANEY, ALD-
FARNSWORTH, ALD-GARDEN, ALD-
LAUREL, ALD-MEADOWS, ALD-
MILLARD, ALD-PALM, ALD-WAPELLO,
ALD-WHITEPARK, LCF-JPL
Altadena West of Lake
Ave extending to
include the JPL,
including all of North
Altadena, and South to
W. Woodbury Road,
excluding CALAVERAS
zones
1/8/25 3:36 AM Warning
LCF-BERKSHIRE, LCF-
COMMONWEALTH, LCF-CROWN, LCF-
FOOTHILLEAST, LCF-INVERNESS,
LCF-STARLIGHT
East of La Cañada
Flintridge and West of
JPL
1/8/25 4:36 AM Order
LCF-BERKSHIRE, LCF-
COMMONWEALTH, LCF-CROWN, LCF-
FOOTHILLEAST, LCF-INVERNESS,
LCF-STARLIGHT
East of La Cañada
Flintridge and West of
JPL
1/8/25 4:47 AM Order
MRV-101, MRV-102, MRV-201, MRV-
202, MRV-203, MRV-204, MRV-301,
MRV-302, MRV-303, MRV-304, MRV-
305, MRV-307, MRV-401, MRV-402,
MRV-403, MRV-404, MRV-405
All of North Monrovia
1/8/25 5:01 AM Warning BRA-001, BRA-002, BRA-003, BRA-004,
DUA-001, DUA-002
Bradbury and Duarte
Wilderness Preserve
1/8/25 5:15 AM Order
GLN-E018, GLN-E027, GLN-E028, GLN-
E029, GLN-E030, GLN-E039, GLN-
E040, GLN-E041, LCF-ALTACANYADA,
LCF-CASTLE, LCF-CIVICCENTER,
LCF-CREST, LCF-DESCANSO, LCF-
FOOTHILLWEST, LCF-HAMPSTEAD,
LCF-HILLARD, LCF-MEMORIAL, LCF-
PARADISE, PAS-E006
La Cañada Flintridge,
Northeast of Glendale
1/8/25 5:43 AM Order ALD-CALAVERAS
CALAVERAS zone,
From Altadena Dr to
Woodbury Rd, Fair Oak
s Ave to West Lake Ave
1/8/25 5:56 AM Order PAS-E008, PAS-E010, PAS-E012 North Pasadena, West
of Lake Ave
1/8/25 6:00 AM Warning
GLN-E001, GLN-E002, GLN-E003, GLN-
E004, GLN-E006, GLN-E013, GLN-
E017, GLN-E026, GLN-E038, CRV-
ALABAMA, CRV-COMMUNITY, CRV-
PINECONE, CRV-HENRIETTA, CRV-
BRIGGSTERRACE, CRV-TEASLEY,
CRV-MOUNTAIN
West of Glendale
Freeway, Montrose,
and La Crescenta
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1/8/25 6:04 AM Warning PAS-E011, PAS-E013
North Pasadena from I-
210 to Washington
Blvd, West of Lake Ave
1/8/25 6:19 AM Order SMD-E018
Sierra Madre between
Sierra Madre Blvd and
Orange Grove Ave
1/8/25 7:07 AM Warning GLN-E043, GLN-E044 Scholl Canyon
1/8/25 7:10 AM Warning PAS-E004, PAS-E005, PAS-E007, PAS-
E009 Rose Bowl
1/8/25 8:22 AM Order GLN-E043, GLN-E044 Scholl Canyon
1/9/25 11:47 AM Order LAC-E167 Mt. Wilson
1/9/25 11:57 AM Order LAC-E167, LAC-E165-B, LAC-E168-A Mt. Wilson
Figure 33: Eaton Fire alerts—Genasys zone evacuation warnings and orders
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Alert Time Alert Type Genasys Zones General Description of Location
1/7/25 10:59 AM Advisory TOP-U003 Topanga Canyon Zone 3 - Northwest of
Topanga Oaks
1/7/25 11:13 AM Advisory *LAFD City Alert Topanga State Park
1/7/25 11:30 AM Warning SSM-U010-B West Sunset Mesa
1/7/25 11:50 AM Warning TOP-U007 Topanga Canyon Zone 7 - West of
Topanga State Park
1/7/25 11:53 AM Order SSM-U010-A East Sunset Mesa
1/7/25 12:01 PM Warning TOP-U009 Topanga Canyon Zone 9, Southwest of
Topanga State Park
1/7/25 12:07 PM Order *LAFD City Alert Topanga State Park
1/7/25 12:14 PM Warning MAL-C111-B Malibu East of Las Flores
1/7/25 12:42 PM Order MAL-C111-B Malibu East of Las Flores
1/7/25 12:55 PM Order SSM-U010-B Malibu East of Las Flores - Tuna Canyon
Park
1/7/25 12:59 PM Warning MAL-C111-A Malibu West of Las Flores
1/7/25 1:00 PM Warning RMB-U030-A North Malibu West of Las Flores
1/7/25 1:18 PM Warning TOP-U008 Topanga Canyon Zone 8
1/7/25 1:39 PM Order *LAFD City Alert Pacific Palisades
1/7/25 4:42 PM Order TOP-U007 Topanga Canyon Zone 7 - West of
Topanga State Park
1/7/25 4:44 PM Order TOP-U009 Topanga Canyon Zone 9, Southwest of
Topanga State Park
1/7/25 4:50 PM Order TOP-U009 Topanga Canyon Zone 9, Southwest of
Topanga State Park
1/7/25 4:59 PM Warning TOP-U005 Topanga Canyon Zone 5 - West of
Topanga
1/7/25 5:26 PM Order TOP-U006 Topanga Canyon Zone 6 - North of
Topanga
1/7/25 5:27 PM Order TOP-U004 Topanga Canyon Zone 4 - Northwest of
Topanga State Park
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1/7/25 5:29 PM Order TOP-U003 Topanga Canyon Zone 3 - Northwest of
Topanga Oaks
1/7/25 5:30 PM Order TOP-U002 Topanga Canyon Zone 2 - Topanga Park
and areas North
1/7/25 5:41 PM Order MAL-C111-A, RMB-
U030-A Malibu West of Las Flores
1/7/25 5:46 PM Warning
CAL-C405, CAL-
C406, CAL-C407,
CAL-C408, CAL-
C409, CAL-C410,
CAL-C411, CAL-
C412, CAL-C413,
CAL-C414, CAL-
C415, DRY-U026,
MTN-U028, RMB-
U030-B, RRC-U027,
SDP-U029, RMB-
U030-C, RMB-U030-
E, RMB-U030-F,
RMB-U030-G, RMB-
U030-H
North Malibu to US101, between N1 and
Las Flores Canyon, stretching Northeast
to cover Calabasas
1/7/25 5:50 PM Warning MAL-C112 Malibu
1/7/25 7:56 PM Order *LAFD City Alert Pacific Palisades
1/7/25 8:55 PM Order MAL-C112-B, RMB-
U030-B Carbon Canyon North of PCH
1/8/25 1:01 AM Order
DRY-U026-A, MTN-
U028, RMB-U030-D,
RRC-U027, SDP-
U029
Monte Nido
1/8/25 1:12 AM Warning MCR-U021-A, MCR-
U021-C Malibu Creek State Park
Figure 34: Palisades Fire alerts—Genasys zone evacuation warnings and orders.
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Appendix 11: 911 LAC Fire Dispatch
Calls
Figure 35: 911 LAC Fire Dispatch calls for structure fires by time interval—Palisades Fire
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Figure 36: 911 LAC Fire Dispatch calls for structure fires by time interval—Eaton Fire
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Appendix 12: Fire Front Progression
Figure 38: FireGuard fire front progression—Eaton Fire
Figure 37: FireGuard fire front progression—Palisades Fire
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FireGuard Front Progression and 911 LAC Fire Dispatch—Eaton Fire
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Figure 39: FireGuard fire front progression and 911 LAC Fire dispatch calls about structure fires, as time intervals—Eaton Fire
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FireGuard Front Progression and 911 Dispatch Calls—Palisades Fire
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Figure 40: FireGuard fire front progression and 911 LAC Fire dispatch calls about structure fires, as time intervals—Palisades Fire
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Appendix 13: McChrystal Group Team
Shawn Tyrie, Partner and Government President
Shawn Tyrie is a Partner at McChrystal Group. He leads engagements
with clients across the federal, defense contracting, and commercial
sectors.
These engagements are unified by their focus on building high-
performing, resilient teams—and the leaders who lead them. He provides
mission-focused technology experience with 20 years of management and
leadership experience in the national security, intelligence community,
and Department of Defense sectors focused on program management and
implementation, strategy development, and systems engineering built on
the context of intelligence community mission experience. This includes
helping customers develop strategic vision, foster innovation, transform
organizational workflows through the application of information
technology (IT), and execute implementation plans over long-time
horizons.
Erin Sutton, Partner
Erin Sutton is a Partner working with public sector clients. Before joining
McChrystal Group, Erin was the Chief Deputy State Coordinator for the
Virginia Department of Emergency Management. She oversaw all daily
operations of the agency and provided overall support to the State
Coordinator during emergencies. Erin has worked in the field of
emergency management and public health for the last 20 years. She
served as the Director of the City of Virginia Beach OEM and has
extensive experience managing large-scale disasters in Virginia.
She received her BS degree in biology from Radford University and her
MS in microbiology and immunology from Wright State University in
Dayton, Ohio. She is a certified Emergency Manager, Master Exercise
Practitioner, and has her Project Management Professional certification.
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OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 128
Shandi Treloar, Principal (Project Lead)
Shandi Treloar is a Principal with McChrystal Group, supporting the
emergency management business within the Government Practice group.
Prior to McChrystal Group, she was the Vice President and Preparedness
Lead for Emergency Management (EM) Partners. In this role, Shandi built
the preparedness practice area from scratch, increasing the firm’s revenue
by over $6 million. Shandi was also responsible for the firm’s first non-
FEMA federal contract with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, supporting their emergency management program.
Prior to EM Partners, Shandi had her own emergency management
consulting firm, EM Strategies, LLC. As the Principal, her goal was to
empower clients and partners to build stronger emergency management
programs, from recovery processes and debris management planning to
strategic comprehensive program development.
Chloe Hite, Senior Associate (Project Manager)
Chloe Hite is an Associate at McChrystal Group, with experience on a
range of products for a diverse set of clients across the healthcare,
pharmaceutical, technology, and energy sectors. She has led and
contributed on a variety of engagements, including leadership
development at scale across a workforce of 80,000, strategy alignment at
a Fortune 500, and aligning narrative development following a rapid
business transformation at a Fortune 5 company.
Prior to joining McChrystal Group, Chloe worked as a Project and
Program Manager in international development consulting, managing
projects in a range of impact areas including disaster relief and risk
preparedness, food security and nutrition, global health, emerging market
supply chain logistics, local economic development, blended finance, and
leadership and governance, with a focus on gender equity and inclusion.
She holds a BA in Anthropology and Economics from Boston University
and an MA in International Economics and Development from the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
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Shruti Holey, Analyst (Project Administrator)
Prior to joining McChrystal Group, Shruti completed her master’s in
public health at Yale, with a concentration in healthcare management.
During her time there, she held various internship positions at Yale New
Haven Health; the Hospital for Special Surgery, New York; and 500
Women Scientists, and was a consultant with the Connecticut Hospice,
where she worked on creating workplace cohesion and implementing
leadership training. She was a fellow at the Yale Institute of Global
Health and at Yale Law School’s Solomon Centre for Health Law and
Policy, where she worked on research on health equity, women’s health,
and global health.
She completed her bachelor’s in dental surgery from Dr D.Y. Patil Dental
College and Hospital, Pune, India. She practiced as a general dentist and
founded a nonprofit that worked toward creating health equity through
healthcare awareness programs in underprivileged communities.
Ryan Aminzadeh, Partner (Analytics Lead)
Ryan Aminzadeh is a Partner and the Chief Data and Analytics Officer at
McChrystal Group. In this role, Ryan is responsible for researching,
developing, and deploying McChrystal Group’s broad portfolio of
analytic and diagnostic capabilities. These include diagnostic surveys,
network analysis, and AI and natural language processing (NLP)-based
analytics technologies oriented around people, teams, and organizations.
Ryan is also responsible for technical operations, including data
engineering; data model development and maintenance; and other
bespoke data scraping, synthesis, storage, processing, and visualization
applications.
Before joining McChrystal Group, Ryan co-founded and served as the
Chief Technology Officer of HelioScout, developing recruiting and talent
analytics and insights software. This included bespoke data acquisition,
augmentation, and search and retrieval software, customized NLP
algorithms, predictive statistical modeling software, user interface
design/development, and IT infrastructure/architecture.
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OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 130
Stephanie Beltz, Senior Learning Designer
Stephanie Beltz is a Senior Learning Designer within McChrystal Group
Academy, where she leverages the latest insights from organizational,
social, and behavioral research to design, develop, and implement
leadership solutions for our clients.
Prior to joining McChrystal Group, Stephanie was most recently a Senior
Talent Management Consultant at Jackson National Life, where she
designed and facilitated leadership training across the organization,
coached managers and executives around leadership competencies, and
developed organizational initiatives related to diversity, equity, inclusion,
and employee well-being. In the preceding ten years, she was a
psychology professor at three institutions of higher education and a
psychotherapist at two behavioral health organizations.
Stephanie received her BA in Psychology from Ohio University and her
MA in Psychology in Education from Columbia University. She also has
a PhD in Organizational Leadership from the Chicago School of
Professional Psychology.
Victor Bilgen, Partner
Victor Bilgen is a Partner at McChrystal Group, where he is the Head of
Team Science, leading a group of statisticians and data scientists
specializing in custom and tailored research analyzing numerous
leadership behaviors, networked communication pathways, and
organizational processes.
An expert in research design, Victor led the development of McChrystal
Group’s analytical methodology used to baseline organizations on our
Team of Teams model. As a thought leader in network analysis and data
analytics, Victor regularly presents at industry conferences, including the
Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology Conference and
Connected Commons.
Since joining McChrystal Group in 2012, Victor and his team have
analyzed hundreds of organizations and hundreds of thousands of
individual respondents.
Victor received a BSc in Communication and Sociology and an MSc in
Marketing Communication from the University of Connecticut. In his
spare time, Victor is an accomplished musician and loves cooking and
trying new foods.
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Edessa Bautista, Associate
Edessa Bautista is a Program Manager at McChrystal Group, where she
manages and coordinates the logistics of multiple learning and
development projects to ensure all team members are adequately prepared
and aligned to execute the program. Additionally, she supports learning
designers in shaping and customizing learning content and materials. She
is currently supporting several learning programs with clients from the
biopharmaceutical industry, state and federal government organizations,
and a Fortune 100 multinational accounting and professional services
firm.
Prior to joining McChrystal Group, Edessa was a math educator, then
transitioned to be an education and program consultant working with
districts, charter schools, and school leaders in the state of California as
their partner in strategic talent acquisition, management, and
development. In addition, she implemented a high touch advising
framework for aspiring California educators to ensure completion of the
credentialing program, employment, and tenure in their respective
fellowships.
Taryn Brymn, Senior Advisor
Taryn Brymn has spent the last decade building peer networking
communities for leading global C-suite executives and board directors,
helping them reimagine solutions to perennial business challenges. Most
recently, she led executive programs at Future Forum, a research
consortium led by Slack in partnership with Boston Consulting Group,
Management Leadership for Tomorrow, and MillerKnoll. Using Future
Forum’s quarterly desk worker research, Taryn turned data into dialogue
centered on new ways of working and managing teams.
Prior to Slack, Taryn was Director of Programs at G100 Network (part of
the World 50 Group), where she shaped membership programs for leaders
of Fortune 500 companies. Earlier in her career, Taryn held roles in
nonprofit grant execution and management. Most recently, her work
supported the revitalization of cultural institutions in New York City at
the Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone.
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OFFICIAL After-Action Review of Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires 132
Ken Pimlott, Fire Subject Matter Expert
Ken Pimlott is the former Director of the California Department of
Forestry and Fire Protection (also known as CAL FIRE). He led the
agency from 2010 to 2018, overseeing wildfire response, prevention
programs, and forest management across California. With over 30 years
of firefighting experience, Ken played a crucial role in managing some of
the state’s most devastating wildfires.
John Sokich, Meteorological Subject Matter Expert
John Sokich formerly served as the Director of National Weather Service
Congressional Affairs at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Association National Weather Service. He has extensive experience in
meteorology, bringing years of expertise in weather forecasting, policy,
and communication, and now operates as an independent contractor
advising on these issues.
Rob Giordano, Law Enforcement Subject Matter
Expert
Rob Giordano joins McChrystal Group from CAS Safety Consulting. Rob
previously served as the Sonoma County Sheriff. During his tenure, he led
the evacuation strategy for the 2017 Sonoma Complex fires (Tubbs, Nuns,
and Pocket Fires). His leadership and contributions during the 2017 fires
were recognized by Congress, California’s State Legislature, and several
local groups. Rob retired as the Sonoma County Sheriff after serving 29
years in law enforcement and started a law enforcement consulting
practice.
Clint Shubel, Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert
Clint Shubel also joins the McChrystal Group from CAS Safety
Consulting. During his tenure as Assistant Sonoma County Sheriff, Clint
served as the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office DOC IC during the 2017
Sonoma Complex fires. His additional expertise is in fire prevention,
emergency action plans, and general health and safety responsibilities
related to the construction industry.
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Item: 14.D.
Meeting Date: 10/13/2025
To: City Council
From: Christian Horvath, Assistant to the City Manager / City Clerk
Thru: Karina Bañales, City Manager
Subject: Receive and file a verbal report on the Rolling Hills Community Association's request
to host a Salvation Army donation drive in the City Hall parking lot
Background:
None.
Discussion:
None.
Fiscal Impact:
None.
Recommendation:
Receive and file. Provide direction to staff.
Attachments:
None
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